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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purposes of this manuscript are (1) to examine the system
of the visual arts in light of its historical development; (2) to propose an aesthetic theory which is appropriate to such development; and
(3) to describe the implications of such a theory for art education.
We now call such diverse objects as prehistoric cave paintings, Maori
war clubs, Cretan pottery, Greek kouros figures, medieval illuminated
manuscripts, paintings of the Italian Renaissance, Amish quilts, abstract paintings of the twentieth century, enlarged comicbook figures,
photographs of space and "earthworks" works of art.

When we consider

the real diversity of such objects, it becomes apparent that for an
aesthetic theory to deal successfully with such a heterogeneous group
of objects it must be an open-textured one; it must allow for all of
these objects yet must not be so inclusive as to allow any object to be
viewed as a work of art.

Such a theory is that of the Artworld, that

is, a theory of art as a social practice.

It is the contention of this

manuscript that the Artworld originated in the Renaissance period of
Western history and gradually evolved into the practice of the visual
arts ·.vith t,.ihich we are now familiar.

It is also the contention of

this manuscript that the practice of art as it now exists is based on
the autonomy of the work of art, that is, that the work of art is
created primarily to be viewed and appreciated.
1
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Chapters II through IV will examine the historical development
of the Artworld.

Chapter II will consider the birth of the Artworld

in the Renaissance and the various currents which met at this time to
originate the concept of the Artworld.

The period of the Renaissance

saw the initial changes of the medieval art product to the art object,
of the craftsman to artist, and the shift in audience from the general
population to a smaller group of educated laymen, or connoisseurs.
These initial changes were intensified during the Mannerist and Baroque
periods by a self-conscious attitude toward the creation of art, by the
concept of artistic genius and by the introduction of art theory which
addressed the aims and nature of the creative act.
will be examined in Chapter III.

These developments

Chapter IV will examine developments

in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which were witness to the
formalization of the Artworld.

These developments include published

criticism, museums and galleries, and the installation of critics and
curators as
also saw the

impor~ant
a~ergence

tems of study.

arbiters of taste in the Artworld.

This period

of art history and aesthetics as specific sys-

All of these gradual steps leading to a formal practice

also reflect the emergence of the work of art as autonomous.

They also

lead to what I have termed the "museum context," that is, the subordination of utilitarian contexts of objects brought into the Artworld
to the demands of aesthetic interest.
Chapter V will examine the institutional theory of art of George
Dickie.

In his institutional analysis he describes the artworld as a

loose coalition of artists, presenters and audience who are governed
by the

prL~arJ

and secondary conventions of the artworld.

However, in
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an attempt to keep the theory open-ended, he has permitted his artworld to be so open-ended that no institutional analysis is possible.
By applying John Rawls' definition of an institution to the basic concept of the artworld, we may define membership, office holders, procedures and the conventions which define the work of art.
convention is

th~

The primary

agreement of artist and audience that they are en-

gaged in a formal activity, and that activity is the creation and
viewing of the autonomous work of art.

The secondary conventions in-

clude the handling of the plastic elements, the history and theory
surrounding the artwork.

Membership is acquired by acknowledgment of

the primary convention and some knowledge of

t~e

secondary conventions.

Office holders obtain offices by publicly demonstrating their expert
knowledge of the conventions.

Artworks are defined as such in a

public manner by the office holders in their presentation of the works
to the members of the Artworld or by the artist in a private sense by
the act of creation.

Chapter VI is an institutional analysis of pho-

tography and is based on the premise that if the theory of the Artworld
which I will

adv~~ce

is indeed a good analytical tool, then the con-

fusions which seem to exist about photography will be explicated.
In light of the elitist nature of the Artworld, its insertion into
a mass educational system would seem to produce a basic dichotomy.
Chapter VII will examine this basic dichotomy, that of the exlusive
nature of the Artworld and the democratization of the art experience
within the mass education system, and the implications this dichotomy
has for art education.
the

teachL~g

One implication is the substantial increase in

of the secondary conventions of the Artworld to students

4

as potential members of the Artworld.

Another implication is the

teaching of a visual education based not solely on the conventions of
the Artworld but rather on conventions more readily accessible to students of mass education, that is, those worlds of the "mass arts."
Before beginning this study, I would like to comment upon several points which are germane to the following text.

The first concerns

the view that the Artworld originated in the Renaissance.

At this

point in time, we are accustomed to viewing the visual, musical, theatrical and literary works of past cultures as works of art.

This at-

titude is so ingrained that we do not consider the utilitarian contexts in which these objects were created.

Indeed, information about

these contexts has often been lost in the centuries or has been clouded
by current perspectives.

In an article describing the genesis and de-

velopment of the modern system of the arts, Paul Oskar Kristeller has
noted:
If the absence of a scheme of the fine arts before the eighteenth
century and its fluctuations in that century have escaped the
attention of most historians, this merely proves how thoroughly
and irresistibly plausible the scheme has become to modern
thinkers and writers.l
I would extend these comments not only to the system of the arts but to
L~e

autonomous nature of

tr~

work of art.

a gradual "awakening'' on th.e part of

bott~

In other words, I perceive
artist and audience si::tce the

Renaissance to the creation of a work which was bereft of a utilitarian
context, which was created to be viewed and appreciated.

I have de-

scribed this as a "gradual awakening" because I think it was an evolution in the way the work of art was perceived; this evolution was begun
in the Renaissance and was completed by the nineteenth century.

We are

5

cognizant to an extent of this change in the perception of the artwork,
but I think that it must be fully understood to understand in turn the
nature of the Artworld and the conventions which have accrued since this
change.

As Kristeller has noted, a modern attitude may be so perva-

sive that we do not notice its presence in an analysis of the past.
examining the Artworld, I

thL~k

In

we must be fully cognizant of the

changes begun in the Renaissance.
In connection with this change in the perception of the artwork,
I will use the terms "art product" and "crafts" to describe artworks
made before the Renaissance, particularly those made in the medieval
times.

I will do this to delineate their utilitarian nature and their

quotidian place in life.

I in no way intend these terms to connote a

negative or derogatory meaning.

I am in no way suggesting that they

lack qualities which can be appreciated, nor that a sense of these
qualities was absent from their making.

Rather, I am suggesting that

the sense of design of their makers was bound to the utilitarian context of the object, whether that context was one of use, religion or ·
magic.
It should also be noted that L'"l using the term "Artworld" I am
referring to a social practice.

In suggesting that there are

perim~

eters to the Artworld, I am referring only to actions which are perceivable as either belonging to the practice or to some other practice.
The "ground" of the Artworld exists in the activities and relationships
of human beings involved in

~~e

positories of the art·,..,ork.

Thus, the term "L'"lstitution" is -:..1sed only

arts; it does not reside in the re-

in a broad sociological meaning, that is, a pattern of behavior by a

6

group of people which is organized and is understood by the participants.
I would also like to note the description of the Artworld in
terms of birth and maturation.

If we think of a newborn child, we do

not expect the child to exhibit all of the traits of an adult nor to
exhibit even the traits of a more mature child.

The newborn, while

holding these traits in potentiality, is expected to be immature, is
expected to be an as yet unformed possibility.

In the same way, the

Artworld of the Renaissance cannot be expected to exhibit all of the
traits of a fully matured Artworld.

However, just as we examine the

newborn infant for future developments and characteristics, so we should
search for the patterns in the newborn Artworld which may come to
fruition at a time in the future.

In the same way, we must examine

the centuries following the Renaissance as a maturation period for the
Artworld.

As the child grows, he aecomes less egocentric, more aware

of the social conventions that surround his behavior and, at the same
time, more self-aware.

For the Artworld, the centuries following the

Renaissance provided such a period of growth and development, a period
of self-discovery and formalization of behavior.
Finally, I would like to note that I will limit my comments to
the visual arts, simply because this is my area of expertise.

I be-

lieve the theory of the Artworld which I will describe is certainly
applicable to the theatre or to music and probably to the study of
literature.

Each of the arts has evolved into a definable practice

and during this process has become a formalized entity.
lowed some sequence of growth which has witnessed the

Each has fol-

acc~~ulation

of
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conventions that govern the practice.

However, the evolution of these

arts will not be addressed in this manuscript, nor will their current
status be discussed except in passing reference to their intersection
with the visual arts.

Notes:
1 Paul Oskar Kristeller, "The Modern System of the Arts: A
Study in the History of Aesthetics (II)," The Journal of the History of
Ideas 13 (January 1952): 45.

•

CHAPTER II

THE RENAISSANCE: BIRTH OF THE AR'l'WORLD

Introduction
The modern Artworld, composed of artists and audience, performances and museums, works of art intended to be aesthetically appreciated
and theories which discuss art, is a phenomenon familiar to most people
today.

However, this familiar Artworld has not always existed in its

current form.
museums~

Medieval Europe knew little of artists and nothing of

the Polynesian carver certainly did not believe he was making

a "work of art."

How then did the modern Artworld come about?

It is

my intention in this chapter to demonstrate that a set of circumstances
came together during the Renaissance to give birth to the Artworld, and
that the informal nature of the Artworld gradually matured or evolved
into a more formal institution.
This chapter deals with the Renaissance and with the various
elements that combined to see the art object emerge from the medieval
art product, the artist separate from the craftsman, and a gap widen
between the art establishment and the general public.
that are explored within this chapter are

~~e

The elements

technological changes

which affected the practice of art, discoveries internal to the arts,
the role of a theoretical approach to art, the changing status of the
artist, the involvement of laymen in a critical position and the establishment of academies.

However, before we begin, it is perhaps best to

examine a few terms that will be used in the following pages.
8
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First, the term "Renaissance" must be clarified.

For the pur-

pose of our discussion, I would like to include what is commonly called
the Proto-Renaissance within the general category of the Renaissance
so that the

ti~me-frame

sixteenth centuries.

is inclusive of the fourteenth through the early
Paul Oskar Kristeller has remarked on the am-

biguity involved in tJ."l.e term "Renaissance" and has concluded:
I . • . prefer to define the Renaissance as that historical period
which understood itself as a Renaissance or rebirth of letters
and of learning, whether the reality conformed to this claim or
not. Yet I think it is still safer to avoid even this questionable
commitment, and to identify the Renaissance with the historical
period that extends roughly from 1300 to 1600 A.D. and that has
been conventionally designated by that name.l
Although Kristeller ends the Renaissance at 1600, I would rather hold
to the feeling of Kristeller's definition and end the Renaissance period with the emergence of the Mannerists at roughly 1520.

In using the

time-frame from 1300 to the second decade of the sixteenth century, I
believe that the changes in the making and viewing of art seem less
startling and more understandable as an evolutionary process which was
part of the complex growth of Western culture during this period.
Second, in order to delineate the work produced by the medieval
craftsman and the Renaissance artist, I use the terms "art product"
and "art object."

Both refer to the work of art, but the change in

terms is used to denote the attitudinal changes within the maker and
viewer of art in the Middle Ages and in the Renaissance.

"Art product"

is the w-ork of a craftsman, "art object" is the work of an artist.
Whether we are looking at a page from the Book of Kells, Simone
Martini's Annunciation or Durer's The Four Apostles, we are viewing a
work of art and an aesthetic object; we do so as persons of the twen-
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tieth century who are familiar with the fully matured Artworld.

Yet

the illuminator, Martini and Durer would have looked at the products
of their labor quite differently; it is this difference that the terms
"art product" and "art object" refer to.

Both are different from

"aesthetic object" which is not used until there is a full system of
aesthetic theory.2
Third, I use the term "utilitarian" in the widest sense possible.
By "utilitarian" I mean the use to which an object is put and I am not
restricting the use to a purely physical sense.
see

~~e

immediate purpose of a window -- to provide light and keep the

elements out.
used.

For example, we can

Windows are used much

~~

way a spoon or a spade is

However, the stained glass windows of the medieval cathedral also

provided decoration for the church, education in the Church's rich
pageantry for the illiterate and inspiration for prayer.
wL~dows

Thus the

served purposes which went beyond a narrow usage of utilitarian.

It is this wider sense that I would like to employ, so

tr~t

I am not

restricting an object's use to a purely physical sense.
With these distinctions in mind, let us turn to the Renaissance
and the birth of the Artworld.
Technological/Internal Discoveries
The Renaissance was a

tL~e

on a new and exciting character.

when Western Europe seemed to take
Within the space of two hundred years

towns had replaced the feudal manor as

tr~e

hub of activity; trade and

the fervor of exploration had supplanted t:.he ::nedieval meditative
spirit; and a :?:ising middle class, combined tvith an increasing cen-
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tralized royal authority, had overcome the feudal system itself.
Greater availability of classical manuscripts, the shift from Scholasticism to a broader approach to philosophy and science, and the influence of Italian humanism combined to broaden intellectual horizons
as the physical horizons had been expanded.

Art was no less suscepti-

ble to this changing tempo than any other facet of life; in fact, the
changes were perhaps nowhere else so tangible.

The Renaissance marked

a turning point in the history of art and it marked the beginning of
the modern Artworld; it was a time of breaking away from medieval traditions and forming a new way of making art and looking at art.

During

this period painting was freed from the walls (fresco painting) and
the manuscript page, sculpture from architectural detail, and the
artist from the status of craftsman.

The medieval ars began the tran-

sition to Beaux Arts and in the process created the aesthetic object,
an object whose purpose was to be appreciated in a special manner.

The

result of the ascendancy of the aesthetic object was to create a chasm
between the "Fine Arts" and the ''utilitarian crafts," between the artist and the craftsman.

The practice and appreciation of the Fine Arts

then became a special practice -- the Artworld.

The Artworld existed

outside the normal activities of day-to-day life, and its boundaries
were delineated by a set of conventions that divided initiates from
non-initiates, practitioners from non-practitioners, and art objects
from non-art objects.

As with any other institution, these conventions

began informally and gradually became formal in nature.

However, it is

in the period of the Renaissance that these informal conventions becarne apparent and laid the foundations for a more formal approach.

12

Technological advancements, cultural change and the emergence of the
individual from the society all contributed not only to the "rebirth"
of

~~e

classical period but also to the birth of the modern Artworld.
Through all of the changes during the Renaissance ran the

thread of technological advances.

These ranged from innovations in

mining, manufacturing, and agriculture to development of precision instruments, chart and map making, and the building of ships and roads.
The last of these was extremely important as better communication from
various points of the continent contributed much to the dissemination
of ideas.

The process of paper making also made its appearance in

Europe at this time.

The first European paper factory was founded at

Padua in 1340, and by 1450 paper was in common use throughout all
Europe.

A related invention -- and probably the most important in-

vention of the period -- was that of moveable type, making the printing
of multiple copies feasible.

In 1423 Coster of Harlem made the first

engraved single page, and by 1456 Gutenberg and Faust had printed the
Bible.

As the new roads had made communications easier and quicker, so

paper making and moveable type made the dissemination of ideas much
quicker.

Both paper making and engraving also added to the dissemina-

tion of artistic styles by making one artist or group of artists aware
of what other artists were doing.
~ade

This was because engravings could be

in multiple copies, were relatively cheap in materials, time and

labor, and easily portable -- especially when contrasted with frescoes
or architectural sculpture.

In addition, the low price of paper en-

abled the artist to do more in the way of preliminary sketches and
studies from nature which were saved for future reference, often in
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notebook form.

Another aspect of the changing technology was the

shift from fresco to tempera to oil as a medium and wall to wood panel
to canvas as a painting surface.

Jan van Eyck is credited with the

first successful use of oils -- although oils had been used for a period of time with tempera or on a tempera ground -- and Botticelli's

Birth of Venus, ca. 1480, is done on

c~~vas.

As in most cases, the

technology would have been irrelevant had not the desire for change
been present.

To the north, Gothic architecture left little room or

possibility for fresco murals and the very style of book illuminators
led them to change from the page to the panel.

Helen Gardner points to

this change in Northern painters:
Toward the end of the fourteenth century, illuminations began to
take on the character of independent paintings, expanding upon the
page until they occupied it completely. By about 1400, these new
forces generated in miniatures seem to demand larger surfaces, and
the shift was made to panel painting.3
In the South, this change from wall to panel was not as rapid nor direct because of both the different architecture which had plenty of
room for mural painting and the predominance of patronage over free
trade; nevertheless, it did occur.

I believe the important point here

is that the technological advances combined with the growing needs of
the painter to help remove painting from the close association with
architecture and decoration that it had during the Middle Ages and
provided it with. a "space" and place of its own.

The painting became

an entity in itself, a special area delineated by its frame.
If we examine the sculptured figures of the Gothic and Renaissance we can see the same tendency toward the creation of a selfcontained space which becomes the art object.

The jamb figures of the

14
Royal Portal of Chartres Cathedral, ca. 1145-1170, can be viewed primarily as an integral part of the building facade (see figure 1).
They do not "reach beyond" the building because they are such an integral part of the building itself.

This is not to say that they do not

hold aesthetic interest for us today, for they surely do; rather, when
they were created they were made as part of the building and were not
viewed as a separate entity in themselves.

In contrast, we can view

Donatello's St. Mark which was created for the Or San Michele in
Florence in the early part of the fifteenth century (figure 2).
only does the classical influence show in

~~e

Not

distributed weight, the

flowing drapery, or the less stylized features, but also in the fact
that the statue is more indicative of a figure for a niche in the
building than an integral part of the architectural features.

An even

more conclusive figure can be seen in Donatello's David, the first freestanding nude figure since Roman times (figure 3).

Gardner describes

this figure in the following way:
The nude as such had been proscribed in the Christian Middle Ages
both as indecent and idolatrous, and was shown only rarely, and
then only in biblical or moralizing context, like the Adam and
Eve story or descriptions of sinners in hell. Donatello reinvented the classical type, even though in this case we have neither
god nor athlete but the young David, slayer of Goliath, biblical
ancestor and antitype of Christ, and symbol of the Florentine love
of liberty • . • Although the body has an almost Praxitelean radiance and a sensuous quality unknown to medieval figures, David
is involved in a complex psychological drama unknown to antique
sculpture. The glance of this youthful, still adolescent hero is
not directed primarily toward the severed head of Golia~~ but
toward his own graceful, sinuous body, as though, in consequence
of his heroic deed, he were becoming conscious for the first time
of its beauty, its vitality, and its strength. This selfawareness, this discovery of the self, is, as we have stressed, a
dominant theme in Renaissance art.4

Figure 1: Detail, jamb figures,
Royal Portal, Chartres, early
twelfth century.

Figure 2: St. Mark, Donatello,
Donatello, 1411-13.

Figure 3: David,
Donate1lo, 1430-32.

.....

U1
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The above described "self-awareness" was shown not only in the emerging individualism of the Renaissance but in the increasing "selfawareness" of the space in which

t..~e

work of art was set.

While this visual framing may seem a relatively minor point, I
think it is very important because it released painting and sculpture
from their dependence upon the architecture in which they were embedded.
As long as painting and sculpture were closely associated with other
objects, they also shared the context, and to some extent, the meaning,
of the other object.

Thus, the altar panels in a church were very much

locked into the context of a church and the meaning of religious ritual.
A framed painting, however, began to lose the close contextual association and could be viewed as something in itself.

This is not to say

that the painting was, at the moment of its first framing, seen as an
aesthetic object.

That was another and more complex step.

It is merely

argued here that the changes in the technology of the arts affected, to
a degree, the way that the arts were presented.

In a like way, the way

they were presented affected the way that they were perceived.
Other currents which seemed to meet in the Renaissance and
change the course of the arts were "internal discoveries" within the
arts.

The most important of these was the use of linear perspective,

generally credited to Brunelleschi (1377-1446).

This new "optical

..,or!.d" affected painti."lg in two ways: it provided a theoretical basis
for painting and it turned the painter's vision to the study of nature.
Perspective used a great deal of geometry and was thought to be mathematical in nature; and as such was thought to possess a theoretical
precision and accuracy

~~at

previously painting had lacked.

Particu-
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larly within the new "picture space," that is, the framed or delineated space, perspective brought the suggestion of a window open
upon reality, that is, a selected and arranged moment from life.
Gardner states:
This discovery was of enormous importance, making for what has
been called the rationalization of sight, the bringing of our
random and infinitely various visual sensations under a simple
rule that is expressible mathematically • • • There is little
doubt that perspective, with its new mathematical authority and
certitude, conferred a kind of esthetic legitimacy from the fact
that it rnade the picture measurable and exact. 5
By "measurable," I think Gardner is indicating the artist's feeling of
an increased ability to replicate at will what was seen and also the
ability to "check" the work he had done in a somewhat scientific manner.

The Renaissance artist believed that the mathematical foundation

of perspective gave the artist criteria by which he could correct mistakes -- and perceive that he had made the mistakes.

We will return to

the role of theory in the development of the Fine Arts at a later
point; suffice it to say at this point that perspective provided the
lir~

between painting and theory.
Perspective also gave the artist the tools to approach nature in

an objective and investigative manner.

This is not to say that the me-

dieval art maker did not draw from nature; rather, he approached nature
in a less analytic manner.

For example, Villard de Honnecourt writing

in the thirteenth century notes: "You should know that this lion was
also drawn from life."6

However, this note appears at the end of a

description of medieval lion taming which suggested that a lion could
be manipulated by beating two dogs within the lion's sight.

Both the

description and the sketch (figure 4} demonstrate a creduious attitude
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Figure 4: Sketch Book, Villard de Honnecourt, 13th century.

that lacks the scientific objectivity of the Renaissance artist.

Per-

haps the key to the difference hetween the medieval and Renaissance
artist's attitude toward the natural world lies in the word "analytic."
The medieval art maker used his perceptions of the world in a general
sense

~~d

as an expression of his faith; his attention was given to an

internal as well as an external world .

His perceptions were not ob-

tained through systematic study, investigations or experimentation.

In

contrast, the Renaissance artist isolated and dissected the particulars
of the world around him to better understand the world and to put his
work on a firm theoretical foundation; he based these investigations
on scientific objectivity and experimentation as they existed at t he
time.

So we might say that "analytic" carried connotations of scien-
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tific objectivity and a theoretical nature to the Renaissance artist
that would not have interested the medieval art maker because fidelity
to images of this world was not his main concern.

Also, perhaps be-

cause of the weight of medieval tradition which was transmitted through
the guild system and its stable and slow-changing nature, the medieval
art maker learned his craft from the master rather than from an independent study of nature.

Cennino Cennini, writing in The Craftsman's

Handbook, represents a mid-point between medieval and Renaissance
thought.
nature.

He commends copying from a master but also practicing from
For instance, he says: "Having first practiced drawing for a

while as I have taught you • • • take pains and pleasure in constantly
copying the best things which you can find done by the hand of great
masters."?

In a later section he adds:

Mind you, the most perfect steersman that you can have, and the
best helm, lie in the triumphal gateway of copying from nature ••
• . and always rely on this with a stout heart, especially as you
begin to gain some judgment in draftsmanship.a
Despite the mixed metaphor, the message is clear: learn

~~e

oasics first

from copying the best masters; then, as the eye becomes better trained,
work from nature.

Leon Battista Alberti gives a more characteristically

Renaissance view:
• • • there is no more appropriate and sure way than to follow
nature, recalling in what way nature • • . has composed the surfaces well in beautiful bodies. To imitate her in this, it is
necessary to take great thought and pains about it constantly. 9
This trend toward an analytic study of nature reached a culmination in
artist.

~~e

work of Leonardo da Vinci, who was as much scientist as

While he does not forbid studying masters, he gives this

warning: "The painter will produce pictures of little merit if he takes
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the works of others as his standard: but if he will apply himself to
learn from the objects of nature he will produce good results."lO
da Vinci believed nature to be the best master.

This attitude is quite

different from the medieval practice of guild training.
spective was instrumental in this change.

Thus

The use of per-

Perspective aided in the

quest for an analytic way of studying nature in that it gave the artist
tools for checking his accuracy as well as a formal way for observing
nature.
Art Theory
The transition from craftsman to artist, from craft to art, was
in great part due to the increasing role of theory within the visual
arts, to the disintegration of the guilds and their traditions, ana to
the emergence of the idea of the individual.

Theory, as a foundation

for art, provided a way of including the arts within the liberal arts,
thus gaining the artist a status separate and distinct from craftsman;
it also allowed the individual artist to'be recognized as a man of a
particular talent and genius.

The medieval concept of the craftsman

was that he manipulated materials or practiced the "mechanical arts."
With the inclusion of the visual arts within an intellectual sphere,
the status of the artist was elevated, and so was his product.

H.

w.

Janson has noted:
The liberal arts were defined by a tradition going back to Plato,
and comprised ~~e intellectual disciplines necessary for a gentleman's education • • • ; the fine arts were excluded because they
were "handiwork," lacking a theoretical basis. Thus, when the
artist gained admission to this select group, the nature of his
work had to be redefined: he was acknowledged as a man of ideas,
rather than a mere manipulator of materials; and the work of art
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came to be viewed more and more as the visible record of his
creative mind. This meant that art need not -- indeed, should
not -- be judged by fixed standards of craftsmanship; soon everything that bore the imprL~t of a great master -- drawings,
sketches, fragments, unfinished pieces -- was eagerly collected,
regardless of its incompleteness.ll
The ancient distinction between thought and manual labor which relegated the visual arts and their practitioners to a lesser status began
to be challenged at tile beginning of the fifteenth century, first by
the addition of a theoretical basis and later by being compared with
another artistic endeavor, poetry.

Cennini, writing in the spirit of

the Middle Ages, made one of the first tentative moves toward the inelusion of the visual arts within a theoretical context.

He wrote:

Man afterward [after the fall] pursued many useful occupations,
differing from each other; and some were, and are, more theoretical
than others; they could not all be alike, since theory is the most
worthy. Close to that, man pursued some related to the one which
calls for a basis of that, coupled with skill of hand: and this is
an occupation known as painting, which calls for imagination, and
skill of hand, in order to discover things not seen, hiding themselves under the shadow of natural objects, and to fix them with
the hand, presenting to plain sight what does not actually exist.
And it justly deserves to be enthroned next to theory, and to be
crowned with poetry.l2
'1'he "theory" that Cennini refers to is the world of ideas, and he ineludes painting within this world not on the basis of its rationality
but on almost a mystical basis.

It is interesting to note that Cennini

emphasizes the use of the imagination in painting.
not

~~e

This is certainly

scientific theor] introduced later in the Renaissance, nor is

it a sense of inventiveness based on the reality of nature; rather, it
is almost a pre-scientific attitude, one in which it is claimed that
the artist can unlock the mysteries of nature with his perceptive abilities.

Thus, in a sense, the artist is allowed to participate, albeit
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minimally, in the world of ideas.

As such, theory is a first step in

separating the craftsman, who merely manufactures, from the artist, who
uses knowledge and imagination to create; however, for Cennini, this
separation has not yet taken place.
The next step is provided by Alberti who begins the delineation
between arts that are necessary and useful and those which go beyond
utilitarian concerns.

He wrote:

Our Ancestors have left us many and various Arts tending to the
Pleasure and Conveniency of Life, acquired with the greatest industry and diligence: Which Arts, tho' they all pretend, with a
kind of emulation, to have in view the great end of being serviceable to mankind; yet we know that each of them in particular
has something in it that seems to promise a distinct and separate
Fruit: some Arts we follow for necessity, some we approve for
their usefulness, and some we esteem because they lead us to the
.knowledge of things that are delightful.l3
With this statement we find the first hint of the separation of crafts
and arts -- some of the products that the artist manufactures are neeessary and utilitarian in nature, some go beyond merely utilitarian
concerns and are valuable for another reason.

Alberti not only gives

the suggestion of the separation of crafts and arts, but also gives the
cornerstone of later art theory -- the concept of beauty as an end of
art.

His definition of beauty was a departure from the medieval con-

cept because he used the concept in a sense that was divorced from the
way it had been used by medieval philosophers like Thomas Aquinas:
Alberti applied

~~e

concept of beauty to the visual arts.

I think that

Kristeller's explanation of the use of the term "beauty" in the medieval
epoch is accurate and succinct:
. the concept of beauty that is occasionally discussed by
Aquinas and somewhat more emphatically by a few other medieval
philosophers is not linked with the arts, fine or otherwise, but
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treated prL~arily as a metaphysical attribute of God arid of his
creation • • • Among the transcendentals or more general attributes
of being, pulchrum does not appear in thirteenth-century philosophy, although it is considered as a general concept and treated
in close connection with bonum.l4
One of the most often quoted statements of Aquinas in relation to the
concept of beauty is the following:
for those things are said to be beautiful which please when
seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion, for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is like them -because the sense too is a sort of reason, as is every cognitive
power. Now, since knowledge is by assimilation, and likeness relates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal
cause.lS
However, this statement is not found within a discussion of art but
rather within the context of goodness and is part of a refutation that
goodness is an efficient cause.

In contrast, Alberti offers a defini-

tion of beauty within the context of a discussion of architecture:
In order therefore to be as brief as possible, I shall define
Beauty to be a harmony of all the parts, in whatsoever subject it
appears, fitted together with such proportion and connection, that
nothing cou'd be added, diminished or altered, but for the worse.l6
While the two statements may sound remarkably alike, Aquinas is speaking
of what God makes while Alberti is speaking of what man makes, of the
function of beauty within art.

It is precisely this contextual differ-

ence which marks the separation of medieval and Renaissance thought.
As has been stated, Alberti was directing these remarks to architecture and was distinguishing between beauty as an inherent quality
and Ornament which was an extrinsic quality.

But this same notion of

beauty is found in his other treatises on painting and sculpture.

In

all of these cases, beauty is thought of by Alberti as an idealized entity which requires some manipulation by the artist but which, at the
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same time, is subject to rules.

For example, Alberti related the story

of zeuxis with the following result:
Because he [Zeuxis] thought he could not find in a single figure
among the Crotonians as many aspects of beauty as he sought,
since nature did not give them all to one person, he therefore
selected the five most beautiful girls from all the youth of that
land, to take from them whatever beauty is praised in women • . •
Therefore we should always take what we want to paint from nature,
and always pick out the most beautiful thing·s.l7
Thus we have a rather conflicting notion of beauty as both universal
and particular, but what Alberti seems to be saying is that beauty is
perceived by the viewer as a universal quality, a perfection which
exists in the mind if not always in life.

The artist may have to pick

and choose in his execution of the work to achieve this sense of beauty,
but it will then be recognizable to the viewer as such.

Because of

this notion of beauty, Alberti also made a distinction between personal
taste and artistic judgment which called for an understanding of the
arts on a rational plane:
Whoever wou'd build so as to have their building commended • • •
must build according to a justness or proportion, and this justness
of proportion must be owing Art. vfuo therefore will affirm, that
a handsome and just structure can be raised any otherwise than by
the means of Art? and consequently this part of building, which
relates to beauty and ornament • • • must without doubt be directed
by some rules of art and proportion • • • But there are some who
will by no means allow of this, and say that men are guided by a
variety of opinions in their judgment of beauty and of buildings;
and ~~at the forms of structures must vary according to every man's
particular taste and fancy, and not be tied down to any rules of
Art. A common thing with the ignorant to despise what they do not
understand! • • • I shall only take notice that all Arts were begot by Chance and Observation, nursed by Use and Experience, and
improved and perfected by Reason and Study.l8
Anthony Blunt notes:
Alberti believes that man recognizes beauty not by mere taste,
which is entirely personal and variable and judges of attractiveness, but by a rational faculty which is common to all men and
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leads to a general agreement about which works of art are
beautiful. Beauty, in fact, is detected by a faculty of artistic judgment.l9
In other words, because art is a rational undertaking and has a theoretical basis, it transcends personal taste.
The statements of Alberti by no means had the weight of a systern of
to.

aesthe~ics

at the time they were made, nor were they intended

They were the explorations of an artist who was thinking about the

work of art as art and not as craft.

Nevertheless, the work of Alberti

was an important step toward the formation of such an aesthetic.

He

consistently applied a theoretic approach in his writings -- a study of
vision for painting, a system of proportions for sculpture, and a
theory for city planning.
tablishes

~~e

In all of these works, Alberti carefully es-

theoretical basis for each art and encourages the artist

to do likewise.

Alberti wrote:

I like a painter to be as learned as he can in all the liberal
arts, but primarily I desire him to know geometry. I like the
saying of P~~philus, an ancient, most noble painter, with whom the
noble youths began to learn of painting. He held that no painter
could paint well if he did not know a great deal of geometry.20
Alberti is important to the early Renaissance because he made the break
from medieval tradition in the arts complete: he articulated a theoretical approach to the arts and turned the artist's eyes from tradition
to a study of nature.

It should be noted that, because of this theo-

retical approach, Alberti has little to say about the imagination and
its role in the arts; in fact, he somewhat negates the role of imagination in order to emphasize the importance of reason and study, the
theoretical foundations for art.

Blunt notes:
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Seen in relation to his predecessors, Alberti's most striking
characteristics are his rationalism, his classicism, his scientific method, and his complete faith in nature. In relation to the
Neoplatonists of the later Quattrocento, the feature which stands
out most is the complete absence of the idea of imagination in his
writings. Everything is attributed to reason, to method, to imitation, to measurement; nothing to the creative faculty. And this
is quite logical. The artists of the early Quattrocento whose
ideas he expresses were entirely occupied with exploring the visible universe which they had so recently discovered. 21
If Alberti brought theory to art, da Vinci might be said to have
married the two.

He was a learned man, as well read and as well versed

in the classics as Alberti.

He brought to painting an attitude of

modern scientific observation, that is, experimentation and direct observation.

His notebooks are full of the observations he made on a wide

variety of subjects -- from anatomy to zoology.

His work in anatomy

alone demonstrates the amazing quality of his scientific observations.
His devotion to what he would call a scientific approach to painting is
demonstrated again and again throughout the Notebooks: "Practice should
always be based upon a sound knowledge of theory, of which perspective
is the guide and gateway, and without it nothing can be done well in any
kind of painting."22

And, "The painter who draws by practice and judg-

ment of the eye without the use of reason, is like the mirror that reproduces within itself all the objects which are set opposite to it
•.o~ithout kl"!.OWledge of the same. n23

He even defines "perspective" in

terms of its scientific appeal: "Perspective is a rational demonstration
whereby experience confirms how all things transmit their images to the
eye by pyramidal lines."24
~~at

This definition also points to the value

da Vinci placed on experience, that is, what is directly observable.

He believed that art was a science, and in that light could be verified
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as accurate and could be judged.

Blunt comments:

Considered as a kind of knowledge, the art of painting is to be
judged by two standards: the certainty of its premisses and
methods, and the completeness of the ~~owledge represented by
its productions.25
In other words, both process and product could be judged in a scientific way.

Furthermore, while the painting is in progress, da Vinci

encouraged the comments of other artists and laymen, believing that the
artist could become too involved with the painting to remain objective
and accurate.

While this cannot be heralded as the birth of criticism,

it is the first time that an artist is recorded as having asked for
criticism from both fellow artists and laymen.

And it indicated the

beginning of judgment of painting in terms of the painting rather than
in terms of the purpose of the painting.
But even as da Vinci espoused the scientific aspects of art, he,
unlike Alberti, allowed the presence of imagination in his view of art.
This was not the mystical imagination of Cennini but was closer to the
modern ideas of talent and creativity.

Giving precepts to the painter,

da Vinci states:
For these, then, and other reasons which might be given, you should
apply yourself first of all to drawing, in order to present to the
eye in visible form the purpose and invention created originally
in your imagination~ then proceed to take from it or add to it .
until you satisfy yourself; then have men arranged as models
draped or nude in the way in which you have disposed them in your
work; and make the proportions and size in accordance with perspective, so that no part of the work remains that is not so
counselled by reason and by the effects in nature.26
The key phrase here is "present to the eye in visible form the purpose
and invention created originally in your imagination," but I have ineluded the rest of the passage to indicate where in da Vinci's scheme
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he placed the imagination.

He gives imagination the role of insti-

gator in the creative process and "reason" the place of "judge" both
in process and product.

In another place, da Vinci makes this clear:

"The idea or the faculty of imagination is both rudder and bridle to
the senses, inasmuch as the thing imagined moves the sense." 27

In a

sense, then, according to da Vinci, the imagination has a central place
in the creative process, a place that cannot be fulfilled by reason
alone.

He believed that mathematics could be learned by consistent ef-

fort; painting, on the other hand, needed a student with imagination
as well as a purely analytic ability. 28

However, it must be reiterated

that imagination drew from the images of nature and that it worked
hand-in-hand with reason to form the finished product.

It is important

to note that painting, in da Vinci's view, was a creative process, not
merely manipulation of materials nor solely intellectual.
Da Vinci also had a definite opinion on the position of the
visual arts.
poetry.

In an oft-quoted passage, he compared painting with

Poetry's position within the liberal arts was firmly estab-

lished and the comparison between poetry and art helped to elevate
painting, and eventually the other visual arts.

He begins his argument

by asserting that vision is the most important sense -- which is consis·tent with his view that sense experience is the basis for knowledge29 -- and that vision gives the most accurate representation of
reality.

He then points to the poet's reliance upon the verbal:

Although the poet has as wide a choice of subject as the painter,
his creations fail to afford as much satisfaction to mankind as
do paintings, for while poetry attempts to represent forms, actions
and scenes with words, the painter employs the exact images of
these forms in order to reproduce them. Consider, then, which
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is more fundamental to man, the name of man or his image? The
name changes with change of country; the form is unchanged except
by death. And if the poet serves the understanding by way of the
ear, the painter does so by the eye, which is the nobler sense.30
Thus, in terms of portraying a concrete reality, one that is perceivable and measurable, painting is superior to poetry; if painting
is superior to poetry, then it should be valued at least as much as
poetry and placed among intellectual pursuits.

Da Vinci continues the

argument by noting the non-mechanical nature of painting:
You have set painting among the mechanical arts! Truly were
painters as ready equipped as you are to praise their own works
in writing, I doubt whether it would endure the reproach of so
vile a name. If you call it mechanical because it is by manual
work that the hands represent what the imagination creates, your
writers are setting down with the pen by manual work what originates in the mind.31
This is an important passage because he emphasized the intellectual
nature of painting and equated the pen and the brush as tools of each
respective medium.

It is also important because it sets aside painting

from the mechanical arts.

He pressed this point in a comparison of

painting and sculpture, where he cited painting as being the more intellectual and demanding art of the two.

However, he believed that

sculpture also possessed enough of an intellectual basis to be separated
from the mechanical arts.

In this way, painting and sculpture were

made different from the mechanical arts because they involved the use
of the intellect while the mechanical arts involved the use of formula
without thought.

The role of theorj in this process of separation was

crucial for it formed the basis of the involvement of the intellect in
areas that had previously been merely "mechanical."
This separation of the arts was initially informal in nature;
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the Fine Arts were not yet named as such nor had they evolved to the
point where the theoretical basis was entrenched enough to be challenged by new theories and new schools of painting.

While different

styles of painting existed during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the notion of "schools" of art did not yet exist.

Theory up to

this point had served two related purposes: giving the visual arts a
systematic and abstract foundation and, because of this foundation,
elevating them to membership in the liberal arts.

However, it had not

received a doctrinal status yet; it was still a practical guide for the
artist.

Erwin Panofsky notes:

The purpose of art theory as it was developed in the fifteenth
century was primarily practical, only secondarily historical and
apologetic, and in no way speculative. That is, it aimed at
nothing more than, on the one hand, to legitimize contemporary art
as the genuine heir of Greco-Roman antiquity and to wrest a place
for it among the artes liberales by enumerating its dignity and
merits1 and, on the other hand, to provide artists with firm and
scientifically grounded rules for their activity.32
It was during the sixteenth century that the Fine Arts began to be
readily recognized as something separate from

~;e

crafts and that

artistic theory began the transition to aesthetic theory.

Blunt

connnents:
the painter, sculptor, and architect obtained recognition as
educated men, as members of H~~anist society. Painting, sculpture,
and architecture were accepted as liberal arts, and are now
grouped together as activities closely allied to each other and
all differL"lg fundamentally from the manual crafts. The idea of
the "Fine Arts" comes into existence this way, though a single
phrase is not attached co them till the middle of the sixteenth
century, when they come to be known as the Arti di disegno. At
the same time critics begin to have the idea of a work of art as
something which is justified simply by its beauty and which is a
luxury product.33
The first step toward the autonomous artwork had been taken.
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Individualism in the Visual Arts
As in the early Renaissance when a series of currents ran together to change the direction of Western art, so in the late Renaissance several factors met -- not to change the direction of art, but
rather to deepen and widen the channel first formed in the early
Renaissance.

These factors were the acknowledgment of the artist as a

creative individual and a transition from art theory as a practical
guide to art theory as speculation on the nature of the creative process.

Central to both of these factors was the changing view toward

the individual involved in the visual arts -- from craftsman to artist
and from communal worker to a singular creative genius.
The individual craftsman of the Middle Ages existed as a cog in
the machinery of artistic production, as part of a group effort to meet
the demands of commissioned work.

The workshop was a collaboration of

master, journeymen and apprentices, all of whom contributed in varying
degrees to the finished product.

And the finished products were not

just paintings or sculptures but rather a wide variety of everyday products from armorial bearings and flags to patterns for carpet-weavers
and embroiderers.

The medieval craftsman's workshop was essentially a

guild workshop where those who could afford the products went to buy
the objects that they needed or wanted to use.

Painters belonged to

the Guild of St. Luke which also included saddlers, glassworkers, mirror-workers and others.

The communal concept and its weight upon the

medieval craftsman is apparent; this influence lingered well into the
early Renaissance.

Hauser states:
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The artist's studio of the early Renaissance is still dominated by
the communal spirit of the mason's lodge and the guild workshop;
the work of art is not yet the expression of an independent personality, emphasizing his individuality and excluding himself from
all extraneous influences. The claim independently to shape the
whole work from the first stroke to the last and the inability
to co-operate with pupils and assistants are first noticeable in
Michelangelo, who, in this respect too, is the first modern
artist. Until the end of the fifteenth century the artistic
labour process still takes place entirely in collective forrns.34
The guild system lost its predominance over artistic activity for a
variety of reasons: the collapse of feudalistic society, the increasing
amount of trade and commerce, the emergence of some masters who were
more sought after than others, and the broadening arena of patronage.
It might be noted here that where medieval craftsmen served Church and
nobility, the artist of the Renaissance received patronage from Church,
an increased nobility, and

~~e

merchant class.

This broadened patronage

and also meant in the South that the artist travelled more, thereby
loosening guild restrictions.
ing with

~~e

This long process might be seen as end-

case of the Guild vs. Giovanni Battista Paggi in 1590

where the courts found in favor of Paggi and asserted his rights to be
a painter in Genoa even though he had not received guild training.

The

freedom from guild restrictions and the broadening public interest contributed much to the interpretation of the artist as an individual.
Blunt remarks: "In his new freedom the artist was no longer a purveyor
of goods which every one needed and which could be ordered like any
other material goods, but an individual facing a public." 35

This

sense of artist as individual creator also caused a kind of competition
that would have been unheard of in the medieval workshop.

Students be-

gan seeking out certain masters because of their reputations; noble
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families employed those artists who were well-known and well though of;
a town would hire an artist whose reputation would enhance their own.
By the middle of the sixteenth century the medieval communal aspect
had been laid to rest and the modern concept of the artist as creative
individual was born.

Blunt remarks:

The artist was now faced with a wide public consisting of educated
people, not merely of Church officials and a few princes, which
he attempted to attract by his art; and in this spirit of competition he began to carry out works other than those directly
commissioned. The artist was still closely tied to his public,
and most of his work was commissioned. The days of exhibitions
were yet a long way off.36
The feature of competition between individual artists also influenced
the product of their work: their work came to be valued as the special
product of a special talent.

Bernard Myers comments:

[During the sixteenth century] the individuality of the artist
himself was not undermined; quite the contrary, he became a very
significant figure indeed. He was no longer the simple guild
artisan working for a local patron but more often an important
social being, a free agent whose art (the product of his studio
instead of his workshop) was much sought after by pope and prince.
With his liberation from the guild, the object of art became an
"aesthetic object" of interest to collectors and to dealers.37
It must be cautioned that the term "aesthetic object" in the above passage does not have its full modern connotations; instead, the phrase
connotes an object set aside from utilitarian concerns, an object which
might be considered beautiful or delightful but which does not yet have
the weight of aesthetic theory attached to it.

It must also be added

that the reference to "collectors" and "dealers" carries somewhat different connotations from the modern sense.

The collectors in the South

were, for the most part, clergy and nobility who used art as much to
enhance their own status as to simply appreciate it.

In the North,
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where there was an active merchant class and fewer powerful noble
families, there was more of an active trade in paintings.

Booksellers,

publishers of engravings, jewellers and innkeepers dealt in art in the
North countries; even framers, who were originally an auxiliary to
painting guilds, became dealers who sold the paintings to a rather
broad clientele. 3A While this trade in art cannot be seen as the same
as modern art trade, it does carry the origins of the modern business
of art.
It was not just the freedom from guild regulations that helped
form the new conception of artist.

The Renaissance emphasis on theory

elevated the visual arts to a higher status; in a like manner, theory
helped elevate the status of the artist from just another craftsman to
a gentleman.

Gardner notes:

We must emphasize again the high value the Renaissance artist
placed upon theory. In his view, if any occupation or profession
were to have dignity and be worthy of honor, it must have an intellectual basis • • • The Renaissance artist strove to make himself a scholar and gentleman, to associate with princes and the
learned, and to rise above the long-standing ancient and medieval
prejudice that saw him as merely a kind of handicraftsman.39
This idea of artist as gentleman was new and was a product of the
Renaissance.

It was more prevalent in the South than North, perhaps be-

cause of Italian humanism and the Italian concept of virt~.

. '

V~rtu

re-

ferred to a sense of personal achievement and enterprise in both thought
and action and was indicative of the rising sense of the individual
within Renaissance society.

While this was not the democratic indi-

vidualism of modern times, it was an acknowledgment of personal merit
which no longer confined great achievement to those of noble birth.
Gardner points to this when she remarks: "Class distinctions and social
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hierarchies had loosened, and men of

arr~ition

and talent could now take

their places even as the friends and companions of princes."40

A mark

of the esteem in which a generally wider group of persons was included
was the proliferation of biographies written about people other than
nobilitY or saints.

Kristeller comments:

Another branch of historical literature that was very much cultivated by the humanists was biography. There was the model of
Plutarch and of other ancient writers, but there obviously was a
great contemporary demand for biographies, not merely of princes
or saints, but also of statesmen and distinguished citizens, of
poets and artists, of scholars and businessmen. Like the portrait painting of the time, the biographical literature reflects
the so-called individualism of the period, that is, the importance
attached to personal experiences, opinions, and achievements, and
the eagerness to see them perpetuated in a distinguished work of
art or of literature.41
Brunelleschi's biography was the first of an artist, Ghiberti's the
first autobiography by an artist.

In 1550 Giorgio Vasari published his

first edition of Lives of the Most EnUnent Painters, Sculptors, and
Architects, a collection of artists' lives who were contemporary with

Vasari and of those who lived in the early Renaissance.

With these

publications the artist joined the ranks of celebrated· personages.
Again, it must be noted that this new status was a great deal different
=rom the anonymity and communal attitude of the medieval craftsman.
was a new way of looking at
view himself.

~~e

It

artist, and a new way for the artist to

Hauser, referring to the biographies and

o~~er

honors

given to artists, states:
All this is the expression of an unmistakable shift of attention
from the works to the personality of the artist. Men begin to be
conscious of creative power in the modern sense, and there are increasing signs of the rising self-respect of the artist. We possess signatures of nearly all the important painters of the
Quattrocento, and Filarete actually expresses a wish that all
artists should sign their works.42
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Hauser also goes on to point to the increased self-consciousness of
artists, demonstrated by the increasing amount of work done without
direct commission.

If one is to work on a painting to satisfy a per-

sonal desire, often ignoring commissioned work for a period of time,
then the implication is of an awareness of talent and vision, a selfconsciousness of one's self as an artist.
had something to say, to

c~nmunicate,

to risk his financial security.

In other words, the artist

that was important enough to him

The medieval workshop would never have

allowed such a pursuit of one's own vision, but more importantly, the
medieval craftsman was not self-conscious of himself as a creator.

H.

w. Janson also points to this changing image of the artist:
Certainly the tendency to view the artist as a sovereign genius,
rather than as a devoted craftsman, was never stronger than during
~~e first half of the sixteenth century.
Plato's concept of
genius -- the spirit entering into the poet that causes him to
compose in a "divine frenzy" -- had been broadened by Marsilio
Ficino and his fellow Neo-Platonists to include the architect, the
sculptor, and the painter. Men of genius were thought to be set
apart from ordinary mortals by the divine inspiration guiding
their efforts, and worthy of being called "divine," "immortal,"
and "creative" (before 1500, creating, as distinct from making,
was the privilege of God alone). 43
I think we must be careful with this statement for several reasons, but
the statement is indicative of the changing perception of the artist,
and Janson is an important art historian whose authority is well accepted.

But before dealing with those issues, it would perhaps be

to place them in the context of Florentine Nee-Platonism.

~est

Marsilio

Ficino, the leader of the Florentine group, was employed by Cosimo de'
Medici in the early 1460's to translate, interpret and teach the works
of Plato, which he did until the 1490's.

During this forty year span

he published a number of works which dealt with Plato, amen them his
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commentary on Plato's Symposium, Theologia Platonica, and a translation
of and commentary on Plotinus.

Central to Ficino's writings, and thus

to the circle of Florentine Neo-Platonists, were the ideas of contemplation, Platonic love, and the immortality of the soul.

Ficino's

notion of beauty was associated with the Good in that beauty kindled a
desire for Good within the soul and aided man in transcending the corporeal.
~J,

Perhaps because of Ficino's background in medicine and astrolo-

this transcendental element had a marked mystical flavor, one that

was far different from medieval Scholasticism.

We will return to a

more detailed discussion of Florentine Nee-Platonism in a later section,
but it should be noted at this point that Ficino was not writing about
art, but rather on theological and philosophical concerns.
So my fi•st concern with Janson's statement is that his emphasis
on Ficino's influence within the arts at the time of his pre-eminent
position in Florence is exaggerated.

Alberti and da Vinci did not sub-

scribe to Nee-Platonic thought, especially not the mystical portions.
Also, it was primarily theological and philosophical in nature and was
not resurrected as a main tenet in art theory until nearly a century
later 'N'hen it was joined with !·1annerist theory.

Panofsky notes:

Ficino's writings were concerned with beauty, but not with art,.
and up to then art theory was not concerned with Ficino. But
now we are confronted with a notable fact of intellectual history:
the mystical, pneumatological theory of beauty associated with
Florentine Neoplatonism was resurrected, after the course of a
whole century, as a Mannerist metaphysics of art.44
.
Second, t.."le "sovereign genius" of Janson's passage might better
be described in more limited terms.

While there were strong personal-

ities during this period, neither the status nor the self-awareness of
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the artist might be described as "sovereign."

Rather, there was an

increasingly self-consciousness within the artist which eventually led
to the widespread acceptance of the concept of genius.

Panofsky notes:

Insofar as the formation of ideas was connected in Renaissance art
theory with observation of nature, it was placed into a realm
that, while not yet that of individual psychology, was nevertheless
no longer that of metaphysics. ~1is was the first step toward
recognizing that which today is called "genius."45
And third, during the Renaissance, the artist was not set apart
from ordinary mortals but rather from the status of craftsman.

How-

ever, despite these problems, Janson does raise an important point -that of the change from "maker" to "creator."

Within this context, the

"maker" connotes the manipulation of materials in a mechanical way
while "creator" implies more than mere manipulation; "creator" signifies origination of a work through the imaginative faculty.

Used with-

in the context of art, it implies not only the use of the imagination
but a freedom from the slavish copy of nature.

As we have seen, in the

early Renaissance copying from nature was important to the artist, perhaps because artists felt that the return to what they thought was a
more realistic portrayal of the natural world needed a certain amount
of direct imitation for a sense of authenticity.

Panofsky points to

this in the following passage:
• nature could be overcome by the artistic intellect, which -not so much by "inventing" as by selecting and improving -- can,
and accordingly should, make visible a beauty never completely
realized in actuality. The constantly repeated admonitions to be
faithful to nature are matched by the almost as forceful exhortations to choose the most beautiful from the multitude of natural
objects, to avoid the misshapen, particularly in regard to proportions, and in general • • • to strive for beauty above and beyond mere truth to nature.46

39

In the latter part of the Renaissance, the artist entered more
and more into the creative process, not just selecting and re-arranging
parts into a more beautiful whole, but allowing a new creative vigor
into their work.
Bucnarroti.

Perhaps the best example of this is Michelangelo

Michelangelo believed deeply in the creative power of the

artist and distrusted other artists' belief in the absolute mathematical
measurability of the natural world.
the creative ability of

~~e

To a great extent, the belief in

artist was based on Nee-Platonism.

Blunt

notes:
For Michelangelo it is by means of the imagination that the
artist attains to a beauty above that of nature, and in this he
appears as a Neoplatonist compared with the rational Alberti. To
him beauty is the reflection of the divine in the material world.47
This Nee-Platonic influence was a strong thread that ran throughout
Michelangelo's life, but not withou certain changes.

In the early

part of his life, Nee-Platonism co-existed with the more scientific attitudes of Alberti and da Vinci; I have said "co-existed" because neither was predominate but both were exhibited.

He studied nature, even

dissecting cadavers for the study of anatomy, but without the sense of
exploration that da Vinci brought to his studies.

During this early

part of his life Michelangelo also displayed Nee-Platonic influences.
To him, the artist was the creator of the artistic product, a product
shaped by his hands but formed in his mind.

The inspiration for the

creation is the Idea, that is, a refined inward

L~age

that is a trans-

formation of the external world and one that is a reflection of the
absolute Idea of Beauty.

In other words, it is the beauty of the

natural world which, in the artist's mind, is made to conform to an
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ideal standard.

For Michelangelo, the artist's inner vision was still

closely tied to the external world, but with the transformation to a
nobler state made within the mind of ~he artist. 48

However, with age

and the increased insecurity of the times, Michelangelo increasingly
emphasized the internal image, the inspiration derived from God, and the
divine gift of talent.

Embedded in this shift was an imperious concern

for his own talent and his own vision.

Blunt comments on this aspect

of Michelangelo:
Painting is no longer talked of as an imitation of nature, and the
artist's interest is diverted almost entirely towards the inward
mental image, which excels everything that can be found in the
visible world •
49
The last part of his life Michelangelo spent in what might be termed
religious fervor; he spent an increasing amount of energy on the pursuit of spiritual rather than temporal beauty, and even recanted his
1evotion to art.

But, in many ways, the earlier portions of his life,

his strong personality, and the Nee-Platonic attitudes of both his
poetry and his work combined to create the image of the Artist, that is,
scmeone set aside from the average man by his talent.

Italians had a

term for Hichelangelo and his 'l'lork: "terribilita -- the sublime shadowed with the awesome and the fearful."SO
The implications of Michelangelo's mystique were far reaching.
Gardner comments:
He mistrusted the application of mathematical methods as guarantees of beauty in proportion • • . Thus, he would set aside
Vitruvius, Alberti, Leonardo, Albrecht Durer, and others who
tirelessly sought the perfect measure, being convinced that the
inspired judgment could find other pleasing proportions, and that
the artist must not be bound except by the demands made by the
realization of the Idea. This insistence upon the artist's own
authority is typical of Michelangelo and anticipates the modern
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concept of the right of talent to a self-expression limited only
by its own judgment.Sl
I think this is an important point: with the mystique of Michelangelo
set in the minds of those dealing with art, the artist's talent and
i~~er

vision were established.

Also, the need for self-expression in

the artist was set up as an alternative for the utilitarian purposes
which had previously motivated artistic production.

The artist was

not only an educated man, but one who possessed special abilities that
set him aside from the ordinary man.

Gradually, over the course of the

next two hundred years, the conception of "genius" became firmly intertwined with the artist and with artistic pursuits.
~~is

A great part of

evolution came about because of the value that was attached to

the process of artistic creation, the step-by-step process of making the
product.

Hauser comments on the increasing value of the internal pro-

cess of the artist:
For the Renaissance, the drawing and ~~e sketch became momentous
not merely as artistic forms, but also as documents and records
of the creative process in art; they were recognized to be a particular form of expression on their own, distinct from the finished work; they were valued because they revealed the process of
artistic invention at its starting-point, where it was almost
completely merged with the subjectivity of the artist.52
During the course of time, both the artist and his product became separated from the normal currents of everyday life -- the artist by ;rirtue of his new status and special ability, and his product through
losing its connection with everJday life; it was no longer the banner
or carpet pattern, but was the work of art.
The emergence of the individual artist, along with the lessening
influence of the guilds, gradually led to another method of teaching
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new generations of artist -- the academy.

During most of the Renais-

sance, the strong personalities and glittering reputations of the major
artists attracted young men who wanted to study with them.

Not only

did the students of a particular master champion his work, but so did
patrons and laymen who were involved with the master.

Myers points to

this development of different "schools" of thought about the visual
arts and their effect on later artists:
There were many "schools" of art during this era, centering about
transcendent personalities like Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo
rather than about workshops, but all had in common the aspiration
toward an ideal human form and an ideal state of being. Grandiose
general statements were made in sculpture and architecture that
were destined to form the basis for later academic practice.
Painting techniques became more standardized; these systematic
procedures were also fated to be transmitted to future generations.53
The "schools" of art were informal in nature until the middle of the
sixteenth century when Vasari helped to form the Accademia del Disegno
in Florence in 1563, which was totally freed from guild obligations
and restrictions by 1571.

The Roman academy of St. Luke was raised to

the status of an art academy in 1593.

Kristeller describes the acad-

emies in the following way:
Art Academies followed the pattern of the literary Academies
that had been in existence for some time, and they replaced the
older workshop tradition with a regular kind of instruction that
included such scientific subjects as geometry and anatomy.54
T~e

This is not to say that the workshops of the Renaissance did not teach
any geonetrj' nor anatomy, but these subjects were taught in a less
comprehensive and systematic manner than the later offerings of the
academies.
As well as establishing a course of studies, the academies
created a blend of professional and non-professional that was unique
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to the history of art.

Not only were artists admitted to the acad-

ernies, but also amateurs and laymen of a cultured circle.

Hauser corn-

rnents on some of the effects of this new mingling:
The fact that amateurs and laymen are also elected to membership
of the art academies creates a solidarity between the cultured
circles of the general public and the artist which is without
precedent in the history of art. The Florentine aristocracy is
strongly represented in the Accademia del Disegno, and this new
role leads to quite a different kind of interest in artistic matters from that connected with previous forms of patronage. The
same academicism, therefore, which on the lower level separates
the artists as a body from non-artistic craftsmanship, on the
higher level bridges the gap between the productive working artist
and the cultured layrnan.SS
Indicative of the involvement of the layman in the arts during
the sixteenth century was the gradual acknowledgment that the layman
could become an active judge of the work of art. 56

Lodovico Dolce,

writing in L'Aretino in 1557 gave a formal recognition to this new
place of the layman within the arts.

In answer to the question "whether

a man who is not a painter himself is qualified to judge painting,"
Dolce replies:
I maintain that man's ability to judge comes, in general, from
practical experience of the way things are. And since nothing is
more familiar and close to man than man himself, it follows that
each man is qualified to pass judgment on what he daily sees -that is, to judge the beauty and ugliness of any individual human
being. What produces beauty is nothing other than a harmony of
proportion, such as resides in the human body in general, and in
the relation of limb to limb in particular~ and disproportion
similarly gives rise to its opposite. Granted this, ~~erefore,
when the eye is called upon to make a judgment, who is the man
who cannot distinguish the beautiful from the ugly? Certainly no
one can fail, unless he lacks altogether both eyes and intellect.
Thus, if man has (as indeed he does have) this knowledge of what
the true form is for an individual of this kind -- that is to say,
a living human being -- why should he not have the same knowledge,
only much more so, in the case of the suppositious reality of inanimate painting?57
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one of the interesting effects of the inclusion of laymen into
the arts was the fact that it was not the general public who was admitted to this circle, but rather a select group.

This group was corn-

posed of the aristocracy and learned men who were already familiar
with artistic theory and had been educated to understand and appreciate
the visual arts. 58

Dolce had argued that any man could make a judgment

about painting because of painting's fidelity to nature and because of
all mankind's intrinsic "sensitivity towards • • . beauty and ugliness,
in such a way that they recognize the attributes." 59

However, Dolce

goes on to say:
My argument, however, does not turn generally on the masses, but
specifically on certain men of fine intelligence, who have refined their powers of judgment with the aid of literature and
practical experience. In this way they can reliably judge a
variety of things, and most expressly painting.6°
Thus it would seem that Dolce is limiting the circle of laymen who can
creditably judge the work of art.

~1oreover,

these "men of fine intel-

ligence" had the leisure to explore new ideas and new styles within the
arts.

I think this is a very important distinction because it set up

a pattern that the arts were to follow for centuries after.

During

the previous periods, art had been a real part of everyday life, not
only as utilitarian objects but also as something which could be
readily understood.

But with the attachment of

~~eory

to art, art

became something that had to be learned, not only for the practitioner
but also for the viewer.

With more of the content of the visual arts

returning to classical themes, combined with the increasing role of
theory, the understanding and appreciation of art became more and
more connected with an elite circle of "cultured" people.
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Nathan Knobler offers an interesting definition of "academy":
The cultural and artistic establishment, formerly an elected
group with teaching {academic) and standard-maintaining responsibilities. 51
I have maintained that an elite circle of cultured people formed the
nucleus of the new-born Artworld and I believe that Knobler has pointed
accurately to this group in the choice of the phrase "cultural and
artistic establishment."

In recent years the term "establishment" has

acquired a pejorative sense, one in which the opposition to change is
pre-eminent.

However, the Oxford English Dictionary supplies a more

balanced definition:
A social group exercising power generally, or within a given
.field or institution, by virtue of its traditional superiority,
and by the use especially of tacit understandings and often a
common mode of speech, and having as a general interest the
maintenance of the status quo.62
Does this definition fit the academy of the late Renaissance?
most ways, it does.

Yes, in

With the advent of the academy there was indeed

a "social group exercising power • • • within a given field or institution."

That social group was composed of artists and of aristocratic

laymen who may be called cognoscenti or connoisseurs.
they exercised was fledgling.

The power that

However, it was still enough to prohibit

an artist admittance to the group.

Moreover, art was rapidly becoming

a field of its own, that is, an area that was beyond normal daily
activity and required special knowledge obtained through study and exposure to or experience of the art object.

Their "tacit understanding"

and "common rn.ode of speech," although in the early stages of formation,
existed.

For example, in treatises on the visual arts beauty was dis-

cussed more in a speculative manner and less in a theological manner,
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thus widening the theoretical horizons of art and narrowing the
participants in the discussion.

This theoretical and speculative dis-

cussion of the visual arts helped to enclose art within the confines of
an educated minority whose leisure and education formed an "informed
vocabulary" and common attitude.

I think the phrases "traditional

superiority" and "maintenance of the status quo" might be found acceptable also.

The Renaissance sense of superiority was not based on

a traditional continuity, but rather on the Renaissance belief that the
"dark ages" had been abolished by the light of classical learning to
which they were heirs.
maintained

The status quo was certainly something to be

new heights of artistic creation had been achieved and it

was difficult for the Renaissance artist to believe that succeeding
generations would not be in his debt.

Hence, the academy which would

supervise academic areas and maintain standards of artistic production
would indeed be interested in maintaining the status quo; maintenance
was an inherent part of the academy.

So, in the sense that Knobler

had defined art establishment, I think that we can say that an art establishment existed at the end of the Renaissance.
How did this establishment differ from what had gone before,
particularly in the Middle Ages?

It might be argued that such an es-

tablishment existed in the

Ages in the form of the guilds.

~iddle

a limited sense, this is true.

In

However, there was a marked difference

between the guild and the academy which dramatically affected the
perimeters of the Artworld.

I would suggest the two important areas

of difference lie in the inclusion of laymen and the addition of a
theoretical base for art.

BoL~

of these changes rest upon an educated
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practitioner and an educated audience.

In other words, the base of

those who participated on an educated level was expanded while the
actual audience contracted.

This seeming paradox may be clarified if

we again think of the utilitarian nature of the crafts during the Middle Ages in contrast with the non-utilitarian nature of art in the
Renaissance.

The craft establishment of the Middle Ages was composed

of guild members.
of the art product.

Church and monarchy acted as patrons or consumers
But I do not believe that these consumers could

properly be called part of the craft establishment anymore than they
could have been counted as part of the establishment of any other guild.
They bought art products in the same way

~~ey

bought clothing or food

products -- according to personal preference but without being an
pert in the areas of winemaking or weaving.

ex~

In contrast, by the end

of the Renaissance, the uninformed consumer began to be supplanted by
the educated connoisseur, that is, someone with expert knowledge of the
field.

The addition of both laymen and a theoretical basis for art to

the medieval craft establishment helped to change the structure of the
visual arts in the Renaissance to a more exclusive practice.

Summary
As we have seen, the transformational influences during the
Renaissance may be described as the technological and internal discoveries, the role of theory and of the individual, and the formation
of new ways to educate the artist and the viewer.

The first of these,

the technological and internal discoveries, helped to transform the
direction of art in several ways.

The technological advances of
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papter-making, engraving, and moveable type helped to disseminate
artistic ideas throughout Europe more easily and more quickly than ever
before.

The medieval dependence upon the relationship between archi-

tecture and painting and sculpture also changed in the Renaissance.
A percentage of this change came with the technological advances within the arts.

During the medieval period, the craftsman who painted

was limited to frescoes to adorn church works or to the illuminated
page.

In the Renaissance, the framed painting and free-standing

statue were developed.

In breaking away from the medieval conception

of painting and sculpture as handMaidens to architecture, the framed
space and free-standing statue heralded a new way of perceiving art,
a new way of looking at art as a separate entity which was to be
separated from the medieval criteria for judging painting and sculpture
as part of the architectural enclosure.
entity of its

o~~,

Each was transformed to an

to be appreciated on its own merits.

The third

technological discovery of the Renaissance was the introduction of
perspective studies which included a theoretical basis in geometry.
This advancement, which made a reproduction of the natural world more
possible for the artist, was seized upon by some artists of the
Renaissance to provide a theoretical basis for art which would then
carry art to a higher plane than the medieval craftsman had ever envisaged.

If the visual arts had not been provided with a theoretical

foundation in the Renaissance, further discussion in later aqes could
not have occurred, especially on a philosophic level.
Closely intertwined 'llith the new status of art was the new
status of the artist.

He not only received a higher place in Renais-
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sance society than he had ever had before, but he also began to emerge
as an individual whose talent was an integral part of his success.
This latter feature was consistent with Italian Hunanisrn.

During the

Renaissance, as a body of theory began to accumulate around the artist,
as he gail&ed a sense of individual recognition, and when the idea of
talent had become accepted, the artist began to practice art in a new
and different way.

He was no longer a craftsman practicing his craft

he was an artist creating art.

This new way of viewing the artist, both

by the public and by the artist, certainly prefigured the idea of
•Jenius.

And more importantly, it set the precedent that the artist,

by virtue of his talent and individuality, could not always be expected
to be easily understood nor could his product receive the immediate response that the craftsman's had.

The product no longer had the immedi-

ate recognizability of the utilitarian object and the artist no longer
had a clear-cut status within the society.

He had embarked upon a new

path which, at this point, was still not clearly delineated.
Finally, we find, toward the end of the Renaissance, a new way
of training artists

the academy.

The medieval guilds gradually lost

their monopoly over artists and their training.

While this loss of

influence may be traced to several sources, much of it was no doubt due
to the increased status of individual artists of the Renaissance and
the theoretical teaching that these artists espoused.

The academy was

basically composed of artists who were elected for their talent and
reputation and of laymen who were elected for their knowledge of the
arts and their culture.

It i3 the inclusion of laymen, thought ac-

ceptable as judges of artistic creation, that becomes an

i~portant
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point in the development of the Artworld.

Election to the academy was

not granted to anyone "off the street," but rather to a select group
who were educated to appreciate and judge the work of art.

The forma-

tion of an art establishment in conjunction with the emergence of the
art object and the artist as artist signalled the birth of the Artworld.
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CHAPTER III

SEVENTEENTH TO T\olENTIETH CENTURIES :

MATURATION OF THE ARTWORLD

Introduction
The last chapter examined the birth of the Artworld in the Renaissance.

This chapter deals with the additional elements that occur-

red within the Artworld during the seventeenth through the mid-nineteenth centuries which created the concept of an art movement, a theory
of art and which removed the contextual restrainsts of the work of art
to create the autonomous work of art.

The elements which are examined

within this chapter are the Mannerist painters, the Nee-Platonic and
Peripatetic arguments concerning a theory of art, the rise of personal
collections and museums, and the introduction of formal criticism to the
visual arts.
The Mannerists
The beginning of the Renaissance had signalled major changes in
the fabric of life in Western Europe; so too, did the end of the
Renaissance.

Politically, France, England and Spain assumed power

under highly centralized monarchies and the Italian peninsula was primarily controlled by puppet governments of Spain and France.

The

political climate was also much affected by changes in the religious
structure of Europe.

What had begun as an effort to reform certain
54
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abused practices within the Church of Rome had lead to the formation
of Protestant sects, primarily Lutheranism, Calvanism and Anglicanism
in the sixteenth century.

The Catholic Church countered with the

Council of Trent, 1545-1563, but the universal Church of the Middle
Ages was gone.

Civil and religious strife not only plagued the se-

curity of Europe, but new theories and discoveries in science challenged
and expanded the notion of the world that Western man had held since
classical times.

Copernicus provided the first impetus toward a new

science with his theory that the planets revolved around the sun.
Kepler, Galilee and Newton followed in his footsteps to provide the
foundation for modern mathematics, astronomy and physics.

Francis

Bacon argued for the tools of modern science -- induction, observation
and experiment -- and helped to usher in the new age of scientific
knowledge.

The seventeenth century saw Newton create the fundamentals

of calculus and formulate the universal law of gravitation, Pascal contribute to geometry, physics and computing machines, Descartes add to
the theory of analytic geometry and algebraic symbolism, Napier invent
logarithms and use the decimal point, and Leibniz add to the knowledge
of symbolic algebra, probability and number theory.

Important dis-

coveries were made in physiology, botany and zoology and provided the
basis for the modern natural sciences; alchemy was gradually transformed into the systematic study, chemistry.

As well as laying a

foundation for modern scientific thought, these new discoveries
and the new attitude toward science -- combined with the religious and
political upheavals to end the Age of Faith and put Western man firmly
on the path of "rationalism," that is, accepting reason as the supreme
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authority in all areas of dispute.
The beginning of these changes can be traced to the middle decades of the sixteenth century: Pope Leo X excommunicated Luther in
1521, the Sack of Rome by Charles V occurred in 1527, Calvin published
The Institutes of the Christian Religion in 1536 and Copernicus published On the Revolution of the Celestial Bodies in 1543.

At the

same time, a new generation of artists followed the masters of the
High Renaissance into prominence.

They have been called the Mannerists

and the period of their production was roughly from 1520 to 1600.

The

Mannerists are important because they are the first of the "modern
movements" in art, that is, the first of the pendulum motions from or
toward a particular theory within artistic practice.

They also must

be noted for their insistence upon the artist as creator and the introduction of a self-conscious expressiveness in their work.
For a long period of time, the work of the Mannerists was viewed
as nothing more than a degeneration of the Renaissance, a period in
which artists tried to emulate the masters of
success.

~~e

Renaissance without

However, more modern art historians tend to view the Man-

nerists as a separate group who stand between the Renaissance and
Baroque periods, not as a negative entity but rather as a transitiorr
between the two periods.

It is perhaps misleading to call these artists

a "group," because art historians for the most part do not readily agree
upon a particular group but include various artists according to their
view of Mannerism.

The most often

L~cluded

artists are Bronzino,

Parmigianino, Jacopo Pontormo, Giovanni da Bologna, Andrea Palladia,
Tintoretto, and El Greco.

The visual characteristics of Mannerism,
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opposed to the restrained classicism of the Renaissance, involved
slendarized and elongated figures and more emotional and complicated
surface compositions in which the manipulation of space has become a
more conscious device.

Gardner has described maniera as "a self-con-

scious stylization involving complexity, caprice, bizarre fantasy (the
'conceit'), elegance, preciosity, and polish." 1

Perhaps the difference

between the High Renaissance classicism and Mannerism can be demonstrated best by a comparison of the Last Supper as portrayed by da Vinci
(figure 5) and by Tintoretto (figure 6).

Da Vinci's is calm, with a

balanced stability due, in part, to the strong horizontal movement.
Christ occupies the center of the canvas and the central vanishing
point is directly behind his head.

And even though the painting por-

trays the moment when Christ has announced that one of the apostles
will betray him, there is a feeling of restrained emotion in the painting.

In contrast, Tintoretto's is based on a strong diagonal axis

which gives it a dynamic quality that the horizontal does not have.
The painting is full of figures of both natural and supernatural origin
and the Christ figure is identified by the brilliant halo of light behind him.

The moment, too, has changed, from betrayal to the Eucha-

ristic feast.

This is a much more emotional rendition, and one which

includes not only a multitude of everyday details but the supernatural
as well.

The restraint and simplicity of the Renaissance is gone.

Myers, commenting on this painting, highlights the basic differences
between the Renaissance and Mannerist painters:
Like other Mannerist works, Tintoretto's version destroys singlepoint perspective, stresses the spiritual over the rational, and
transforms the balanced, closed composition of the Renaissance
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Figure 5: The Last Supper, Leonardo da Vinci, 1495-98.

Figure 6: The Last Supper, Tintoretto, 1592-94.

59

into a deliberately unbalanced, infinitely extending space in
which figures assume uneasy agitated postures.2
Tintoretto's painting was not only a departure from what had
come before but it was a reaction against what had gone before.

Al-

though the Mannerist drew heavily from the artists of the Renaissance,
their anti-classical stance was a revolt from the "coolness" and raThe qualities of maniera overcame

tionality of the previous period.

the qualities of restraint and simplicity which were important in the
Renaissance~

expression of emotion overcame the rational approach of

artists like Alberti and da Vinci.

Federico Zuccari, founder of the

Academy of St. Luke in Rome, wrote a refutation of da Vinci's insistence upon a mathematical foundation for art:
I say -- and I know I am saying the truth -- that the art of
painting does not draw her principles from the mathematical sciences. Nor is there any need to have recourse to them in order
to learn this art's rules and methods, nor even in order to be
able to discuss them theoretically. 3
A bit later, Zuccari, still referring to mathematical rules, notes:
The artist's mind should be not only clear, but free. His fancy
should not be trammeled and restrained by a mechanical slavery
to such rules.4
Thus the scientific foundation for art that Alberti and da Vinci had
believed so important for art became unwanted baggage for the Mannerists.s

In a like manner, the scientific observation of nature which

had been so important to the Renaissance artist was relegated to a lessposition by the Mannerists.
for his writing on painting

Giovan Battista Armenini, now more known
~~an

his own painting, advised students

that the best method for perfecting their own painting technique was
to copy an

ac~~owledged

master, one whose work approached that of an-
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tiquity.

He further stated:

• that besides seeking the best a~d most perfect things of
nature, you must supplement them with a good manner, and go with
it as far as you deem sufficient, because, once you have combined
a good manner with a good living model, you can make a composition
of excellent beauty.6
While this advice may sound quite similar to that given by medieval
craftsmen, it is quite different.

In contrast to da Vinci's advice

to observe nature, Armenini counsels the student to seek "the best and
most perfect things of nature," that is, what comes closest to ideal
beauty.

This is an echo of Alberti, but framed within the Mannerist

context of Nee-Platonism (which will be discussed more fully a bit
later).

Armenini then suggests that one may further improve on the

original with a good manner.
what is before him.

In other words, the artist may "interpret"

The medieval craftsman interpreted the visible

world to a great extent, but would never have believed he was doing so;
his interests lay beyond the natural world.

The Renaissance artist on

the other hand, was primarily interested in the natural world, and
while he used selection and arrangement as tools, they were not an
overriding concern.

With the Mannerists, however, selection and ar-

rangement became even more important and became intertwined with the
artist's desire to create.

In this sense, interpretation took on a new

meaning to the artist, one which allowed him to express his own point
of view.

The aim of Armenini is not fidelity to nature but rather "a

composition of excellent beauty."

Fidelity to nature has been sub-

ordinated by a desire to create "art" as a primary aim of the artist.
Gardner points to this in the following statement:
The Mannerists, instead of continuing former research into nature
and natural appearance, turned for their models to the masters of
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the High Renaissance, especially Michelangelo, and to Roman
sculpt,Jre, especially relief sculpture. Thus, instead of nature
as their teacher, they took art. One could say that whereas
their predecessors had sought nature and found their style, the
Mannerists looked first for a style and found a manner.7
Hauser also comments:
We are dealing here • • • with a completely self-conscious style,
which bases its forms not so much on the particular object as on
the art of the preceding epoch, and to a greater extent than was
the case with any previous significant trend of art. The conscious attention of the artist is directed no longer merely to
choosing the means best adapted to his artistic purpose, but also
to defining the artistic purpose itself -- the theoretical program is no longer concerned merely with methods, but also aims.S
Thus, it is

bo~~

in the turning to art rather than nature and

in the revolt from the previous period that the Mannerists initiated
the notion of a "movement" in art.

The artist began to build the Art-

world, consciously marking out the perimeters of his concerns.

The

Mannerist artist had fastened his attention more upon the work he did
in relation to other artists and less upon the utilitarian context of
his work.
Art Theory and Philosophical Thought
As Hauser has pointed out, Mannerist theorJ was not only concerned with methods but with the aims of art; at the center of art is
the creative act and the Mannerists turned their theoretical inquiry in
that direction.

If art had not become more self-conscious, had not

seen the artist as creator, then the need to scrutinize the creative
act would not have become as important.

And if the Mannerists had not

put fidelity to nature in a secondary place, the need to explore the
relationship between the external world and the artist's imagination
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might not have been felt at this early date.

However, the writings of

two Mannerists clearly show that the relationship between ideation and
sensory experience had become important.

The first of these writers

was Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo, mentioned in the previous chapter in connection with the Nee-Platonism of Marsilio Ficino.
T~attato

Lomazzo published

del'Arte della Pittura, Scultura, et Architettura in 1584 and

Idea del Tempio della Pittura in 1590, but it is the latter work that
holds interest for us.

In chapter 26 of Idea, Lomazzo offers a defini-

tion of beauty that is often quoted as the I1annerist position: "First
we must understand that beauty is nothing more than a certain spiritual
and lively grace •

n9

However, the full quotation bears a somewhat

different message:
First we must understand that beauty is nothing more than a certain
spiritual and lively grace, which by means of the divine ray is
first infused into the Angels, in whom the shapes of any sphere
may be seen; reflected in the Angels these are called exemplars
and Ideas. Then it passes on to the spirits, in whom these shapes
are called reasons and notions, and finally into matter, where
they are called images and forms
10
Ficino's contribution to this passage comes from chapter 6 of Commentary on the Symposium which is entitled "What Components Are Needed to
Make a Thing Beautiful, and That Beauty Is a Spiritual Gift."

This pas-

sage is as follows:
Beauty is a certain vital and spiritual grace, which is infused first into the Angel by the divine ray, then into the spirits of men, and following these, into corporeal forms and voices;
and this grace by means of reason and sight and hearing moves and
delights our spirit; and in delighting, enraptures, and in enrapturing, inspires ardent love.ll
Ficino was speaking of beauty in relation to the good, and the ardent
love of which he speaks is basically the love of God.

Lomazzo, on the
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other hand, was writing a tract on art and used this definition as an
introduction and basis for his following remarks.

For Lomazzo, the

heart of the creative act is beauty which is the "face of God" and is
reflected through the angels, the human soul and finally into the corporeal world.

This is not to say that beauty is at all corporeal, but

rather that it remains like the light which transmits it; it is recognized on a spiritual level.

Lomazzo states:

And the spirit, created as it is, surrounded by an earthly body,
stoops from its corporeal ministrJ. Weighed down by this propensity, it forgets the beauty that is hidden within it, and insofar as it is enveloped in a terrestrial body, it proceeds to use
this body, accommodating to it the senses and sometimes also
reason. Hence it does not behold this beauty which radiates within it, until the body has matured and reason has awakened, with
which it observes the beauty that shines in ~~e sight of the
whole world and there abides.12
In other words, Lomazzo believed that beauty abides within man, a
"stamp" of God, an internal image, and that it is recognized through
the intellect.

Beauty is a visible manifestation of the good, one

which is perceived internally through reason and not through the
senses.

Lomazzo notes:

True beauty is only that which may be truly understood through
reason and not through these two corporeal windows. This may
easily be demonstrated in that no one doubts that it can be found
in the Angels, in the spirits and in the bodies, and that the eye
cannot see without light. So that ~~e shapes and colors of the
bodies are not seen, if not illuminated by light, and they do no~
appear with their matter to the eye, although they must be in the
eyes in order to be seen.: 3
This rather confusing passage may be clarified by examining Ficino's
explanation from which Lomazzo borrowed:
We do not doubt that this Beauty is incorporeal, since it is manifestly incorporeal in the Angel and the spirit, and we hav·e shown
above that it is incorporeal in the bodies. From this then we
can understand that the eye does not see else but the light of the
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sun, because the shapes and colors of the bodies are never seen
unless illuminated by light, and they do not appear with their
matter to the eye. Yet it seems necessary to have them in the
eye, so that they may be seen by the eye. Hence one and the same
light of the sun, painted with the colors and shapes of all the
bodies it strikes, presents itself to the eyes. The eyes through
their own natural rays receive the light of the sun so painted,
and once they have received it, they see the light and all the
paintings that are in it. That is why the entire order of the
world, which is visible, is perceived with the eyes, not in the
matter of the bodies, but in the light which flows into the eyes.
And because this order is in the light, separated from matter, it
is necessarily incorporeal.l4
Thus, Lomazzo argues, it is not the eyes which see beauty, but the intellect which recognizes it.

Within this somewhat transcendental and

mystical presentation, Lomazzo has settled the conflict of ideation and
sense perception to his satisfaction by placing both issues within a
divine context.
While Lomazzo concentrates on the concept of beauty, the second
Mannerist writer, Federico Zuccari, addresses the nature of the creative act in a more direct fashion.

In his L'Idea de' Pittori, Scultori

e Architetti, he states that the work of art exists first in the mind

of the artist, but uses an argument that is more within the tradition
of the Scholastics than Lomazzo's Nee-Platonism.

He calls the idea

disegno interno and the resulting work of art as disegno esterno.

He

defines disegno interno as:
I shall say that by Inward Design is meant the concept formed in
our mind which enables us to apprehend any object and to do practical work in accordance with ~~is concept • . • It is true,
though, that by this term Inward Design I do not mean solely the
concept formed in the mind of the painter, but also that concept
which is formed in any intellect; but for the sake of greater
clarity and for the better understanding of my fellow artists, I
have defined in the begir~ing this term Inward Design for our profession alone. If we wish to define the term completely and universally, we shall say that it is the concept and the idea formed
so as to understand and to put into practice any object.lS
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According to Zuccari, this "idea" exists first in the mind of God, then
in the angels and then in the mind of man.
divine inspiration.

It is again, like Lomazzo,

But unlike Lornazzo, Zuccari does not overlook the

role of sensory experience.

He acknowledges the debt that any cor-

poreal being has toward the senses, but he also subordinates the senses
to the idea.

He states:

Here perhaps some fine mind may want to object by saying that
this ideal concept, this intellectual Design, although it provides
the first impulse and the first light to the intellect, does not
operate by itself, inasmuch as the intellect does everything by
means of the senses.
A penetrating objection, but empty and of no substance: for
as communal things are the property of all, and each may use them
freely, possessing a part of them as the wealth of the republic,
yet no one may become their absolute master except the Prince himself; in the same way we may say that, since the intellect and the
senses are subjects to Design and concept, Design, as their
Prince, ruler, and governor, uses them as his own property.l6
Thus the senses become participants in the process, but are always at
the service of the idea.

The act of artistic creation has become just

that -- creation.

Since man may share in Divine inspiration through

his intellect,

also shares in the ability to create.

m~~

rows from Thomas Aquinas to apply

~~is

Zuccari bor-

concept directly to the visual

arts:
The reason, then, that art imitates Nature is that the inner artificial Design, and therefore art, proceeds to bring forth artificial objects in the manner that Nature itself proceeds. And if we
wish to know why Nature can be imitated, it is because Nature is
guided toward its own goal and toward its own procedures by an
intellective prL~ciple. Therefore her work is the work of unerring intelligence, as the philosophers say; for she reaches her
goal by orderly and infallible means. And since art, chiefly
with the aid of the above-named design, observes precisely the
same method in its orocedure, therefore Nature can be imitated by
art, and art is abl~ to imitate Nature.l7
It should be noted here that Zuccari is not talking about the direct
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reproduction of the external world as mimetic, but rather is examining
the process of the creative act.

His argument is based on the fact

that art follows the same ideational procedure as nature and so imitates nature's generative forces.

The notion of "genius" became ac-

ceptable in application to an artist because of the artist's participation in the idea.l8
With the writings of Lomazzo and Zuccari, both Nee-Platonic and
Peripatetic thought became a part of the theory of the visual arts.
However, both men were Mannerists and as the sixteenth century closed,
the Mannerist movement came to an end.

As the Baroque age began, the

new generation of artists reacted against the Mannerists much in the
same way that the Mannerists had reacted against the Renaissance masters.

Many of the new artists viewed the Mannerists as degenerate and

excessive.
One of these artists was Michelangelo da Caravaggio whose work
r:~ay

be characterized as uncompromising realism.

has been used in connection

wi~~

The term "naturalism"

Caravaggio's work and the reason can

be seen when examining such work as The Calling of St. Matthew (figure
7).

In this painting we see a sacred theme treated in a totally con-

temporary and realistic
Roman tavern of

~~e

people of the day.

mar~er.

The place might have been a common

times, and the participants drawn from common
The supernatural of the Mannerists has no place in

this work; it is intended to be a statement that the common people
could associate with.
~~e

The ver] thin halo over the head of Christ is

only suggestion of his divine nature.

achieved by

~~e

The emphasis on Christ is

manipulation of light, which is a characteristic of
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Figure 7: The Calling of St. Matthew, Caravaggio, ca. 1597-98.

Caravaggio.

But it is the realism of the situation that is so strik-

ing, its everyday setting and characters.

However, as much as Cara-

vaggio had intended his work for the common man, it was not well received in that quarter.
His
man
and
his
and

Janson notes:

work was acclaimed by artists and connoisseurs, but to the
in the street, for whom it was intended, it lacked propriety
reverence. The simple people resented meeting their likes in
paintings; they preferred religious imagery of a more idealized
rhetorical sort.l9

Albert E. Elsen also shares this opinion:
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Dedicated to making art that would meet the needs of the masses,
Caravaggio was a failure, for the people, conditioned by mere
aristocratic images of insincere piety, distrusted the stark
reality of his types and the brutal realism with which the Bible
was interpreted. It was with connoisseurs and artists that the
recognition of his talent was achieved.20
caravaggio not only brought realism to his religious art, but also extended the concept of painting by being one of the first genre painters

(The Card Sharps, The Fortune Teller) and still life artists (Basket of
Fruit).

It is in relation with the latter that he caused reaction a-

mong other artists.

He believed that regardless of the subject matter,

the treatment should be consistently on a high level which meant that
he would take as much trouble with a still life as a Biblical scene.
His insistence on a realistic portrayal of all the world around him
sharply separated him from the Renaissance and the Mannerists; it also
divided him from theorists of the time who found his naturalism lacking
in intellectual capabilities and imagination.
One of the foremost spokesmen for the seventeenth century visual
arts was Giovanni Pietro Bellori, a layman who had been appointed "antiquarian of Rome" by Clement X.

He was associated with the Academy of

St. Luke in Rome and also with Colbert and Poussin.

Although he was

not a painter by profession, he was considered an expert judge of art
by his contemporaries and in his "L'Idea del Pittore, della Scultore e
del'Architetto" he argued against the excesses of the Mannerists on one
hand and the naturalism of Caravaggio on the other.
Bellori began with the accepted Nee-Platonic exposition of the
idea.
Sublunar bodies . . • are suoject to change and deformity; and
although nature always intends to produce excellent effects,
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nevertheless, because of the inequality of matter the forms
change, and human beauty is especially disarranged, as we see from
the infinite deformities and disproportions that are in us. For
this reason the noble Painters and Sculptors, imitating that first
maker, also form in their minds an example of superior beauty, and
in beholding it they emend nature with faultless color or line.21
He then cited the story of Zeuxis which Alberti had used to demonstrate
this point.

It was from this reference that Bellori went on to argue

against the likes of Caravaggio whom Bellori accused of being a slave
of nature and of painting without the benefit of the idea.
Thus nature is for this reason so inferior to art that the copyist
artist and imitators of bodies in everything, without selectivity
and the choice of an Idea, were criticized. Demetrius was told
that he was too natural, Dionysius was blamed for having painted
men resembling us • • • just as in our time Michel Angelo da
Caravaggio was criticized for being too natural in painting like22
nesses
But Bellori also had to contend with what were felt to be excesses by
the Mannerists, that is, the ignoring of nature and the turning inward
to expression.

Bellori therefore stated that the idea had its roots in

the senses, but the senses as purified and raised from their lowly
state.
Born from nature, it [the Idea] overcomes its origin and becomes
the model of art; measured with the compass of the intellect it
becomes the measure of the hand; and animated by fantasy it gives
life to ~~e image . • • The Idea of the Painter and the Sculptor
is that perfect and excellent example of the mind, to which imagined form, imitating all things that come into sight assL~ilate
themselves • . . Thus the Idea constitutes the perfection of natural beauty and unites the truth with the verisimilitude of what
appears to the eye, always aspiring to the best and the most marvelous, thereby not emulating but making itself superior to nature; revealing to us its elegant and perfect works which nature
does not usually show us as perfect in every part. 2 3
He summarized his argument against both extremes as follows:
Quintillian teaches us that all things perfected by art and human ingenuity have their origin in the same nature, from which the
true Idea springs. Hence those who without knowing the truth
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follow common practice in everything create spectres instead of
shapes; nor are they dissimilar from those who borrow from the
genius and copy the ideas of others, creating works that are not
natural children but bastards of nature, so that it seems as
though they are wedded to the paintbr~shes of their masters. Addded to this evil, arising from lack of genius or the inability
to select the best parts, is the fact that they choose the defects
of their teachers and form an idea of the worst. On the other
hand, those who glory themselves with the name of Naturalists
have no idea whatever in their minds; they copy the defects of
the bodies and satisfy themselves with ugliness and errors, they,
too, swearing by the model, as their teachers. If the mode~ is
taken from their sight, their whole art disappears with it. 4
Thus Bellori had dealt with both schools of painting, counseling a middle path for the artist.

By using a blend of statements and attitudes

from such Renaissance masters as Alberti and da Vinci and by answering
the twin challenges of Mannerism and Naturalism, Bellori formulated into a concrete theory what had been only implied speculation before.

It

had become a system of thought, one that to enter into French, Ge=man
and

. h

Engl~s

. .

wr~t~ngs

. f or aesth et~c
. t h eory. 25
on art as a b as~s

Bellori also added this interesting comment about the relationship between the common man and the visual arts:
Yet the
sense.
things;
they do
disdain
art, on
Idea is

common people refer everything they see to the visual
They praise things painted naturally, being used to such
appreciated beautiful colors, not beautiful forms, which
not understand; tire of elegance and approve of novelty;
reason, follow opinion, and walk away from the truth in
which, as on its own base, the most noble monument of the
built.26

It would seem that the arg\tment which Dolce had first put forward,
that the refined and educated man can best judge art, had found an echo
in Bellori.

In this second instance, it is a stronger statement and

seems to be predicated on the fact that the common people rely solely
on the senses and are not trained to use their intellect when viewing
~~e

work of art.

When so much emphasis had been put on the use of
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reason as a transcendental part of making art and viewing art, it
would seem natural that those who were illiterate and limited in using
their intellect were relegated to a lesser position, a position where
they might view but were not expected to appreciate.
Thus far, art theory had been a conglomeration of thought from
artists and art theorists,

bo~~

practicing artists and laymen, who had

borrowed from various philosophical writings and brought these writings
into the Artworld.

Also, the rift between the artist and the general

public was widening, due in great part to the increasingly complicated
theoretical basis for the visual arts which required training in classical images and thought.

This gap was to continue to widen with the

rise of public exhibitions, art criticism and museums.
Formalization of the Institution
Leadership in the visual arts, which for so long had rested in
Italy, began to be posited in the hands of the French during the seventeenth century.

However, many of the leading French artists had been

educated, or at least had spent time in Italy and much of Italian
thought found its way into the new French ascendancy.

Particularly

noticeable was the spread of the academy from Italy to France.

The

L'Academie Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture was founded under the
leadership of Charles LeBrun in 1648 and was modeled after the Academy
of St. Luke in Rome.

By 1655 the Academy had acquired the exclusive

rights to teach life drawing, and with the death of cardinal Mazarin in
1661, the Academy came under the increasingly centralized power of
Louis XIV, the "Sun King," and his Finance Minister, Jean Colbert.
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Colbert, who was in charge of economic policy for the King and who had
organized and regulated most industries and trade for France, became
surintendant des bRtiments and brought the same type of policies to

the French artists and craftsmen.

Using a government subsidy, Colbert

put the Academy under the firm control of the monarchy in 1664.

All

artists who won commissions from the government had to join the Academy
and all members of the Academy were expected to show their work in the
annual exhibitions which began in 1665 in the galleries of the Palais
Royal.

These exhibitions were limited for many years to court society

much in the same way that the painting and sculpture was limited to the
glorification of the monarchy.

1664 also saw the beginning of the con-

ftrences which LeBrun initiated to set down a body of theory which was
as absolute as the monarchy. 27

~

The Conferences took the

fo~

of lee-

tures before the Academy in which works of art were discussed and principles drawn frcm the discussion.

The following example is excerpted

from a lecture entitled "Concerning Expression in General and in Particular" which LeBrun gave in 1667 and which was published in Amsterdan
in 1698:
When anger takes possession of ~~e soul, he who experiences this
emotion has red and inflamed eyes, a wandering and sparkling pupil,
both eyebrows now lowered, now raised, the forehead deeply
creased, creases between the eyes, wide-open nostrils, lips pressed tightly together, and the lower lip pushed up over the upper,
leaving the corners of the mouth a little open to form a cruel
and disdainful laugh.2 8
This is a short example of the type of cataloguing that the Academy attempted.

While this type of cataloguing had been done since the Ren-

aissance, it never before had the weight of authority that the Academy
carried.

This kind of authority also affected the subject matter that
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was thought to be appropriate for painting.

This attitude toward sub-

ject matter can probably be traced from Bellori and Poussin to LeBrun.29
In "Observations on Painting," published by Bellori in Vite de' Pittori
Scultori et Architetti Moderni in 1672, Poussin counsels the painter

as follows:
The grand manner consists of four elements: subject or theme, concept, structure, and style. The first requirement fundamental to
all the others, is that the subject and the narrative be grandiose,
such as battles, heroic actions, and religious themes • • • Thus the
painter not only must possess the art of selecting his subject, but
judgment in comprehending it, and must choose that which is by
nature capable of every adornment and of perfection.3°
This attitude had been present in the Renaissance, but had never been
explicitly stated as a canon of artistic belief or placed in the position of primary importance.
Poussin's attitude toward beauty follows that of his Italian
predecessors, but his definition of painting adds a new note to art
theory and the viewing of art:
It is an imitation made on a surface with lines and colors of
everything that one sees under the sun. Its end is to please.31
The interesting elements here

that painting is imitation and that

its aim is to please -- may have been implied before this time, but
never in such an unadorned manner.

It is quite likely that Poussin

was commenting on, or perhaps quoting from De Pictur~ Veterum by
Fran9ois Junius, but this statement was published under his name and
can be acknowledged as representati'le of his thought.

The reference to

painting as imitation would seem to carry the usual Nee-Platonic connotations, i.e., that the process of creation shares in the divine.
However, the second part of his statement, that the aim of art is to
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please, is a further development.

In the Middle Ages this notion

would have been impossible; in the Renaissance, irrelevant.

The Man-

nerists, particularly Lomazzo, pointed in this direction with their
emphasis on beauty and the creation of beauty.

But it is with this

statement that the ground is fully prepared for aesthetic theory.
It is interesting to note that the concept of the beaux arts was
popularized at this time, especially in the works of Abbe Dubos (1719)
. h ed Les beaux arts
and Abb e, Batteux, who pub ll.s

cipe in 1746.

,

. ts a' un meme
.A

redu~

•

pr~n-

Batteux, in fact, established the main categories of

the Fine Arts which have been accepted until recent years: the separation of the Fine Arts from crafts, or mechanical arts, and the five
major divisions of the arts into music, poetry, painting, sculpture and

•

the dance, with the addition of the theatre as a combination of the
others.3 2

The audience who viewed the beaux arts was still primarily

a court-centered aristocracy whose world centered on the bon mot,
court intrigue and the splendor of Louis XIV.

It was an educated, re-

fined and elite society that maintained the Rococo period until the
French revolution.
Because of the tremendous influence of the French court during
this time, academies of art were opened all over Europe, so that by
the middle of the eighteenth century there were over one hundred academies which eL~ibited the work of their members in annual Salons. 33
The Royal Academy of Arts in London was granted a charter in 1765 and
opened their first exhibit in April, 1769.

The French Academy had

moved their exhibit to the Louvre and had opened the show to the public
in 1725.

The exhibits and

~~eir open~ngs

became important social oc-
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casions and the news of them was eagerly sought throughout Europe.
Elizabeth Holt notes:
Because of the ritual of the opening on the name day or fete of
the king and of the ceremony of the awarding of prizes, the annual or biennial exhibition became an event in the court calendar,
particularly in France. French was the lingua franca of the
European courts, as French fashions and customs were paramount.
What transpired in Paris was "news."34
Reporting and commenting on the exhibits became an established practice.
Denis Diderot wrote a commentary on the Salon of 1759 which was conversational in tone and represented his opinions of ~~e works involved. 35
And although this report was published in Grimm's Correspondance litteraire for only a small and select group of Europeans, this type of
reporting became pervasive with the advent of newspapers and magazines.
The end of the eighteenth century saw many periodicals come into existence: Der teutsche Merkur, Monthly Review, Propylaen, Artist's Repository, The Foreign Quarterly Review, and Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine
to name a few.

The tone of the articles varied according to the pub-

lication and author.

Holt notes:

The form these reports took was determined by the type of publication and its subscribers. It could be an informative, descriptive
or even critical account of what was to be seen, written for the
twenty thousand middle-class subscribers who were as eager to keep
up with the news as were the two thousand persons in the literary
and artistic world more intimately involved with the works exhibited. 36
An

early example of this commentary is J. H. 'iilhelm Tischbein 's "Let-

ters from Rome about new •11orks of art by contemporary artists, " published in Der teutsche Merkur in February, 1786.
Recently a painting was put on exhibition which attracted the attention of all Rome. In the history of art we read of no painting
~~at might have awakened more uproar on its appearance than this
one. Not only ar~ists, art lovers, and connoisseurs, but even the
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people troop by from morning until evening to see it. The enthusiasm is general. We must, willingly or unwillingly, join one
side or the other. No one is allowed, in this case, to have his
own opinion; that modest judgment of finding the good good and the
mediocre mediocre no longer counts here. With the present public,
a matter is either raised up to heaven or, with a peremptory order,
cast down among the most wretched stuff. At parties, at coffeehouses, and on the streets, we hear one judgment or the other, for
nothing else is spoken of but David and The Oath of the Horatii. 31
Following a description of the artist and the painting, Tischbein relayed the reactions of the French and the Italians to the painting and
the more "neutral" reactions of German and English critics.

While re-

luctant to admit David to the ranks of the great masters like Raphael,
he does put David in

~~e

same category as the Carracci and calls The

Oath of the Horatii "the masterpiece of French art and the picture of
our century." 38
A more critical review was written by John Eagles on the exhibit at Somerset House in 1835.

Eagles reflects the conservative at-

titudes of his publication, Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine.

Of J. M.

W. Turner's The Bright Stone of Honour and Tomb of Marceau, Eagles
writes:
How paints the R.A.? All jumble and confusion in effect, colour,
and composition. Here is in its utmost poverty, raw white, and
unharmonizing blue -- ~~e texture is perfectly fuzzy. It represents no~~ing, substantial or unsubstantial, neither earth, air,
fire, nor water • • • The figures are red and white dolls, and
not quite so well painted as dolls usually are. There is not as
much poetry as the paring of a nail.3 9
After more criticism of Turner and Constable, Eagles goes on to say:
The old masters made it [the value of shade] their principal care;
we fly to the other extreme, and make light, or rather white the
great aim. When I say we, I only speak in reference to the fashion set by some great moderns. If they are right, Claude was
wrong; if they are right, Poussin was wrong, ~~e Carracci were
wrong, Correggio wrong, all wrong. I have spoken, it will be
perhaps thought, on this subject, with too much severity; but it
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is as I feel, when pictures that are meant, or ought to be meant,
to please for ever, only to astonish at first, and then give unmitigated pain • • • 40
In both of these reviews, the authors compare contemporary artists'
work against the standards of the masters, that is, those artists from
the Renaissance and later whose work was admired.

They also state

clearly that these are opinions, albeit opinions of learned men.
comments on

~~e

Holt

effect exhibitions and reviews had upon the artist:

The advent of art exhibitions as such and of widely published
popular interpretive criticism brought major changes in both the
artist's manner of working and the viewer's manner of evaluating
art. By the end of the eighteenth century the artist no longer
addressed himself, as he had for centuries, to the preferences of
a particular patron or to the requirements of a particular occasion or installation site. He conceived and executed his work
according to aesthetic, philosophical and personal principles
which belonged to him individually or to a group of artists.
Finished works were sent out to compete for public recognition
with those of other artistic persuasions. Here they were judged
by the public, whose opinion might be disparaged or lauded but
could never be disregarded. Because the ?ublic, unlike the earlier highly cultured aristocratic patron, frequently felt itself
in need of an introduction to and an interpretation of, the myriad
of works and schools set before it, the critic became a persuasive
and thus powerful arbiter of taste and value in the visual arts. 41
This change in the Artworld was from the artist working on a commission
basis for an aristocratic patron to a "freelance" basis subject to critics and public opinion.

It was a major shift, not only in the economic

structure but in the foundation of the Artworld.

The artist was free

to confront his public through the medium of exhibits.

However, it

should be noted that the "public" was still a relatively small group.
Holt has put the number of subscribers to literary journals at twenty
thousand which is still a small number of people when compared to the
entire population of Europe at the time.

The range of classes in-

volved in the visual arts had expanded from the aristocracy and

cler~J
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to the middle class, but the "people" were still another entity who did
not belong in the Artworld.
The final element in the formal structure of the Artworld was
the advent of the museum.
items of interest to them.

Originally, a few wealthy men collected
These collections included examples of the

natural sciences, books, archeological finds and art works.

Normally,

the collections were broken up upon the death of the collector.

How-

ever, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the collections
became larger, more methodical and provided the basis for later museum
collections.

For example, the collections of the naturalist Aldrovandi

formed the nucleus of the museum of Bologna; the manuscripts of the Earl
of Arundel formed the center for the book collection of the British
Museum.

The earliest modern use of the term "museum" appears to have

been in connection with the collection of Elias Ashmole in 1659, which
was the foundation of the Ashmolean Museum at Oxford that became the
property of the University in 1677.

Gradually, museums became more

well defined and were devoted to either science or art.

The formation

of art museums was stimulated by the excavations of Pompeii and Herculaneum and the need to classify and display the objects found.

The

Museo Pio-Clemenrine was completed in 1774 and housed many examples of

Greek and Roman art, catalogued according to Winckelmann's history of
art styles.

The Grand Galerie of the Louvre was dedicated to house

France's collection of art in 1793 and the Musee des Monuments Francais
was formed to house chronologically arranged medieval and
sculpture two years later.

Renaiss~~ce

Museums added to the stature of the nation

and were appropriately designed.

Holt notes:
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The exterior form of the museum was that of a temple. Within the
museum, heterogeneous art objects of different cultures and previous epochs were subjected to analysis, documentation, and classification. Chronology determined the arrangement of the objects.42
Holt also remarks on the differences between the older collections of
the nobility and the new museums:
The nineteenth-century museum was separated from the collections
in princely or royal galleries by the impersonal nature both of
the installations and the acquisition of the objects. In the
museum the single art work or fragment existed for itself, available for contemplation and stimulation, free from any specific
purpose. The art museum was a treasury of objects that came to
possess the quality of reliquaries whose presence augmented the
quality of nationality.43
The nationalistic character of the early museums, as well as their educative nature, is clearly stated by Alexander Lenoir, the first curator
;

of the Musee des Monuments Francais •

•

A museum in its institution ought consequently to have two objects
in view; the one political, the other that of public instruction.
In a political point of view, it should be established with sufficient splendor and magnificence to strike the eye and attract
the curious from every quarter of the globe, who would consider
it as their duty to be munificent amongst a people friendly to the
arts; in point of instruction, it ought to contain all that the
arts and sciences combined can produce towards the assistance of
public teaching: such were the museums of the ancients, whose memory we still respect.44
Another museum of a national character was the National Gallery, opened
in London in 1838.

Holt describes the early years of the National Gal-

lerJ and its reception by the public:
Drawn by the exhibitions as much as by the visits of royalty,
Londoners flocked to th.e building, located on "the finest site in
LOndon," the recently completed Trafalgar Square designed by John
Nash. Visitors crowded into the National Gallery on Mondays especially, when admission was free. On May 1, ~~e traditional opening date of the Royal Academy exhibition, they hurried to the East
Gallery, where t.'le Hanging Committee placed the paintings it considered exceptional, and noted eagerly which artists had been further honored by having work placed "on the line" marked 'by a
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ledge about eight feet from the floor.45
Public response was good and museums of art were founded all over
Europe

~~d

America.

While at first most contained paintings or sculp-

ture only, and normally that which was of a national character, the
museums gradually began to acquire objects and artifacts from all over
the world and from every period of artistic production.

The amalgama-

tion of so many diverse pieces created the "museum context," that is,
the removal of the work of art from its original context and the substitution of an aesthetic context.

Andre Malraux comments upon this trans-

formation:
So vital is ~~e part played by the art museum in our approach to
works of art to-day that we find it difficult to realize that no
museums exist, none has existed, in lands where civilization of
modern Europe is, or was, unknown; and that, even amongst us, they
have existed for barely two hundred years. They bulked so large
in the nineteenth century and are so much part of our lives to-day
that we forget they have imposed on the spectator a wholly new
attitude towards the work of art. For they have tended to estrange the works they bring together from their original functions
and to transform even portraits into "pictures."46
~ialraux

at a later point expands his notion of a changed context:
'

The Middle Ages were as unaware of what we mean by the •11ord "art"
as were Greece and Egypt, who had no word for it. For this concept to come into being, works of art needed to be isolated from
their functions. What common link existed between a "venus" which
was Venus, a crucifix which ~as Christ crucified, and a bust? But
three "statues" can be linked together.47
The context of a particular piece of art changed when it was pulled into the Artworld and was given aesthetic value.

If one views an African

mask in a museum one •Tiews it as an aesthetic object.

To the general

observer, little may be known of its function in the society within
which it was created; in fact, its original function has little to do
with its viewing.

The utilitarian and contextual connotations that
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it had originally have been superseded by the museum context; the
mask is no longer an accoutrement of ritual but rather a piece of
primitive art analyzed as an abstract and expressionistic work.

When

viewed in the museum context, any object was to be viewed as a work of
art, as an autonomous artwork.
Thus, by the beginning of the twentieth century we have a matured
Artworld, an Artworld that gradually evolved from the practices of the
Renaissance to an institution with which we are now familiar.

It is

populated by artists, critics, connoisseurs and lovers of art; its
habitat is the museum, the gallery and the printed page.
Summary

In the centuries following the Renaissance, developments quickly
succeeded one another until the adult figure of the Artworld was formed.
The first of these developments, the Mannerist "crisis," contributed
several elements to the maturation process.

The first of these was an

art which both built upon and reacted to the preceding period of art.
In this dual response, the first "modern movement" in art was created.
I think we are able to say that the visual arts turned inward at this
point; the artist became aware of what had been done within art as a
point of commencement for his own work.

The notion cf "movement" in

art came into being with the Mannerists and gradually evolved to the
concept of the changeable nature of the visual arts.
The second element that the Mannerists contributed to the development of the Artworld was in the area of theory.

While the

Renaissance had given a theoretical foundation ·to art, the Mannerists
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expanded the area of theory to include the aims of art and the nature
of the creative act.

What had been philosophical writings on the

nature of beauty and the good, both in Nee-Platonic and Peripatetic
traditions, fully entered the Artworld as theories of beauty.

With the

advent of the Baroque age, these theories underwent change as a new
generation of artists reacted to the Mannerists.

Bellori stated that

the idea had its roots in the senses, that is, what is perceptible in
the natural world, but that the senses were purified by the idea, which
is man's sharing in the divine.

The delicate balance that Bellori had

set remained one of the main tenets of art theory; through LeBrun and
Poussin, it entered the writings and attitudes of the French Academy
where it was filtered and passed on to the rest of the European art
establishment.
As the Baroque period moved into the Rococo and Neo-Classical,
three other elements became fixtures in the Artworld that completed its
basic structure.

These elements were the introduction of art exhibits,

critics and museums.

The pattern of the French Academy, which became

pervasive throughout Europe, contributed much toward the development of
exhibits and critics.

The French court of Louis XIV used their tight

control of artists to add splendor to the monarchy; exhibitions of the
new works of art, first for the court only and later for the general
public, certainly fulfilled the desire for aggrandizement.

The openings

became social occasions of the first magnitude -- and also became a
mark of the refined individual.

Because of the evolution of schools

and styles of painting, the general public needed a guide through the
sometimes bewildering displays.

Hence, the critic was born.

Follow-
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ing in the Renaissance tradition of the educated layman, most critics
were just that.

The advent of the newspaper and periodical gave these

critics a voice and a forum for debate, and they soon became powerful
arbiters of public taste.
museum.
of

~~e

Another arbiter of public taste was the

Two conventions of the Artworld followed from the development
museum: the demarkation between the original context of the

work and its aesthetic properties became important, and the creation of
the resulting thought that any object might be brought into the Artworld and examined on an aesthetic level.

Both of these concepts are

important, and both result from the museum context.
What then are the main characteristics of the Artworld at this
point?

First, we have an art object which may be differentiated from

the medieval art product by the fact that it is no longer primarily
utilitarian in nature but is autonomous.

It is no longer inevitably

tied to architecture or book page but occupies its own space.

The

art object has lost much of the utilitarian feature of instruction for
a more contemplative attitude of viewing it as a beautiful object.
Moreover, it is an object which requires an unveiling, requires a critic
and is at home in the museum.

It also requires a body of theory,

theory on creating and on the aims of art, to be understood.

Second,

the artist is no longer considered a craftsman but an artist who draws
upon theorj and imagination to create the art

objec~.

His status is

no longer a maker, an equivalent to the weaver or winernaker, but a
creator, an equivalent to the poet or man of genius.
confined to the guild and patron, but by
produce a work for his own satisfaction

vir~ue
~d

of

He no longer is

reputation~

can also

present that work to the
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public at large.

He draws not only on the world around him for in-

spiration, but also on the body of work done by his predecessors.
While at times subject to strict canons of representation, the artist
still sees himself more and more as an interpreter and feels the need
to express his own vision.
more stratified.

And third, there is an audience which is

Dolce noted that he was less concerned with the

masses than the man of refined intelligence, and the advent of the
academy reinforced this trend toward a much more restricted and select
audience.

The more participation that was required to belong to the

art establishment, the fewer people who were qualified to belong.
Even the audiences of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were
given only limited participation in the art establishment, who made
judgments about the art object, and who exercised power within the art
establishment.

Thus, the basic structure of the Artworld is intact by

the beginning of the

twentie~~

centur] and

~~e

only remaining component

to be examined is aesthetic theory which will be discussed in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER IV

AESTHETIC THEORY AND THE ART"flORLD

Introduction
In the last two chapters the various elements which combined to
form the Artworld were examined.

The gradual transformation of the

Artworld from an informal to a formal institution had been accomplished
by the end of the nineteenth century.

The art object had emerged as

an autonomous entity surrounded by critics, curators, dealers and art
historians; the artist had emerged as creator, as an interpreter of his
world and his vision; the audience had become educated and refined
spectators, led in their taste by critics and curators.

However, the

last remaining transformation, from art object to aesthetic object remains to be discussed.

In this chapter, I would like to briefly ex-

amine the beginnings of aesthetic theory in the eighteenth centur] to
demonstrate how they contributed to the conventions of the Artworld
and at the same time were a result of the Artworld which they described.
This excursion into eighteenth century aesthetic theory is intended to
demonstrate the two-way relationship between aesthetic theory and the
Artworld.

Each aesthetic theory will not be examined in detail, rather

particular features of several seminal theories will be discussed.
There will be an equally brief excursion into the modern Artworld to
demonstrate the other side of

~~e

relationship.
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Origins of Aesthetic Theory
As we have seen, the theory which surrounded the visual arts until the eighteenth century was primarily a distilled version of Platonic or Peripatetic thought voiced by practitioners of art or those
laymen closely associated with the practice of art as connoisseurs or
critics.

In the eighteenth century this condition changed with the

emergence of the philosopher into the perimeters of the Artworld.

This

is important because it defined the study of art as a distinct area of
study, a pursuit that separated the arts from other activities in a
. 1 way. 1
specl.a

The naming and describing of aesthetics as a separate field was
made in the middle of the eighteenth century, but other developments
had somewhat prefigured it.

TWo British writers of the early eight-

eenth century should be noted here: Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl
of Shaftesbury and Joseph Addison.

Both contributed to the notion of

"disinterestedness" which was not only important to later aesthetic
~~eories

but indicated the separate nature of the

aes~~etic.

Very

basically stated, disinterestedness describes a state of contemplation
in which self-interest or self-concern is excluded.

There is an ab-

sence of practical action directed toward an anticipated goal as well
as motivation for such action.

As a mode of contemplation, the view-

er's attention is directed toward and absorbed in the object of such
contemplation.

That a work of art could find itself the object of such

attention in the theories of Shaftesbury and Addison was an indication
of the changed status of artworks; they were no longer thought of as
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utilitarian objects but rather as autonomous objects.
The concept of disinterestedness first appears in Lord Shaftesbury • s Characteristics o.f Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, a series of
essays published in 1711.

Shaftesbury was much influenced by the Cam-

bridge Platonists and he examined ethical and religious concerns of the
day from much the same perspective.

Shaftesbury was reacting to re-

ligious and ethical systems which depended upon future reward or punishment for motivation.

Neither seeking good for ultimate benefits

nor avoiding evil for fear of punishment seemed to Shaftesbury to be
an adequate basis for either ethics or religion; rather, he proposed
seeking the good for its own sake only, without thought of eventual
reward or punishment.

This contemplative mode he called disinterested-

ness, and his concept of disinterested love may be found in the following passage:
A love which is simple, pure, and unmixed, which has no other object than merely the excellency of that being itself, nor admits
of any other thought of happiness than in its single fruition.~
Thus for Shaftesbury, the love of God is unconcerned with anything
other than "its sL"lgle fruition."

In a like manner, the contemplation

of virtue is of primary importance for the moral life; contemplation of
virtue is not instrumental and a man who demonstrates disinterestedness
is one who has no thought of eventual reward or punishment.
However, it is not just in the area of moral life
uses the concept of disinterestedness.

t~at

ShaftesburJ

He applies it specifically to

objects which require the same kind of disinterested attention, that
is, nature and works of art.
da~cnstrates

disinterestedness

The most commonly cited passage which
wit~in

an aesthetic domain is the
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following:
Imagine • • • if being taken with the beauty of the ocean, which
you see yonder at a distance, it should come into your head to
seek how to command it, ~~d like some mighty admiral, ride master of the sea, would not the fancy be a little absurd?
Let who will call it ~~eirs • • • you will own the enjoyment
of this kind to be very different from that which should naturally follow from the contemplation of the ocean's beauty.3
He continues:
Suppose that, viewing such a tract of country as this delicious
vale we see beneath us, you should, for the enjoyment of the
prospect, require the property or possession of the land.
The covetous fancy • • • would be as absurd altogether as
that other ambitious one.4
In these examples and the two which follow, Shaftesbury suggests a
contemplation of beauty in which enjoyment of the object is the only
end of the contemplation.
or use the objects.

This excludes a desire to possess, control

While this parallels his beliefs for the moral

life, the contemplation of beauty is a separate area, in a large part
because the object of contemplation is different.
attention is focused on the

·~rk

When disinterested

of art, the perfection of the per-

ception and contemplation of the work are the only ends.
Joseph Addison published a series of articles in the Spectator
entitled "Pleasures of the Imagination" which certainly point toward
~~e

concept of aesthetic responsiveness.

To Addison, the imagination

was contained neither in the realm of sense experisnce nor understanding.

While dependent upon an original experience of the sense of

sight, i.e., "when we have them actually in our view," the imagination
mediates the original experience:
We cannot, indeed, have a single image in the fancy that did not
make its first entrance through the sight; but we have the power
of retaining, altering, and compounding those images, which we
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have once received, into all the varieties of picture and vision
that are most agreeable to the imagination
5
Addison does not specifically define the imagination, but does convey
that the imagination is neither purely sensual nor cognitive:
The pleasures of the imagination, taken in their full extent, are
not so gross as those of sense, nor so refined as those of the
understanding. The last are, indeed, more preferable, because
they are founded on some new knowledge or improvement in the mind
of man; yet it must be confest, that those of the imagination are
as great and as transporting as the other.6
Addison divides the pleasures of the imagination into those which are
primary, that is, the pleasure derived from objects before us, and
secondary, the pleasure derived from memory or from objects that recall
a memory.

He then discusses the man of polite imagination:

A m~• of polite imagination is let into a great many pleasures,
that the vulgar are not capable of rece~v1ng. He can converse
with a picture, and find an agreeable companion in a statue. He
meets with a secret refreshment in a description, and often feels
a greater satisfaction in the prospect of fields and meadows,
than another does in ~~is possession. 7
Al~"lough

Addison does not use the term "disinterested," this passage

indicates the same lack of possessiveness, or of desire of possession,
as Shaftesbury's description.
pleasing to the imagination.

Addison also examines nature and art as
He finds nature more pleasing but notes

the relationship between the two:
• • • we find the works of nature still more pleasant, the more
they resemble ~~ose of art • . • Hence it is that we take delight
in • . • any thing that hath such a variety or regularity as may
seem the effect of design, in what we call the works of chance.
If the products of nature rise in value, according as they
more or less resemble those of art, we may be sure that artificial works receive a greater advantage from their resemblance of
such as are natural • . • 8
He then turns his attention to architecture, statuary, painting, description and music, all of which are classified as secondarf pleasures
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because they are associative. 9

In all of these cases, Addison is re-

ferring to a particular kind of experience, one that he might have
called "aesthetic" had the term been in use.
of this experience occurs in his discussion of
and the uncommon as

e~~ally

The clearest exposition
~he

beautiful, the great

viable initiators of the experience:

Our imagination loves to be filled with an object, or to grasp
at any thing that is too big for its capacity. We are flung into
a pleasing astonishment at such unbounded views, and feel a delightful stillness and amazement in the soul at the apprehension
of them.1°
This then, is the pleasure of the imagination for Addison: a delightful
stillness and amazement in the soul.

He has described a contemplative

mode and something that is set off from usual experience.
~~is

He has used

kind of experience to describe the response to the beauty of

nature, and also its great and uncommon qualities.

Furthermore, he has

extended this experience to the Fine Arts, although he does not name
t.'le system as such.
The recognition of a separate type of perception or perceptual experience led to the publishing of Meditaticnes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten in 1735.
In contrast to Shaftesbury and Addison, Baumgarten was influenced by
Descartes, Leibnitz and Wolff and tried to work out a system of aesthetics according to Cartesian principles.

There is no mention of the

term "beauty" in Baumgarten's theory; instead, he is interested in the
examination of perception, its autonomy and perfection.
especially in relation to

t.~e

arts, is the core of

Perception,

Baumgar~en's

theory.

Basic to his dissertation was the way one might differentiate poetry
from eloquent language and

~~roughout

.'>!edi tationes he attempted to de-
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scribe ways in which this could be accomplished.

Baumgarten notes:

The philosophers should be busy in general in drawing boundar]
lines and especially in defining accurate limits between poetry
and ordinarJ eloquence.ll
Bau."tlgarten coined the word "aesthetics" to describe this special study,
later expa~ded to the arts in genera1, 12 which was based on ~1e belief
that the arts represented cognition of an inferior kind because this
cognition was mediated by the senses:

• • • things known are to be known by the superior faculty as the
object of logic; things perceived [are to be known by the inferior
facultyi as the object] of the science of perception, or aesthetic. 3
For Baumgarten, aesthetics is the counterpart of logic for sensate cognition and has as its end the perfection of perception.

The rational-

ists had put a premium on clear and distinct ideas, that is, logical
discourse.

Baumgarten based his theorJ of poetry and the arts on sen-

sate cognition, that is, clear and confused ideas.

By "confused,"

Baumgarten meant a fusion of sensual images as opposed to the distinct
ideas of purely cognitive discourse.

The clarity he refers to is what

he describes as "extensive" clarity, that is, a compilation of sensuous data as opposed to the "intensive" clarity of logic where essences are the main concern.

Thus, for Baumgarten, logic and scientif-

ic discourse are concerned with classification and essences; poetry and
~,e

arts are =oncerned with an intuitive representation of concrete

sense data.

Both are modes of cognition; sensate cognition is an in-

ferior mode, but one that can still be perfected.
All three of these theories, despite their differences, point
toward the development of a philosophical inquiry that was new and
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different.

In Shaftesbury, disinterestedness was central to all of

his writings, but was applied specifically to an aesthetic domain.

Yet

it is difficult to perceive Shaftesbury as a turning point in aesthetic
theory, perhaps because large portions of his ideas on the aesthetic
were embedded in discussions of the moral life.

However, the impor-

tance of Shaftesbury lies in his introduction of the notion of disinterestedness to the arts.

Addison is equally important because he

turns his attention clearly on the nature of the aesthetic experience.
He discusses both nature and the arts within the context of the aesthetic and includes the great and the uncommon along with the concept
of beauty as integral parts of the aesthetic experience.

Both men,

publishing in the early portion of the eighteenth centur], were pivotal
figures in aesthetics in that they took important steps toward underscoring the nature of the aesthetic as an autonomous activity in life.
Baumgarten, although his eventual influence upon aesthetic theor] was
considerably less than Shaftesbury or Addison, should be remembered as
more than the man who coined the term "aesthetic."

Baumgarten thought

that the aesthetic domain was clearly different from other areas of
life and tried to apply a rationalist analysis to the aesthetic.

In

doing this he established a systematic approach to the aesthetic.
Jerome Stolnitz, commenting on the installation of disinterestedness as a central point of aesthetic theory, suggests that it also
led to the distinguishing of Fine Arts from those of utility or entertainment:
that the work of art must be evaluated in respect of its
intrinsic structure and significance, not as a moral ''ehicle or
a source of knowledge • • . That the work is autonomous and unique,
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and that it therefore defies such extra-aesthetic criteria, is
an idea which comes into prominence only after the concept of
"disinterestedness" has established itself. For it is just in its
relation to disinterested perception that the work is autonomous
-- because it is attended to for its own sake -- and unique -because such perception dwells upon and relishes its qualitative
individuality • • • It is by reference to the aesthetic attitude
that other thinkers distinguish "fine" art from "the arts of utility" or "entertainment."l4
This is a complex statement
points to be considered in it.

~~d

there are several important

First, that the Artworld, by its evo-

lution from the Renaissance had already prepared

~~is

step.

As we

have seen in the previous two chapters, the art product of the Middle
Ages evolved into the art object of the eighteenth century through its
gradual divorce from utilitarian purposes -- the art object had been
divested of most of its utilitarian connections with architecture and
common usage, its ritualistic connotations and its feature of instruction -- and had been invested
a beautiful object.

wiL~

its own purpose -- to be viewed as

If this had not happened, the next transformation,

from art object to aesthetic object, could not have happened.

And in-

deed, it is this second transformation which Stolnitz has described.
Disinterestedness describes and names what had become a common feature
of the Artworld,

tha~

is, the contemplation of the art object without

utilitarian or contextual considerations as primary.

The art object

had attained the status of an autonomous object, one whose purpose for
being was to be appreciated; the aesthetic experience gave a name for
the mode of appreciation or contemplation for this special object.
Aesthetic theory attempted to describe this mode of attention, to discuss it in systematic terms, and to define the
thetic.

perL~eters

of the aes-

Harold Osborne has noted the autonomy of the work of art:
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A work of art, it is now held, is in concept an artifact made for
the purpose of being appreciated in the special mode of aesthetic
contemplation; and although particular works of art may be intended to do other things and may in fact serve other purposes
as well as this, the excellence of any work of art as art is
assessed in terms of its suitability for such contemplation. This
is what is meant by claiming that art is autonomous: it is not
assessed by external standards applicable elsewhere, but by standards of its own.lS
This statement occurs during a discussion of the autonomy of
of art as a relatively new attitude.

~~e

work

Osborne goes on to note that

while the autonomy of the work of art is an accepted notion now, it
was first

L~plied

within the notion of the Fine Arts, which made its

appearance in the eighteenth century,
to aesthetic theory.

~~d

from there found its way in-

The concept of disinterestedness was the first

step toward an aesthetic theory; it was also the first naming of the
work of art as autonomous by those outside the practice of art.
Second, although Stolnitz does not emphasize it, the concept of
evaluation is an important facet of his statement.

He notes that the

classification of works into Fine Art categories or other categories is
dependent upon an evaluation of the work's uniqueness and qualitative
individuality.

I think this sense of evaluation is important in the

transformation of the art object to aesthetic object and very much part
of the structure of the Artworld at the time of this transition.
are several interconnected issues here.

There

One is that evaluation became

part of being an artist, an artist who was known by reputation as an
individual capable of creative genius.

The medieval craftsman had been

embedded within the guilds and guild system; when individuality had
been introduced in the Renaissance and extended by the Mannerists and
academic system, the evaluation of the work of a particular artist be-
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came an integral part of the Artworld.

Not only was a work judged on

the basis of its craftsmanship, but also on the notion of the creative
genius of its creator.

The later development of the connoisseur, the

critic and the curator reinforced the idea of evaluation as a major factor of the Artworld.
Another issue is the consistency of the visual art object from
the Renaissance to the time in question in Western European culture.
While painting had experienced several movements -- the Renaissance,
Mannerist, Baroque, Rococo and Neo-Classical movements -- there had
been a general agreement within the Artworld as to what constituted a
painting: (1) a general agreement to

theme~

(2} a basic understanding

of plastic elements, which might include composition, perspective,
color, light, pigment, line, space, general handling of

surface~

and

(3) the representational method, that is, production of a recognizable
image of the natural world.

For example, in the early part of the

eighteenth century a great debate raged among painters who were divided
among the "Poussinistes" and the "Rub~nistes."

The one group, who fol-

lowed the writings of Poussin and LeBrun, insisted that form was the
most important of the plastic elements; those who were "Rub~nistes"
thought color the most important of these elements.

The debate was in-

ternal to painting, that is, was based on a discussion of accepted conventions that were painterly.

The discussion assumed canvas, pigment

and a certain relationship among methods of painting.

The style of

painting of Antoine Watteau, a colorist, might be discernable from
that of Hyacinthe Rigaud but both would be
as paintings.

recogn~zable

and regarded

The same kind of understanding or assumptions could also
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be applied to sculpture, or for that matter, to other arts.

Thus, at

the time when aesthetic inquiry was becoming a separate field, the
visual arts had developed an evaluative criteria that changed somewhat
from movement to movement but was basically consistent because there
was noting within the Artworld to challenge the criteria.

It is not

until the mid-nineteenth century that the Artworld began to experience
serious challenges to its conventionally held notions.

We might say

then, that when aesthetic inquiry was originated, it was within an Artworld that had solidified and concrete expectations of artists, their
products and the presenters of the works of art.
For brevity's sake, I think we can say that early aestheticians
were aware of a particular kind of attention that was afforded to nature
and to certain objects which were considered works of art.

Aesthetic

theory, which even in its inception was multifaceted, grew in different
directions as it developed.

Attention was most often concentrated on

the aesthetic object or the perception of the object.

Rather than pur-

sue in detail the developments within these areas of aesthetic theory,
I would like to return briefly to the Artworld to delineate changes
which affected the further development of aesthetic theory.
The Modern Artworld
In the mid-nineteenth century, the visual arts began what was to
be a radical change.

This change was most apparent in what I have de-

scribed as the tmderstanding within the Artworld as to what constituted
a particular medium.

I described those factors

L~

painting as a gen-

eral agreement to themes, a basic understanding of plastic elements,

100

and a representational method.

The challenge to the first came pri-

marily from Gustave Courbet and the movement called Realism.

Courbet

wanted to paint the reality of what he could see, that is, the people
and situations around him.
~;at

In this he defied the conventional approach

had long been in operation which stated that grand themes of

painting should come from fiction, history or imagination. 16

Courbet

was criticized for the commonplace character of the subject matter of
painting, but in his treatment of the everyday he opened the way to
later painters.

Courbet noted:

In particular, the art of painting can consist only in the representation of objects visible and tangible to the painter. An
epoch can be reproduced only by its own artists. I mean by the
artists who have lived in it. I hold that the artists of one
century are fundamentally incompetent to represent the things of
a past or future century • • • It is in this sense that I deny
the existence of an historical art applied to the past. Historlcal art is by its very nature contemporary.l7
He continued:
I hold also that painting is an essentially concrete art, and
can consist only of the representation of things both real and
existing.l 8
Courbet

~;ereby

placed the everyday and the commonplace directly with-

in the artist's vocabulary.
Courbet also was criticized for his "sloppy" handling of the
medium, particularly in using the palette knife at times (see figure
8).

The application of paint to the surface of the canvas in this

manner, for a finished product, was virtually unknown.

This was the

beginning of the challenge to the second of our factors, the plastic
elements.

This second challenge was begun in earnest by the Impres-

sionists and continued through successive movements until the present
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Figure 8: The Stone Breakers, Gustave Courbet, 1849 •
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Figure 9: Detail, Portrait of Mme. Pissarro Sewing Near a Window,
Camille Pissarro, 1878-79.
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time.

Katharine Kuh has analyzed the modern movements in terms of

their break-up of the plastic elements and has commented:
The art of our century has been characterized by shattered surfaces, broken color, segmented compositions, dissolving forms
and shredded images. Curiously insistent is this consistent emphasis on break-up • • • And during the last hundred years, every
aspect of art has been broken up --color, light, pigment, form,
line, content, space, surface and design.l9
If we examine the Impressionists, we can see this initial breakup.

Their emphasis on the fleeting moment and the quality of light

caused experimentation with the palette knife to build up juxtaposed
areas of color that when viewed from a distance merged together to
form highly saturated colors (see figure 9) •

This also ended the tra-

ditional underpainting and brushwork techniques.
These initial experiments were carried further with PostImpressionism, Expressionism, Cubism, Futurism, Constructivism, Surrealism and finally abstract art.

During the progression of these

movements, all of the conventional plastic elements were changed in
drastic ways.

For example, the multiple viewpoints and simultaneous

presentation of discontinuous planes by the Cubists resulted in a new
kind of pictorial space (see =igure 10).
During this same progression, our last factor, the representational mode, was also denied.
nies

~~e

The very term "abstract" explicitly de-

representational mode as the only

mea~s

for expression.

While

the abstract movement might be seen as climaxing with Kasimir Malevich's
Suprematist Composition: White on White

L~

1918, I think the progres-

sion through each movement -- and their interrelationships -- was not
in fact complete until the New York School of abstract painting in the
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Figure 10: Guitar and Flowers,
Juan Gris, 1912.

Figure 11: Man.' s Head, Pablo
Picasso, 1907.

Figure 12: Mask, Itumba region,
Africa.
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1950's with works of artists like Jackson Pollack and Willem de
Kooning.

It should also be noted that although I have used the term

"progression," I have not used this term to describe a linear sequence
where one movement followed another.

Rather, many movements were con-

current with one another and some artists were active in more than one
movement.
Simultaneous with the break-up of all of the conventional factors
which had previously defined painting there was also a recognition of
new objects, new media and new technology in the Artworld.

The new ob-

jects ranged from Japanese prints to African masks and other ritual objects.

I have commented in the last chapter on these items and the

fact that they were brought into the Artworld, but it should be noted
here that they helped to broaden the idea of what art could be.

These

objects influenced many modern artists directly (see figures 11 and
12); they also expanded the plastic elements by bringing to attention
their expressive and stylized elements.
The new media included photography and film, and most recently
video.

Each required its own category within the system of the arts

because each had characteristics similar to but yet very different from
existing categories.

For example, film was like theatre in that it

shared the basic story-telling characteristic; yet film changed the
idea of proscenium presentation, time sequence and location.

The

viewer was no longer "rooted" in one position while the action of the
drama unfolded before him in the theatre.

With film, an overview of a

battlefield, medium shots and close-ups of

~~e

men in battle could be

cut together to move the viewer through the action.

Small details

105

could be shown as easily as full-scale scenes.

Moreover, film could

demonstrate the mind of the actor by directly projecting such psychological effects directly onto the screen, either as special effects or
flashbacks.

In Spellbound (1946), Gregory Peck's character begins to

unravel his amnesia by association of certain sights with others; this
associative process is shown to the viewer by short cuts of the original
sight with those he is currently seeing.

There are many other conven-

tions within film that helped to separate it from the theatre, but this
discussion is not intended as a complete description or analysis of
film.

Rather, it should be noted that the new media were admitted to

the Artworld and that they helped to enlarge the horizons of the Artworld.

It should also be noted that each of these --photography,

film and video -- had its roots in what Erwin Panofsky has called folk
art.20

In other words, they began as documentation (photography) or

entertainment (film and video) and only later came to be recognized as
art forms.

The genesis of photography as an art form will be discussed

in detail in chapter 6 as a case study for the theory of the institutional analysis of the Artworld.
The new technology included materials never before used, from
plywood and plastics to neon, and methods like vacuum molding.

These

new materials and methods also helped to change the categories in which
~~e

visual arts had been placed.

Painting and sculpture had been two

definite and distinct areas, but with new materials and the explorations they caused, sculpture and painting became much less differenti~ d • 21
a.e

Sculpture often had painted surfaces that were comparable to

two-dimensional paintings, and which were quite different from older
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Figure 13: Still Life, Pablo Picasso, 1914.
polychrome forms.

An early example of this blending of the conven-

tions of the two media was Pablo Picasso's Still Life which featured
painted wood and curtain fringes (figure 13).

Also, paintings were no

longer always contained within two-dimensional space, but expanded to
three dimensions, either by the addition of three-dimensional objects
to the canvas or by expanding

~,e

dimensions of the canvas itself.

Sculpture and painting also lost additional distinctive characteristics
with their entry into performance pieces and environmental events. · A
good example of this merger of theatre and sculpture was Jean Tinguely's
The Machine that Destroyed Itself, a found-object sculpture which selfdestructed on the grounds of the Museum of Modern Art.
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The addition to the Artworld of new objects, media and technology in conjunction with the break-up of the traditional plastic elements increasingly focused attention on what constituted the work of
art.

As we have seen, from the Renaissance to the mid-nineteenth cen-

tury, the work of art was clearly identified as a work of art; the
definition between what was art and what was not art was clear.

In a

sensef until the modern movements, the more clearly the work of art
was perceived as autonomous, the more clearly the conventions governing
the work of art were understood by artists and audience.

It would

clarify the changes in the Artworld if we could examine them with the
aid of a more formal definition of conventions.

George Dickie has

noted the use of conventions within the Artworld as a relational attitude betwee~ artist and audience. 22
primary and secondary.

He describes the conventions as

The primary convention is a shared agreement

between artist and audience that they are engaged in a formal activity;
secondary conventions include spatial and/or temporal cues which emphasize the primary convention.

He suggests that primary and second-

ary conventions are specific to each art form and while the secondary
conventions may change as the Artworld changes, the primary convention
remains stable.

A more detailed discussion of Dickie's use of con-

ventions will be presented in the next chapter, but this will at least
provide a starting place for the notion of conventions within this context.

The idea of a primary convention is tied very closely with the

viewing of the artwork as autonomous.

If we examine Dickie's state-

ment that a primary convention is a shared agreement between parties
who are engaged in a formal activity, we must ask what that formal
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activity is.

The answer to the question must be the creation and

viewing of the work of art.

This assumes an autonomous work of art,

one that is created to be viewed for no other purpose than its viewing
and ultimately its appreciation.

Thus, we can say that the primary con-

vention is the creation or viewing of the autonomous work of art.

As

we have seen in the previous two chapters, the work of art became recognized as an autonomous creation beginning in the Renaissance; until
some of the modern movements, this autonomy of the artwork was clear
and unchallenged.

The same was true of the primary convention.

For

example, Impressionism or Cubism, although appearing different from
previous movements in art, did nothing to challenge the proposition
that artists were creating and audience viewing a painting, a work of
art.

It should be noted that when these works were originally created,

they were not accepted by all members of the Artworld as great, or
even good art; however, this was an evaluation of the work, and at no
time were these objects rejected as not being artworks.

On the other

hand, Marcel Duchamp's "ready-mades" challenged the very notion of an
artwork as autonomous and the primary convention of sculpture.

The

essential nature of a "ready-made" negated the autonomy of the art object because the objects were mass manufactured and "pulled" from
everyday life by the artist basically as they were. 2 3

In other words,

the act of creation -- if any -- was in the naming of the objects as
artworks, not in the conventional creation of the object.

The formal

activity engaged in between artist and audience was radically challenged -- Duchamp's The Bicycle Wheel or Fountain, albeit within the
precincts of Dadaism, challenged the notion that the work of art was
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created as an original form from the artist's imagination to be viewed
and appreciated as a work of art.

The Bicycle Wheel was not hewn from

stone nor carved from wood -- it was assembled with "pre-fabricated"
parts; Fountain was a more blatantly "pre-fabricated" piece.

The in-

tention of the artist was one of challenging the primary convention.
Duchamp used the ready-mades as neutral objects presented to the Artworld as works of art.

Octavio Paz has noted:

The "ready-mades" are anonymous objects which the gratuit:ous gesture of the artist, by the simple act of choosing them, converts
into "works of art." At the same time this gesture dissolves the
notion of work. Contradiction is the essence of the act; it is
the plastic equivalent of the pun: the latter destroys meaning, the
former the idea of value. The "ready-mades" are not anti-art, like
so many of the creations of Expressionism; they are an-artistic.
• • • It would be stupid to discuss them in terms of their beauty
or ugliness, as much because they transcend beauty an~ ugliness
as because they are not works but rather question-marks or signs
of negation that oppose the idea of works.24
Duchamp himself adds:
Dada was an extreme protest against the physical side of painting.
It was a metaphysical attitude. It was a way to get out of a
state of mind -- to avoid being influenced by one's immediate environment, or by the past: to get away from cliches -- to get free •
• • • Dada was very serviceable as a purgative.25
The ready-mades were a protest, a challenge and, as Paz has noted, a
visual pun which signalled a questioning of the values of the Artworld.
They were a way of negating the conventional attitudes of the Artworld,
of obtaining distance from the conventions of the Artworld.
While Duchamp and the Dadaists were challenging the primary convention, other artists were challenging the secondary conventions, albeit

wi~~

the intention of exploration rather than negation.

As we have

seen, Dickie has described secondary conventions as spatial and/or
temporal cues which reinforce the primary convention.

Dickie does lit-
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tle to broaden this description, especially for the visual arts.

If

we are to view the secondary conventions as Dickie has suggested, as a
relational attitude between artist and audience, not only the work hut
the relations between artist and audience must be included.

I think

the secondary conventions can he made more explicit by referring to
the historical precedents cited earlier.

For example, the general

agreement to theme, the handling of plastic elements and the use of a
representational image might very well he considered secondary conventions for painting during the seventeenth through mid-nineteenth
centuries.

Along with these elements, the framing and hanging of

paintings in special galleries and museums, the internal discussion of
painting and the subsequent theories of painting, the analysis and
criticism of painting by critics, juries and curators, and the viewing
of the paintings by an audience in special places, i.e., museums, galleries or the artist's studio, might also be considered secondary conventions.

Therefore, I think we can say that the secondary conventions

for the visual arts include the way of handling the plastic elements
and the theory surrounding the creation, presentation and viewing of
the artwork.
As Dickie has noted, these conventions are subject to change in
a way the primary convention is not.

The secondary conventions which

have been noted changed with the onslaught of the modern movements in
~~e

mid-nineteenth century.

As we have seen, the most immediately

noticeable changes were in the handling of the plastic elements.

But

the theories surrounding painting were also dramatically changed
for artists, presenters and audience.

As each movement formed, dis-
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cussion centered on the concerns of each movement and the discussion
expanded the notions of what the painting could be.

The Impression-

ists' concern for the momentary image of nature, the Cubists' use of
simultaneous surface images, or the Post-Impressionists' emphasis on
the expression of emotion all broadened the notion of what painting
could look like, as well as what the audience response could and should
be.

The viewers of the modern movements were asked for an educated

awareness of the rather fluid conventions the artists were forming as
few other audiences before had been.

In relation to the change which

had occurred in the Artworld previously, the changes which the modern
movements caused were extremely rapid and forced the viewer constantly
to expand his understanding of the secondary conventions.

This ap-

plied to aestheticians as well as other members of tae Artworld.

For

example, the older aesthetic theories of beauty and mimesis were illequipped to deal with art that did not reflect the traditional secondary conventions.

As a result, new aesthetic theories, or modifications

of older theories, were formulated in response to the challenges of
the new art.
1913.

One such theory was that of Clive Bell first published in

It was intended as a positive response to the criticism of

Post-Impressionist painters.

Bell argued that the essential quality- in

all works of art was that which provoked a personal response from the
viewer, an aesthetic emotion.

He called this quality "Significant

Form" and defined it as "lines and colours combined in a particular
way, certain forms and relations of forms, [which] stir our aesthetic
emotions." 26

He rejected the older notion that the essential quality

was beauty because the response to beauty is not confined to the work
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of art and the object of aesthetic emotion must be a more confined
idea applicable only to the work of art.

In this way, the older idea

of beauty was transformed to Significant Form, a term which was more in
keeping with the non-representational images of the Post-Impressionist
painters.

Also, Bell's emphasis on the aesthetic

~otion,

a subjective

response, reflected the shift from a search for absolute objective
criteria for the work of art to a more relativistic and personal response on part of the viewer.

This shift was indicative of the chang-

ing and expanding condition of the secondary conventions.

To be rele-

vant to the state of the Artworld, aesthetic theory had to make adjustments to reflect the change from stable and consistent secondary
conventions to those which were expanding with each new movement of
the moderns.
It should be noted that the rapidity of change and the expanding notions about the work of art increased the gap between the "average man on the street" and the members of the Artworld.

Very often

"Everyman" did not come into contact with the new art and when he did,
his lack of understanding of the secondary conventions precluded appreciation of the artwork.

The Artworld had become too complicated

and too riddled with competing

~~eories

to be viewed without an educa-

tion in the preceding and current theories.
The change and expansion of secondary conventions continued
and, with the addition of new objects, media and technology, resulted
in a proliferation of new movements in the 1960's and 1970's which
challenged virtually every convention of art that had previously
existed.

Op, Pop, Minimal, Photographic Realism, Conceptual and Anti-
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art movements, to name a few, have all found favor within the Artworld
in the last twenty years.

Pieces like Jasper John's Painted Bronze

(figure 14}, Robert Smithson's Spiral Jetty (figure 15), a number of
empty flower pots, piles of dirt or other objects or even telephone
calls that circled the earth have all found their way into museums,
galleries, art books and journals.

The state of the Artworld at this

point has led one critic and artist, Helen Parmelin, to state:
Something extraordinary is happening in the world of art. The
situation, which was already strange, is now approaching a bizarre climax. It is a situation where anything goes and all is
forbidden • • • a situation in which art has every right 1 is
losing its every means, and is discovering other means. 20
Some of these movements seem to be challenging the secondary conventions, some the primary.

For example, Photographic Realism seems to

be attempting to blur the distinctions between the secondary conventions of painting and photography; earthworks and wrappings seem to
challenge the museum setting.

On the other hand, Anti-art and Con-

ceptual movements seem to resume where Dada had stopped, that is, with
a challenge of the primary convention.

While Anti-art mounts the

challenge in a very similar manner to Dada, Conceptual "art" attacks
the central idea of the art object, i.e., replaces the art object with
a concept.

The artifacts which are presented in museum or gallery are

usually documentation of the concept or resulting act, although occasionally the act itself is presented in a museum setting.
It is at this point that traditional aesthetic theories found
themselves unable to deal with the Artworld they were supposed to be
addressing.

A new discussion

'NaS

begun which tried to define art in

a way which could take into account these occurrences within the Art-
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Figure 14: Painted Bronze, Jasper Johns, 1960.

Figure 15: Spiral Jetty, Robert Smithson, 1970.

115

world.

One of the most interesting theories to emerge from this dis-

cussion is the institutional theory of art which will be discussed in
the next chapter.
Summary

The final transformation of art object to aesthetic object was
made in the eighteenth century with the appearance of aesthetic theory
as a separate field of philosophic inquiry.

Lord Shaftesbury provided

the first step by applying the principle of disinterested contemplation
not only to the moral life but also to nature and art.

Joseph Addison

took another step with the attention that he focused on the nature of
the aesthetic experience.

In his discussion of the "man of polite

imagination," he describes what is very much the same quality that
Shaftesbury had called disinterestedness.

In both cases, aesthetic

disinterestedness pointed to the aesthetic as an autonomous activity
in life.

The confirmation of this autonomy could be seen with Alexander

Gottlieb Baumgarten when he instituted the study of the aesthetic as
a particular branch of philosophic inquiry, named it as such and began
the systematic study of it.

With the initiation of a particular branch

of study of the aesthetic and the installation of disinterestedness as
a central concept in the aesthetic, the autonomy of the art object was
fully realized.

In this way, aesthetic theory joined the other cur-

rents within

Artworld which had formed a new chapter in the history

~~e

of art in the West.
~inct

The territory occupied by the Artworld was a dis-

area defined by the autonomy of the aesthetic object, an object

created only to be viewed and appreciated.
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Conditions within the Artworld did not remain stable for long.
BY the mid-nineteenth century, the series of modern movements had begun and with them, a series of challenges to the conventions of the

Artworld.

I have described the primary convention as a shared agreement

between artists, presenters and audience that they are engaged in a
formal activity which involves the autonomous work of art.

The sec-

ondary conventions for the visual arts included the way of handling
the plastic elements and the theory surrounding the creation, presentation and viewing of the artwork.

It was these secondary conventions

to which most of the modern movements addressed their challenges.

The

first challenge came from the Realists, particularly Courbet, who
challenged the convention of theme.

In a like manner, the modern

movements, beginning with the Impressionists and continuing through the
Abstract Expressionists, challenged the way of handling the plastic
elements.

The representational image was no longer considered the only

method of painting.

The theory which surrounded each of the modern

movements provoked discussion of the secondary conventions and these
conventions were broadened to include the new artworks.

Along with

the acceptance of the new movements and the subsequent expansion of the
secondary conventions, new objects, new media and new
ther expanded the secondary conventions.

tec~~ology

fur-

As a result, the conventional

distinctions between media were blurred: painting could encompass threedimensional shapes or photography could be sculptural.

Thus, while not

changing the primary convention -- the work of art remained autonomous
-- the secondary conventions changed as artists explored new paths of
creation.
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However, there were challenges to the primary convention in the
form of Dada, Anti-art and Conceptual movements, the latter two occurring within the last fifteen years.

These attacked the primary con-

vention in two ways: by denying the autonomy of the artwork and by
denying the artifactuality of the artwork.

Both Dada and Anti-art

removed the object which was created and original and replaced it with
common, everyday objects that were usually mass produced.

The con-

ceptual movement removed the artifact and replaces it with a concept
or an act which represents the concept.
convention has been challenged.

In both cases, the primary

The evaluation of the work of art

seems to be as much in a state of flux today as other convention within the Artworld.

Traditional theories of the aesthetic seem inadequate

to deal with the barrage of contemporary movements and their challenges
to the conventions of the Artworld.

However, one must remember that

these challenges appear within the context of the Artworld -- they appear in museums and galleries, on the pages of art books and critical
reviews.

It would seem that a theory could be constructed which took

into account the current state of the Artworld as well as past conditions in its formation.

The institutional analysis of George Dickie

seems to provide a starting place for a discussion which can encompass
the medieval illuminated page, the masters of the Renaissance and
wrapped buildings.

Dickie's theor1 will be examined in the next

chapter, as will certain modifications which will render it a more
complete analytical tool.

What should be noted at this point is that

the Artword is a formal institution with conventions governing its
participants.

These conventions, both primary and secondary, have
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grown with the formation of the Artworld since its genesis in the
Renaissance.

They include an agreement between participants that they

are engaged in a formal activity involving an autonomous work of art
as well as secondary conventions which govern the creation and viewing
of the artwork.
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CHAPTER V

A THEORY OF THE ARTWORLD

Introduction

In the last chapter, the origin of modern aesthetic theory in
the eighteenth century was examined.

Aesthetic theory became a sepa-

rate field of philosophic inquiry and with the concept of "disinterestedness" as a keystone in the theory, the autonomous nature of the work
of art was underscored.

The advent of the modern movements in the

mid-nineteenth century caused the modification of older aesthetic
theories and the formation of new ones in an attempt to better analyze
occurrences in the Artworld.

In this chapter, I would like to examine

one of the most recent theories, that of the institutional analysis
of George Dickie.

The theory has caused considerable comment within

philosophic circles, most of it critical.

However, by making certain

modifications based on the concept of the Artworld which has been presented in the previous three chapters and on John

Raw~'

notion of an

institution, a more complete institutional theory may be achieved.
Using these modifications, the perimeters of the Artworld then will be
examined in an effort to distinguish art and non-art objects.
An Institutional Analysis

While there have been several institutional theories proposed
120
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in recent years, one of the most complete is that of George Dickie.
Central to this analysis is the attempt to define art, and to fit
this definition within a cultural, social and historical context.

He

rejects the traditional attempts to define art and the contention that
art cannot be defined and instead argues that art can be defined by
relational and non-exhibited properties.

As Dickie sees them, the

defining characteristics are artifactuality and conferred status.

A

work of art is placed within the realm of the Artworld when it has conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some member
or group of members of the Artworld.

But before examining these ideas,

it would be best to begin with a few distinctions that Dickie makes.
Dickie begins with the well known proposal that art cannot be
defined by Morris Weitz. 1

Weitz maintains that art cannot be defined

because the necessary and sufficient properties for such a definition
are lacking.

If such properties existed, then art would be a closed

concept, but by its very nature it is open.

The properties which are

often taken for defining are in reality noting but "strands of similarities.

Weitz notes:

But the basic resemblance between these concepts is their open
texture. In elucidating them, certain {paradigm) cases can be
given. I can list some cases and some conditions under which !
can apply correctly the concept of art but I cannot list all of
them, for t~e all-important reason that unforseeable or novel
conditions are always forthcoming or envisageable.2
Thus, to Weitz the concept of art and its subconcepts remain open.
Dickie refutes this argument in the following manner:
All or some of the subconcepts of art may be open and the generic
conception of art still be closed. That is, it is possible that
all or some of the subconcepts of art, such as novel, tragedy,
sculpture, and painting, may lack necessary and sufficient con-
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ditions and at the same time that "work of art," which is the
genus of all the subconcepts, can be defined in terms of necessary
and sufficient conditions. Tragedies may not have any characteristics in co~mon which would distinguish them from, say, comedies
within the domain of art, but it may be that there are common
characteristics that works of art have which distinguish them
from nonart, nothing prevents a "closed genus/open species relationship.3
The second of Weitz's arguments, that of classification, breaks
down the concept of "X is a work of art" into descriptive and evaluative utterances.

For the descriptive sense, Weitz sees no necessary or

sufficient conditions but rather the "bundle of properties" which
normally are present when we describe a work of art but which need not
be.

Weitz notes:
None of the criteria of recognition is a defining one, either
necessary of sufficient, because we can sometimes assert of something that it is a work of art and go on to deny any one of these
conditions, even the one which has traditionally been taken to be
basic, namely, that of being an artifact: consider, "This piece
of driftwood is a lovely piece of sculpture." Thus, to say of
anything that it is a work of art is to commit oneself to the
presence of some of these conditions. • • But • • • no one of
these or any collection of them is either necessary or sufficient.4

Weitz also points out that the evaluative sense is used in two ways:
one in which the criteria of evaluation becomes synonymous with art or
one

whe~e

the criteria are used to justify a particular definition of

art:
. • • what cannot be maintained is ~~at theories of the evaluative use of "art" are true and real definitions of the necessary
and sufficient properties of art. Instead they are honorific
definitions, pure and simple, in which "Art" has been redefined
in terms of chosen criteria.S
Dickie criticizes Weitz's position in several ways.

First, he

makes note of Maurice Mandelbaum•s 6 contention that the essential
nature of art may be found in non-exhibited relational characteristics,
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that is, those characteristics which are not directly perceivable or
are perceivable only in combination with others.

Mandlebaum makes the

following distinction:
Like the biological connections among those who are connected by
family resemblances • • • such a characteristic might be a relational attribute, rather than some characteristic at which one
could directly point and say: "It is this particular feature of
the object which leads me to designate it as a work of art." A
relational attribute of the required sort might, for example, only
be apprehended if one were to consider specific art objects as
havin? been created by someone for some actual or possible audience.
In other words, Mandlebaum sees the relationship between object, artist and audience to be more important than specific qualities of the
pictorial surface.

The former, relational characteristics, are basical-

ly what Dickie considers non-exhibited properties while the latter,
specific qualities of pictorial surface would be an example of exhibited properties.
Second, Dickie introduces Richard Sclafani's8 notion of a third
sense of "·..rork of art," that of the contingency of a non-artifact upon
a paradigm work of art which is always an artifact.

For example, a

piece of driftwood, ·l'lhich is a non-artifact, may have properties in
common with Brancusi's Bird in Space which is an artifact.
continuation of these properties in the eyes of

t~e

It is the

viewer which ex-

tends the term "work of art" from Brancusi's sculpture to the piece of
driftwood.

Sclafani notes that there is a primary or paradigmatic

sense which is derivative.

It should be noted here that the derivative

sense is normally employed from non-artifact to artifact, but it can
also be used from artifact to artifact.

Dickie

~~en

proceeds to as-

sert that there are three senses of the concept "work of art":

(2.)
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the classificatory or descriptive which is primary; (2) the secondary
or derivative; and (3) the evaluative.

The first sense, the classifi-

eatery, is to Dickie a purely descriptive one used to identify a work
of art.

Dickie notes:

We rarely utter sentences in which we use the classificatory
sense, because it is such a basic notion: we generally know immediately whether an object is a work of art, so that generally
no one needs to say, by way of classification, "That is a work of
art" • • • 9
The evaluative sense, on the other hand, carries quality meanings, or
a belief that the referent has valuable qualities.

Thus, the phrase

"That is a work of art" can have three meanings or senses of interpretation, depending upon the context of the utterance.

In the case of

any of these three uses, Dickie believes that artifactuality is a
necessary condition of the work of art.
Dickie then proceeds to the second defining characteristic of
a work of art, that of conferred status.
Dante's "artworld."

To do this, he enters Arthur

During a discussion of two "identical" appearing

paintings and their possible interpretations and derivations, Danto
turns to knowledge of theories of art and history of art as essential
to the understanding of contemporary art.

He states:

To see something as art requires something the eye cannot decry
an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history
of art: an artworld.lO
Dickie interprets this statement as agreement with Mandelbaum's idea
of non-exhibited relational properties.
is pointing to

~~e

Dickie believes that Danto

institutional nature of art; that art is not only

the doing but the knowledge of what has been done and why within a
loosely structured coalition of artists, presenters and audience.
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Dickie uses the term "artworld" "to refer to the broad social institution in which works of art have their place." 11

He further delineates

his use of "institution" by equating it with an established practice.
This established practice exists within the systems (theatre, painting,
sculpture} and subsystems (theatre of the absurd, collage, junk sculpture) of the artworld and is not only the doing of the artists involved, but the conferring of status upon the products of their work
by the people who populate the artworld of a particular time and place.
This brings us to Dickie's definition of a work of art:
A work of art in the classificatory sense is {1) an artifact (2)
a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status
of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on
behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld) .12
Dickie draws an analogy between some legal actions of the state and
the conferring of status in the artworld.
indicting someone, the

chairma~

For example, a grand jury

of the election board certifying that

someone is qualified to run for office, a minister pronouncing a couple
~an

and wife, or congress conferring the status of national monument

upon a thing or an area.

He also gives examples of a non-legal con-

ferring of status: a degree bestowed by a university, the election of
someone as Rotary president, or the title of village idiot upon someone.

He goes on to say:
The counterparts in the artworld to specified procedures and lines
of authority are nowhere codified, and the artworld carries on
its business at the level of customary practice. Still there is
a practice and this defines a social institution. A social institution need not have a formally established constitution, officers, and bylaws in order to exist and have the capacity to
confer status -- some social institutions are formal and some are
informal.l3

He defines the members of the artworld as practitioners, producers,
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museum directors, rnuseum-goers, theatre-goers, reporters for newspapers, critics, art historians, art theorists, philosophers of art
and others.

"In addition, every person who sees himself as a member of

the artworld is thereby a member." 14

And it is through membership in

the artworld that status may be conferred.

A sure sign of this would

be a performance in a theatre or a show in a museum or a gallery.
However, one person acting alone and privately may confer this status:
The status in question may be acquired by a single person's acting on behalf of the artworld and treating an artifact as a candidate for appreciation. Of course, nothing prevents a group of
persons from ccnferring the status, but it is usually conferred
by a single person, the artist who creates the artifact.lS
This conferring of status is in no way connected with the
evaluation of the work.

The work becomes a candidate for appreciation;

it is not necessary that the work actually be appreciated.

By "ap-

preciation" Dickie means "in experiencing the qualities of a thing one
finds them worthy or valuable." 16

He finds no difference between ap-

preciating art and nonart except that the object of appreciation differs.

However, he does believe that the work in question must have at

least the potential for being appreciated.
Dickie also introduces two other conditions to the artworld:
human intentionality and originality.

The first he uses to eliminate

things like chimpanzee paintings and accidents.

If paintings done by

chimpanzees were exhibited at a scientific museum, they would not belong to the artworld; however, if they were exhibited in an art museum,
they would belong to the artworld because they were sponsored, with
h~~an

intentionality by

~~e

director of

~he

museum.

It should be noted

here that Dickie is not using human intentionality in the interpretive
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sense, that is, the author's intention as a necessary part of the meaning of the piece, but rather as a human function.

So, in other words,

if a museum curator found the paintings of a chimpanzee interesting
enough to be hung in the museum, then those paintings would enter the
artworld via the credit of the curator.
The second condition,
copies from the artworld.

~~at

of originality, would remove fakes or

Originality covers the concept of a deliber-

ate fake for Dickie, but following the lead of Danto, he believes
that work which is derivative or imitative is different from the deliberate attempt to duplicate a particular work of art.

Dickie draws

an analogy between the function of originality within the artworld and
the concept of patent law.

He states:

Once an invention has been patented, one exactly like it cannot
be patented -- the patent for just that invention has been "used
up." In the case of patenting, of course, whether the second
device is a copy or independently derived is unimportant but the
copying aspect is crucial in the artistic case. 17
Dickie believes that originality is an "antecedent requirement" for
painting but is hesitant to extend this condition in a blanket fashion
over the rest of the arts.
In the discussion of aesthetic objects, Dickie again rejects
various aesthetic attitude theories which are based in the belief that
~~e

aesthetic attitude is a special psychological state.

Instead, he

believes a relational "attitude" exists between artist and audience in
that they are both aware of the conventions of the art practice and
are governed by these conventions which he describes as primary and
secondary conventions.

He suggests that the primary convention is a

shared agreement between artist and audience that they are involved in
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in a formal activity. 18

Secondary conventions would include spatial

and temporal cues which emphasize the primary convention.

While the

primary convention changes very little, the secondary conventions are
subject to change as the artworld changes.

Dickie does little to ex-

plain or define these conventions except to offer an example of a
traditional theatre production.

The primary convention is the realiza-

tion of the audience and actors that they are present at a theatre
presentation --perhaps as opposed to a riot or a supermarket opening.
The secondary conventions might include a specific stage area, seats
arranged to view the stage, house lights dimming, the curtain being
raised, a program, an arrangement of acts or scenes in a serial order,
and even a backstage area which is concealed from the audience.

These

secondary conventions might vary from theatre to theatre, or with the
kind of play presented; certainly the conventions of the ancient
Greek theatre are different from the theatre of the absurd or from No
drama of Japan.

Dickie also states that these conventions are learned

in an unself-conscious way, much like people learn their native language.

Thus, Dickie feels that discrimination between aesthetic ob-

jects and other things are obtained through knowledge of these conventions:
In general, the ability to make the locations and distinctions in
a given case depends upon an understanding of the type of art
which the given case is an instance. This means that the distinguishing of aesthetic objects is a piecemeal affair, since it
depends upon experience and understanding of specific art forms.
Each art form has a primar] convention or practice for presenting
works of that type, together with a variety of secondary conventions of greater and lesser importance.l9
Thus, the conventions are used to "locate and specify" the aesthetic
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features of a work of art.

He further states:

• if one must know of the aspect in order to understand what
is presented through a primary convention, then that aspect of
the work is also an aspect of the aesthetic object of the work. 20
One might say that the artist is bound by the primary convention, that
is, to create a work of art, and the audience shares in this aspect of
the aesthetic when it seeks to locate and specify the aesthetic features in the work.

Dickie makes the distinction between the work of

art and its aesthetic features in the following manner:
Quite naturally, when the concern is with what makes something a
work of art • • • the emphasis will be on the aspects of the artworld that make creation possible -- on acting on behalf of an
institution, on conferring of status, on being a candidate, and
on appreciation. When, on the other hand, the concern is with
the aesthetic and nonaesthetic features of works of art • • • the
emphasis will be on those features of the artworld that govern and
direct the spectator's attention. The connectedness of the two
aspects of the artworld is obvious: the aesthetic object is the
aspect of the work for the sake of which the art is created.21
Let us examine a few examples that Dickie gives to concretize
his views.

First of all, a piece of driftwood could be considered a

work of art in the derivative sense if it shared properties with a
paradigm work of art.

It would also seem that this piece of driftwood

would have to be elevated to the status of candidate by a
artworld.

ma~er

of the

Second, a work like Duchamp's Fountain would seem to be a

work of art in the classificatory sense because an artist has conferred
the status of candidate for appreciation and a museum director has
seconded

~~e

nomination.

However, the question of the potential for

appreciation might be raised in that the gesture of Duchamp could be
appreciated but the object itself could not.

Dickie replies that only

a minimal potential value is needed and that Fountain shares many
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qualities with the work of Brancusi and Moore like gleaming white surface, pleasing oval shape, etc.
ies and copies.

Finally, there is the case of forger-

Dickie insists these are not legitimate works of art

because, like a patent, once the original piece is enfranchised, the
franchise has been used up.

As has been noted, Dickie is hesitant to

extend his comments on originality beyond painting, but even in the
area of painting he does not really distinguish between a forgery and
a copy.

He furthermore ignores related areas, those of printmaking and

photography, where the distinctions could be demonstrated more readily.
Dickie's theory is interesting in many ways, but one of the most
important features is the flexibility it gives to the artworld.

Ob-

jects which were not originally created as part of the artworld can be
brought into the artworld.

And change within the artworld is acom-

modated by the acknowledgment of the change in membership through succsssive centuries, periods, artists and audience.

Change, to Dickie,

is a key concept, and perhaps the raison d'~tre for the institutional
analysis.

However, in his concern to formulate a theory which not only

accommodates the artworks of today but also those of past and future,
Dickie has left the theory ver] open-ended.

If drawn to its logical

cor.clusion, any person can elevate any object to the status of a candidate for appreciation.

This is one of the main criticisms that Dickie's

many commentators have made.

Other criticisms point toward problems

with the classificatory nature of the theory and the sense of ambiguity
in conferral of status, in the object of conferral and in membership in
the artworld.
instit~tional

Let us examine some of these criticisms leveled at the
theory.
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The first criticism has been voiced by Ted Cohen 22 and although Dickie has considered some of the objections previously, it
would be well to examine Cohen's position.

Cohen asks for clarifica-

tion of two points: "in what circumstances and by whom can this property be bestowed, and what qualifies a thing to receive this bestowal."

23

Cohen questions the example of the Fountain that Dickie has cited -who precisely confers status upon the object, the artist or the museum
director?

Would the end result have been the same if a plumbing

salesman had entered the piece in the show?

What if Duchamp had been

rejected from the show but displayed the object in his studio?

And

what if a well known artist came to your house and drew on the wall to
cover some cracks in the wall?
workman doing the same act?

How would this be different from a

Cohen suggests that at least part of the

answer to these questions lie in the enfranchisement of the artist:
• • . one of the ways the "art•11orld" breeds Art is by way of enfranchising Artmakers. Anyone who did "Nude Descending a Staircase" and the rest would be an Artmaker (however good), but only
an Ar~~er could make that urinal Art (if it is art). It is
because he did "Nude" that Duchamp is an artist; it is because he
is Duchamp that "Fountain" is not just a misplaced urina1. 24
He does not pursue this line but turns again to question the construetion of Dickie's analogy between legal enfranchisement and the artworld's.

He points out that an aldermanic candidate is not just

"made," even by the mayor or the head of an election board.

Rather,

there are constraints placed upon the candidate (minimum age, residence requirements, etc.).

And, if the analogy is extended, then there

must be constraints placed upon the art object also, or upon the artmakers.

Furthermore, Cohen states that "there must be a boundary, how-
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ever hard to chart, between making art, and trying but failing to
make art." 25

Cohen returns to Duchamp's Fountain, stating that per-

haps we should neither judge it art nor non-art:
• • • I think we must give up the compulsion to decide about
"Fountain," to rule it in or out; and I think we can do this by
taking seriously the suggestion that whether "Fountain" is art
depends upon whether and how a certain kind of act was performed •
• • • What we need to discuss are the ways in which "Fountain" is
very much like normal art and the ways in which it is altogether
unlike normal art, and then how this bears on the character of
Duchamp's act of putting it forward and having it called art.26
Dickie answers Cohen on several of these objections.

First, he

states that Fountain must be classified as an artwork because it shares
with other artworks the distinction of being in art history books and
being displayed in galleries.

And he adds that "In the case of more

ordinary art it is less easy to notice the status of the works as art
because we are so used to experiencing such works and because their
non-status features seize our attention."27
Second, Dickie denies that every feature of political analogy
could be transferred to the artworld.
to suggest

~~at

the ability to confer

"Specifically, I did not intend
~~e

status of candidate for ap-

preciation is acquired in a formal, procedural way •

,.28

Dickie

also feels that his example of the plumbing salesman reinforces the
non-formal qualities of the artworld.

He believes that "the plumbing

supplier could have conferred the relevant status if he were able to
see himself in relation to and as an agent of the artworld and wanted
to create a work of art."29

And, in reference to Cohen's question to

the status of Fountain if it had been refused by the museum, Dickie
says:
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in speaking of an institutional setting, I was not talking
about a thing's being in a museum or some sL~ilar physical institutional location; rather, I was referring to a social way
of thL~king about and regarding things -- a social practice.30
And third, Dickie restates his belief that any object can be
placed as a candidate for appreciation.
• • • the very things which Cohen cites as paradigms of things
which cannot be appreciated -- ordinary thumbtacks, cheap white
envelopes, and plastic forks -- have appreciatable [sic] qualities
which can be noted if one focuses attention on them. Photographs
frequently bring out these qualities of quite ordinary things by
focusing narrowly on them.3I
He adds that if there are constraints and whatever they might be, they
are not very limiting

~~d

almost anything can be a work of art.

Richard Sclafani has also raised questions concerning the analo-

gy that Dickie used.

First, he asks who can and who cannot confer

status on behalf of the artworld.

What he is asking for is a deline-

ation of who is a bonafide member of the artworld.

Sclafani thinks a

minimal condition of membership in the artworld is a concept of what
a work of art is.

If Dickie's analogy is to work, whether it refers

to a political, an ecclesiastical, or an academic world, knowledge of
that world is necessary.
L~plies

In other words, to be a member of that world

a knowledge of "a vast network of beliefs, attitudes, conven-

tions, social practices, and historical happenings" 32 of that world.
Sclafani rules out

~~e

plumbing salesman because he would not have the

knowledge of the artworld sufficient to make this gesture:
The significance of Duchamp's act cannot be divorced from his
ingenious conception of what the artworld of ~~e World War I era
was and was not ready for. This required an intimate familiarity
on Duchamp's part wi~~ both the recent and not so recent history
of European art. It also required the recognition and development of t~e notion that artistic creativity need not involve manual craftsmanship.33
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Second, he questions Dickie's contention that any object can
have art status conferred upon it.

Sclafani suggests that at least

some justification be given for the object's status since so much is
left unsaid about who can bestow status.

Third, he asks for clarifica-

tion of the act of conferring status: is it simply the act of production or is there another act which actually confers the status?
Fourth, he asks if Dickie's definition does actually reflect linguistic practice.

And he suggests that Dickie is "committ.ed far more

strongly to a theoretical stance on the nature of art than he would
like to admit." 34
Bruce N. Morton suggests that one odd feature of Dickie's theory
is that it makes creating a work of art independent from an institution
virtually impossible.

For instance, i= a painter painted a picture in

his studio, kept it there for several days without shewing it to anyone, and then destroyed it, Morton believes it would still be a work of
art according to Dickie's sense; however, if the same procedure was
done by a person outside the artworld, someone impelled

to do this one

painting even though he had no knowledge of art, Morton feels that
Dickie would have difficulty fitting this example into his definition
without stretching it to include everyone living in the society:
To admit that almost any member of society has sufficient status
within an artworld to be able by his own activity to confer the
status "work of art" is to abandon any serious reliance on the
notion of an institution within the institutional analysis. So
we require some criterion (even if a very lenient one) to pick out
those individuals able to confer status from within an institution, from those unable to do so because they are outside the institution.35
He goes on to point out that to say membership is contingent upon

•
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creation of a work of art develops a circular notion in which works of
art exist for the artworld rather than the artworld existing for -or because of -- works of art.

He also denies the existence of the use

of the classificatory sense in common practice.
Joseph Margolis feels that Dickie's position can offer much in
the way of analysis of the world of art, but as a definition it lacks
credibility.

Dickie has described artifactuality as a simple matter,

but Margolis disagrees.

In the example of the driftwood, Dickie has

stated that artifactuality

c~~

be conferred upon the object.

Margolis

asks if this is concurrent with conferral of the status of candidate,
and if they are, then what distinguishes the two?
~~at

He also believes

Dickie has not delineated the conventions within which an aes-

thetic object is presented and what is

aes~~etically

relevant to ap-

preciation.
A fuller criticism is offered by Anita Silvers, who quotes from
Samuel Butler's "Erehwon" and suggests that the artworld occupies in
reality a similar place as Erehwon -- nowhere.

She begins her argument

with a brief look at the artworld as sketched by both Danto and Dickie,
and some differences between these

pic~ures.

Silvers believes that

Dante's artworld is people by theories about art: "In Dante's Artworld, agents seem to play a secondary role; they exist to formulate
relationships holding among art objects and to devise art theories
which express these relationships." 36

She sees Dante's agents dealing

with art objects in a more constrained manner because they must deal
with the objects from a theoretical perspective.

On the other hand,

she feels that Dickie's artworld is peopled with agents who are vir-
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tually unrestrained by art objects; indeed, it seems that "the Artworld is completely logically prior to art objects ... 37

Silvers draws

an analogy between the conferring of status and between naming a child.
A parent has an institutional position and can name a child anything
the parent wants, regardless of the consequences to the child, other
relatives, or the parents themselves.

Naming a boy "Sue" may lower

the credibility of the parents in society in general, but the name remains valid.

However well this reflects Dickie's position, Silvers be-

lieves that naming a child is an act of individuation -- naming a
specific -- where naming art should be a classification rather than an
act of individuation:
Presumably, classification involves sorting things together and
distinguishing them from other sorts of things in terms of their
membership in a group rather than in terms of their individuality.
Sorting things into a class or group would be useless if everything equally warranted membership in the class.3 8
She continues that there is nothing in Dickie's artworld that
would stop a member from conferring status upon every object in sight,
thus destroying all distinctions between the artworld and the world in
general.

She points to the pen and paper she is writing with and finds

it hard to believe that they can share the same aesthetic status as
Guernica.

She discounts the notion that Dickie would accuse her of

confusing the evaluative and the classificatory sense by stating that
the two are "inextricable bound together in usage." 39

She adds that

in cases where new theories are proposed and the artworld is expanded
these theories very often are defended by evaluative criteria as well
as acknowledged through evaluative criteria:
The heart of the matter, then, lies in the attempt of Institution-
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al theorists to provide a liberal and tolerant account of art on
which everything, from can openers and plumbing fixtures to
artists' actual or threatened self-inflicted wounds, has an equal
opportunity to qualify as art. This drive for what might be
termed universal aesthetic sufference [sic] enjoys a current
popularity which extends beyond the purveyors of the Institutional
Theory of Art. 40
Silvers sees this phenomena resting upon what she calls the
"transmigration thesis" where an object is changed into an art object;
moreover, it is these borderline cases which she finds interesting.

In

contrast to Cohen, she believes that borderline cases are important by
the very fact that we are forced to consider what we

me~~

by art.

She

re-examines the Fountain and suggests that what Duchamp did was not
only to make a gesture but combined an object with the gesture in a
total activity. 41

She goes on to note that this complicates Fountain

because one must be aware of the activities of Duchamp as a Dadaist as
well as the object itself; and the "uninitiated" would not be able to
apprehend both constituents.

She believes that Fountain was about

art, that it was a conceptual statement. 42

However, while she agrees

that there is an institutional aspect to art -- an identifiable group
of participants who travel within the artworld -- she denies that it
is the definition of art:
• • • the fact that members of an institutionally defined group
engage in applying the term ''art" to unusual objects does not
prove that the term "art" is defined by reference to that institution. To make such an inference is analogous to claiming that,
since policemen constitute the group who most often apply the
term "criminal," the term is to be defined by those who are members of the institutionally defined Policeworld. 43
She finishes by saying that a

defini~ion

of art cannot be contained

within the confines of the Artworld.
Jay E. Bachrach also finds several points of criticism of
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Dickie's position.

First of all, he takes the act of conferring status

as a command "that one take X in terms of certain conventions for appreciating it." 44

And a command once ordered is difficult to dispute.

However, disputes do exist, and they exist because other people refuse
the command, or perhaps because they issue a counter-command that X is
not art.

What is needed is justification

that X may prove valuable

enough to be appreciated.

Next, Bachrach asks how an individual acts

in behalf of the artworld.

He suggests that acting in an institution

as a member is not the same as acting on behalf of that institution
and that those who act on behalf of an institution normally have been
granted the authority to do so:
But in presenting a work he (the artist) does not act in behalf
of anyone but himself unless he is acting as the representative
of a school of art, a movement, or an academy, in short some institution in the narrower, more clear-cut sense of that term, not
the kind that Dickie says the artworld is. 4 5
If Dickie means acting in the artworld then the distinctions between
the artworld and the general world are blurred and become meaningless.
Next Bachrach looks at other structures within the artworld.
For instance, membership within the artworld seems to be overly democratic in that an occasional museum-goer has the same status as an art
historian.

Moreover, it is unstable.

In addition, the individuality

of the conferring of status I'enders a social structure meaningless
if one does not need museums or critics to confer status, then why
have a social institution at all?
~orld

Thus, Bachrach feels that the art-

should not be present within a definition of a work of art.

He

believes that status can be conferred but in a much different social
sense

tha~

Dickie has used:

139

The huge, untrained silent majority who time and again object to
the untraditional offered as a work of art demonstrate that conventions are not sufficient for making it so • • • I would like to
stress •
that one takes the object as work of art only insofar
as he or she accepts it as initially worthy for appreciation.46
Bachrach finds the terms "taking as a work of art" and "is a work
of art" as non-equivalent terms.

He further states that an object must

have positive or negative aesthetic values -- not neutral as in the
case of the tumbtack -- to be considered a work of art.

He then offers

his own definition of the work of art, one which omits Dickie's artworld. 47
Patricia H. Werhane argues that Dickie has ignored the evaluative
aspect of the classificatory sense.

She believes that it is possible

for a viewer to say that "X is not a work of art," not basing th}.s
opinion on the object's lack of interesting aesthetic qualities but
rather questioning the artworld's classificatory criteria.

She states:

"The classificatory process is a selective process, a process which employs criteria for selectivity.

And at least some of the criteria for

selecting and rejecting phenomena as art are evaluative." 48

She lists

some of the evaluative criteria used in the artworld as follows: (1)
any artifact done in a conventional or traditional medium or uses traditional materials; (2} phenomena produced by recognized
phenomena produced by those who claim to be

artists~

artists~

(3)

(4} natural ob-

jects presented as art objects; (5) original uses of materials, art
forms, or subject matter; and {6) artifacts with a content that comments upon philosophical,

~~eological

or sociological concepts.

She

further states that this list is not conclusive, is used by producers
and consumers, is subject to historical and cultural constraints, but
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does not need to be used singularly nor applied all the time.
is important to recognize that there is a

p~ocess

But it

of selection which

is prior to the art object:
This process is partly arbitrary, and the qualifications for
"final choices" cannot be exhaustively delineated. But this is
an important process, because what is finally chosen as art is
determined by these evaluative a~d selective standards. Thus the
institutionalization of art phenomena depends on evaluative criteria, and this element of classifying art has largely been overlooked by institutional definitions.49

w.

E. KennickSO has also raised some questions about Dickie's
He contends that the whole notion of the artworld is obscure

theory.

as Dickie uses it and that not using the concept of art aids in this
obscuration.

Kennick asks who exactly belongs to the artworld -- a

museum's custodian as well as the director and his secretarJ?

Equally

unclear is the concept of acting on behalf of a university in the conferring of a degree, which can also be denied or withdrawn.

And how

do we know if an artifact has had the status of candidate conferred
upon it?

Could we expect some notification process?

Kennick has no

answers for these questions, nor does he expect Dickie's theory to provide any.
As a final comment on Dickie's institutional theory, let us
examine Jeffrey Wieand's assertion that there cannot be an institutional theory at all.

He begins by delineating two kinds of institu-

tions: A-institutions which are action oriented and governed by rules
and P-institutions which are agent oriented.

He notes:

An A-institution, then, is simply a kind of conventional act. Examples of such acts include promising, christening, saluting, and
marrying; examples of social practices which are not A-institutions
include smoking cigarettes and driving to work.
In general, a
P-institution acts through those of its members who are empowered
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to act on its behalf.Sl
He gives the Catholic Church as an example of the latter when it is
engaged in fund raising or condemning an injustice.

He also notes a

certain ambiguity in the term "institutional act." 52

Wieand states

that the actions of an A-institution, as an established practice, must
conform to the conventions and that the members of a P-institution, as
a social group, must act as agents.

He argues that Dickie has

de~

scribed what is a P-institution but has refused to acknowledge the artworld as anything but an A-institution.

He feels this is particularly

true when conferral of status is considered.

If viewed as a P-insti-

tution, Dickie's artworld still lacks the necessary ingredient for an
institution because Dickie's artworld has agents without having an accreditation process.

Wieand also cites the lack of the ability to name

or describe the conventions which govern the conferral of status as a
sign that Dickie's theory is not an institutional one.

He concludes

with the following:
If art itself were an institution in an interesting sense it
would either be a kind of conventional act or a social group.
But art, understood as a body of works or as an activity, is
plainly neither of these things • . . Art is inextricably bound
up with social institutions and artistic conventions, but none of
these is so §rucial or pervasive as to determine the nature of
art itself. 5
The main concerns that these critics have voiced seem to center
on what they perceive as an egalitarian description by Dickie that obscures positions and processes within the Artworld and also obscures
any delineation between the perimeters of the artworld and other
worlds.

An underlying concern seems to be the absence of any evalua-

tive criteria within Dickie's theory, whether the evaluation is ap-
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plied to the aesthetic object or to the membership process within the
artworld.

The next section in this chapter will draw a more definitive

portrayal of the artworld which will render this theory a better analytical tool and answer the criticisms that have been described.

The Artworld Revisited
It might appear that from the foregoing considerations that
Dickie's theory of art is somewhat of a shambles.

But, however severe

his critics have been, all have taken him seriously enough to carefully
examine his theory.

I think this serious attention is indicative of

the very perceptible sense of confusion within the Artworld today.

For

example, the philosopher's concern about a lack of evaluative criteria
within Dickie's theory echoes a concern within the Artworld's membership about a similar lack of evaluative criteria, particularly with the
rise of Anti-Art and Conceptual movements.

As we have seen, both of

these movements have challenged the primary convention by either negating the autonomy of the artwork or denying artifactuality.

In do-

ing this, they have also challenged the traditional and conventional
understanding of evaluation of the aesthetic object.

And because of

the quotidian aspects of the objects or acts that these movements and
artists have introduced into

~;e

Artworld, they have provoked a dis-

cussion of art and non-art that precedes a discussion of evaluation of
the aesthetic object.

When empty flower pots, piles of dirt, or the

self-infliction of wounds by the artist appear within the precincts
of the museum or gallery, the focus of discussion must deal with the
issue· of what differentiates these objects and acts from those ex-
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isting outside the Artworld.

The discussion therefore becomes, with

more and more frequency, "Is is art?" before "Is it good art?"

I

think this discussion of differentiation between art and non-art -which is unequivocally a modern phenomena

is what Dickie has noted

with the classificatory sense of the work of art.

What he has not

noted is that this is a recent development and that such a distinction
would have been as incomprehensible before the challenges to the primary convention as aesthetic contemplation would have been to a Navaho
working on a sand painting two hundred years ago.

He has also failed

to note that the classificatory sense is operant within an institutional framework.

This is what Werhane has underscored in her sugges-

tion that the classificatory has an evaluative connotation -- within
the Artworld.

All of the six classificatory criteria which she has

stated (see page 139 of the previous section) are part of the secondary conventions which govern the Artworld, i.e., the theory surrounding
the creation, presentation and viewing of the artwork.

The classifi-

catorf process is embedded within the theoretical framework of the
Artworld and therefore does not lend itself to a simple "yes/no"
situation.

The complexity of classification within the Artworld may

be better explicated if we look at an example.
The classificatory process, in general as a logical tool, is
usually used to establish a general category and the features which
help to distinguish items within the category from those outside.
These distinguishing characteristics are also used to establish subcategories and their relationships.

For example, if one instituted

a category as "chair," one would look for features which would dis-
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tinguish a chair from a non-chair.

If we described chair features as

a seat with a back, legs or other support usually intended for one
person's seating, we would then have characteristics with which we
could distinguish a chair from other objects.
do several things.

This would allow us to

First, it would eliminate such objects as stools

(no back support} , floor pillows (no legs or other support) , sofas
{intended for multiple seating}, or other objects which clearly are
not seats such as desks, tables or trees.

Second, it would allow us

to create sub-categories of chairs such as "rocking chairs" or "chaise
longues."

Third, it would help identify the Saarinen chair (a pedes-

tal chair} as a chair even though it looks different from traditional
chairs and is made from different materials.
al~o

And finally, it would

help us to see a relationship between chairs, stools, pillows and

sofas that might cause us to create a category called "seating" where
all of these items would be sub-categories.

In all of these cases, the

concepts and relationships among concepts are simple.
ti~ctions

As finer dis-

are made between chairs for sub-categories, as between a

Saarinen chair and an Eames chair, more of
chairs must be known.

~~e

histor] and theory of

Thus for a simple item, a simple description of

the item is sufficient; for a finer discrimination

or for a more.

complex item -- considerable knowledge of the item is required.

The

concept of "work of art" is very complex because of its changing nature
and the history and theory in which it is embedded.

If we examine the

chair as a work of art within the confines of the Artworld, we can see
~~e

much more complex nature of the work of art.

The first chairs

which come to mind in this context are those which were made by other
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cultures in different times and which have been brought into the Artworld at a later date from their origin.

In this way, an Egyptian

chair and a medieval throne are viewed in the museum as works of art.
They have lost their original context, whether it be symbolic of
power or comfortable seating, and are viewed as aesthetic objects.

As

we have seen, the museum context is a fairly recent occurrence and was
achieved through a complex evolution.

It rests on the autonomy of

the art object and the selection of the best examples available for
display.

Part of the selection process also depends upon the knowledge

of the curator and his ability to make very fine discriminations.
even this comparatively

sL~ple

So

example for the Artworld is a very much

more complex notion than the simple discrimination between chair and
non-chair.

The chair in the Artworld becomes an even more complex

notion when it is used as a motif.

Alan Artner, art critic for the

Chicago Tribune, has noted the use of the chair as a motif in recent
art.

Reviewing an exhibit of chairs at the Museum of Contemporary Art

by artist Margaret Wharton, Artner describes one of the pieces in this
way:
• . • one wall piece from 1975 is a chair that has been cut into
small sections, restructured with the addition of protruding wires
and hung from a single nail. Everything slumps, as if pulled by
gravity like a marionette on a peg. However, once we notice that
Wharton has called the work "Martyr," the wires suggest flagellation as surely as the overall attitude reflects suffering or
death. But whose suffering, whose death? First, the chair's, as
its life as a functional object has been drained through sectioning and hanging; then the entire range of willing victims so
often memorialized in Western sculpture; and, finally, more
humorously, anyone who would think of occupying the seat of so
prickly a chair.
This kind of richness is characteristic of all ~~e works on
show. It gives pleasure not only because much contemporarJ art
is devoid of allusions, but because Wharton gives us many from
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which to choose. Religious references are shawl-to-shoulder with
innocent fun, and as the sculpture matures, there is also the
growing sophistication of the artist's wordplay.S4
An

art

histori~,,

Carla Gottlieb, also comments on the use of the

chair as a contemporary motif within the modern Artworld:
As to chairs in contemporary art in general, it appears that
none, with the possible exception of Rauschenberg, where this
point is intentionally made ambivalent, invites the onlooker to
sit down. ~lis feature separates contemporary from precontempoary chairs. Contemporary chairs are not meant for leisure; they
suggest waiting in tense suspense. Depending upon the artist,
this nonleisurely chair motif may be a rejection of Matisse's
hedonistic goal for art, or a reference to the psychological unrest of troubled times, or many other things.SS
She continues:
None of these comments on contemporary art could be made if
a historical background were lacking; without it, the meaning of
the empty chair as a motif in an individual artist, in a country,
and in contemporary art as a whole, could easily be misunderstood.S6
The point of the above comments, one from a critic and one from an art
historian, is the complex nature of the work of art and how the work
of art is understood through an understanding of the secondary conventions.

Artner has described a re-assembled chair as void of any

utilitarian purpose yet viable as an aesthetic object within the museum
context.

The viability in large part is due to its title and the al-

lusions which it has created.

Gottlieb directly points to the involve-

ment of history and theory in the understanding of the artwork.
states

~~at

without an understanding of

~~ese

She

secondary conventions, the

meaning of contemporary art could be easily missed or misunderstood.
In other words, removed from the museum context, the work might not be
recognized as a work of art at all.

I think all of this demonstrates

the necessity of the secondary conventions in making the classification
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of art and non-art.
Furthermore, evaluation has been present within the secondary
conventions since the advent of the Artworld.

In the discussion so

far, I have stated that the evaluative sense of classification resides
in the theory which surrounds the creation, presentation and viewing
of the artwork.

I have not mentioned the handling of plastic elements,

the other portion of the secondary conventions.

This is because the

handling of plastic elements is the normal location for the discussion
of evaluation within the arts.

How well or how poorly the artist has

handled the plastic elements -- albeit within the movement -- is what
concerns the artist, the critic, the curator and the general viewer.
If we make this kind of distinction between the secondary conventions,
we can still allow a classificatory sense of the work of art within the
confines of an institutional theory.

The classificatory sense refers

to the theory surrounding the creation, presentation and viewing of
the artwork.
notations.

As has been noted, this involves some evaluative conHowever, the normal usage for the evaluative sense invokes

the handling of the plastic elements.

Thus, while the two areas are

related, Dickie's evaluative sense can be applied primarily to one, i.
e., the handling of the plastic elements.

Moreover, what this dis-

tinction underscores is the lack of a formal notion of an institution
in Dickie's theory.

Dickie has defined the work of art in terms of

the institution in which the work is embedded.

Yet, he has failed to

describe the institution in the richness of its traditions, history,
~~eories

and conventions.

I would like to suggest that the Artworld is a more formal
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structure than Dickie has described.

The usual meaning of "formal" is

that which is conventional or in accordance with conventional requirements.

It is in this sense that the Artworld of Dickie's description

lacks dimension and definition.

Dickie has called the Artworld a

social practice, or an institution, yet has failed to give substance to
these terms.

In order to expand these terms, and hence our idea of the

Artworld, I would like to turn to two definitions offered by John
Rawls:
I use the word "practice" • • • as a sort of technical term meaning any form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines offices, roles, moves, penalties, defenses, and so on, and
which gives the activity its structure. As examples one may think
of games, rituals, trials and parliaments.57
At a later date, Rawls has defined an institution in the following
manner:
Now by an institution I shall understand a public system of rules
which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties,
powers and immunities, and the like. These rules specify certain
forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden; and they provide for certain penalties and defenses, and so on, when violations occur. As examples of institutions, or more generally
social practices, we may think of games and rituals, trials and
parliaments, markets and systems of property.58
While Rawls formulated both of these definitions within the context of
a theor] of justice, I think they provide a good framework with which
to discuss the Artworld.
In Rawls' definition he speaks of a "system of rules" which
helps to structure the activity.

In games, the system is easy to see

and it is equally easy to recognize the system in trials and parliaments.

With ritual we can readily accept a system of rules --

~~at

they exist -- but I think we may find them harder to describe or to
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name except in the instance of specific examples.

Thus a person may

not be able to describe "rules for rituals" but could describe the
rules present in a Roman Catholic mass, a bar mitzvah, or a wedding
ceremony.

And I think another name for this system of rules might be

"conventions."

Thus we might say that the primary convention of a

Roman Catholic mass is the understanding shared by the priest and the
congregation that they are engaged in a certain kind of formal activity. 59
I think that the system of rules in Rawls' definition may be
taken as an equivalent for Dickie's conventions.

However, the notion

of rules in the Artworld seems rather harsh and alien, even when called
conventions.

Rules seem to connote a structure that is unchanging and

inflexible and, as we have seen, the Artworld is evolutionary.

Working

from Rawls' definition of a practice, Thomas Morawetz60 has distinguished between several kinds of practices and I think these distinctions may be an aid in clarifying the nature of the Artworld.

He first

describes a practice which is game-like in that it has constitutive
rules which must be learned before the game is played and must followed during the game.

They are simple, unambiguous, cannot be justi-

=ied individually, and give to the participant an "internal" point of
view.

On the other hand, Morawetz contends that there are other prac-

tices, like law and language, which are different from games.

He sug-

gests that becoming a practitioner of these is an acquisition of bevavior that is appropriate to the practice.

Morawetz notes:

To say that becoming a user may be a matter of acquiring a way of
behaving is not to deny that a user of English will have an internal point of view. Being an English speaker involves more than
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emitting appropriate sounds regularly (i.e., behaving as if one
were following a rule); it is also a matter of being able to
criticize misuse by others and to ask appropriate questions.61
He also makes a further distinction:
In brief, the internal point of view of the language user consists not in knowing a definitve set of rules but in having the
notion of a rule of language. To one who lacks the notion all
languages have the character of noise. To one who has the notion
of language, particular languages are examples of practices.
Thus, a language user may be able to identify a totally unfamiliar language as language. 6 2
This way, recognition of the practice as practice becomes important as
well as a proper understanding of the practice.

Morawetz also notes

that rules for the second kind of practices are not a set of definitive
and interlocking constitutive rules but rather are an approximate description of what is done in practice:
The suggestion here is that in practices of the second kind
• of
rules codify and structure the actual practice, but no set
rules is definitive or constitutive of the practice. In these
practices, and not in games, the practice evolves, the rules
change, through the participation of the participants themselves.
While the rules of ches~ or baseball may evolve or change, they
do so of necessity outside and not within particular instances of
the game. The rules of practices of the second kind are in a
sense malleable and change with usage.63
It should be noted that Morawetz refers to the rules of language and
law as an approximate description of what is commonly accepted in practice.

This may seem to be a simple description of how those engaged

in the practice behave, however, upon examination, I do not think this
is what he had in mind.

A rule-book is definitive in that it gives

simple "yes/no" answers as to whether something is permissable or not.
A dictionary or codification of law provides a more complex answer -and also sometimes provides the basis for an argument to be advanced
which would eventually change the rJles.

If this were not true, lan-
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guage and law would be mechanical, inflexible and unchanging.
should also be ncted that changes in the

r~les

It

of language and law de-

velop slowly and are subject to the scrutiny of authorities in the
field.

Thus I think that we can say that the rules for language and

law are not simple descriptions of common usage but rather complex descriptions of what has become accepted usage.
Morawetz bases the evolutionary character of rules of language and
law on the infinite number of situations in which they are involved.
Unlike games which have a finite number of situations, both language
and law are involved in situations which are as varied as human nature.
It is this variety which gives la."lguage and law an "open texture."

He

notes:
[The second kind of practice] evolves because it embraces an unforeseeable range of situations in which its rules have employment for social ends. The rules must have open texture and allow
indefinite application.64
I believe

~~at

the Artworld belongs to the second kind of prac-

tices which Morawetz has described.
world has in common

wi~~

the primary conventions of language and law

the defining nature of the practice.
mary convention of

~~e

The primary convention of the Art-

While we may say that the pri-

Artworld is the creation and viewing of the

autonomous artwork, we may also say that the primary conventions for
language and law respectively are human communication and social order.
This is what Morawetz has described as "employment for social ends" and
is basically an unchanging convention in each of these practices.

The

primary conventions of all of these practices define the practices and
are logically prior to the practices.

If the primarJ convention was
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changed at all, it would also change the practice.

However, the se-

condary conventions of these practices are subject to change and have
the open texture which Morawetz has described.

As we have seen, the

handling of the plastic elements and the theory surrounding the creation, presentation and viewing of the artwork have changed dramatically
over the last hundred years.
to

~"l

Spiral Jetty would be as incomprehensible

eighteenth century French artist as the word "anti-es.tablishment"

would be to a speaker of Middle English or corporate law to the signers
of the Magna Carta.

In each case, the secondary conventions surround-

ing the practice have changed as the need for new applications have
been formed within the society.

I think that we can therefore include

the Artworld within the group of practices which include language and
law and note that their open texture comes from the evolutionary nature
of their secondary conventions.
With the above distinctions in mind, we can return to Rawls' definition.

In formulating this definition, he has also noted some con-

ditions which are important to the definition.

He suggests that the

system of rules must be known to the participants of the practice:
In saying that an institution . • • is a public system of rules,
I mean that everyone engaged in it knows what he would know if
these rules and his participation in the activity they define
were the result of an agreement. A person taking part in an institution knows what the rules demand of him and of the others.65
Elsewhere he has noted that these rules must be teachable, that is, they
must be able to be taught as a coherent body of information. 66

Yet

Dickie has described the learning of the conventions as being "picked
up in an unself-conscious way."

Does the Artworld have conventions

which are taught and are publicly known?

I would answer "yes."

In the
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legal world, there are law schools for practitioners, publication of
laws and theory surrounding them, and a certain amount of instruction
(both formal and informal) for laymen.
the Artworld.

There are also equivalents in

There are schools of art for practitioners from those

which are self-contained (the School of the Art Institute of Chicago)
to those which are part of larger educational structures (a Fine Arts
Department of a university).

There is even a major open to art stu-

dents which is known as art education.

There are also publications

within the Artworld from art history texts to theoretical studies by
artists, art historians and philosophers.
vide an

~~alysis

Exhibit catalogues also pro-

of the works included in the exhibit, and magazines

and journals are published which discuss current trends in the Artworld as well as past movements and artists.

And there is instruction

provided for laymen in the form of art education in primary and secondary schools, continuing education programs and programming on the
arts on both commercial television and PBS.

Therefore, I would suggest

that there is a coherent body of conventions which may be taught,
which are public and which yield conventional behavior within the
practice.

Moreover, I would suggest that these conventions are not

picked up haphazardly but are learned conventions.

A child learning

a language must first understand that language is a form of human
communication, then grasp certain basic fundamental rules and gradually
increase his expertise.

While instruction at the fundamental stage is

mostly informal in nature, the continuing education in language is
normally more formal, i.e., classroom instruction in the language arts.
~~

adult's use of language greatly reflects the sophistication of the
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learning of language he has accomplished.

While I hesitate to draw

a direct parallel between learning the conventions of language and the
Artworld, I would suggest that they are in some ways alike.

One must

first realize the existence of the primary convention, whether it is
human communication or the creation and viewing of the autonomous work
of art.

Then the secondary conventions of the practice must be learned

and the end proficiency in the practice is dependent upon how well the
secondary conventions are learned.
Rawls has also noted that the "rules of practices are logically
prior to particular cases."

He states:

Now what is meant by saying that the practice is logically prior
to particular cases is this: given any rule which specifies a
form of action (a move) , a particular action which would be taken
as falling ~~der this rule given that there is the practice would
not be described as that sort of aetion unless there was the
practice. 66
As examples, Rawls cites actions which are described as belonging to
the game of baseball.

While it would be possible to swing a piece of

wood in everyday life, it would only be possible to "strike out" within the game of baseball.

The term "strike out" takes its meaning from

the practice in which it exists.

Thus Rawls states: "unless there is

the practice the terms referring to actions specified by it lack a
sense." 67

I think Rawls' assertion can be applied to not only actions

•11ithin a practice but also to roles in the practice.

A "batter,"

''shortstop," and "umpire" also have meaning within the game of baseball.
In a like manner, "lawyer," "Supreme Court Justice," or "litigant" have
their meaning within the practice of law, as do the terms "bring suit,"
"prosecute," and "overrule."

The Artworld, as I have described it,
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also has equivalents.

"Critic," "curator," and "sculptor" are terms

which find their meaning within the Artworld as do "openings," "exhibitions," and "reviews."

For example, a person.might view a work

of art and give his opinion of it.

I think this would parallel the

situation in Rawls' example where a person swings a piece of wood.

The

person is not "reviewing" the artwork any more than the person with the
piece of wood is "striking out."

A review is written by someone with

expertise and is meant to be published.
within the Artworld.

The concept "review" belongs

Moreover, if the Artworld were not a practice,

there would be no actions or roles describable as belonging to the
practice.
To return to Rawls' definition, he has stated that a system of
rules defines "offices, roles, moves, penalties and so on" within the
practice.

I would suggest that proficiency within the practice, that

is,varying degrees of expertise concerning the conventions, serves to
delineate offices and roles.

Within legal practice there are examples

of offices (judge, prosecutor) and roles (defendant, jury).

The posi-

tions which can be considered offices are those which demand a high
degree of expertise in the field.

Thus a judge is assumed to be ex-

pert and to use this highly developed knowledge to render his decisions.

Prosecutor and defense counsel are also expected to be know-

ledgeable and to use their knowledge for the benefit of their clients.
On the other hand, defendants and jury are not expected to be experts.
In most jury trials, both counsels present not only factual material
but points of law and after

~~e

summations, the judge

instr~cts

the

jury in the points of law which they must consider to come to their
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verdict.

There are also positions within the practice of law which

require various amounts of expertise.

These positions can include

court reporter, bailiff, clerk to the judge or secretary to the defense counsel.
areas of law.
~~owledge

Each of these has knowledge applicable to more specific
For example, a law secretary may have a much better

of legal terms than the layman, but may not have the know-

ledge of the law in general to present a case for trial.

The mechanism

of law is dependent upon all of these offices and roles, but some have
more responsibility than others for the final disposition of the case.
In a like way, we may describe offices and roles in ritual.

Offices

may include bishop, rabbi, minister; roles may include member of a
congregation, engaged couple, godparent.

In ritual it would seem

that office holders also have more expertise and knowledge of the conventions involved.

However, with language it would seem more difficult

to describe offices and roles.

Obviously most people fit within the

category of user of language.

But one would expect a greater amount

of expertise and facility with language from some speakers, i.e.,
teachers of language, linguists, or lexicographers.

I would suggest

that these experts occupy the offices within the practice of language,
but that they are more difficult to identify because they are not
voted into or appointed to a specific office that has a title.
they certainly have influence in the practice of language.

Yet,

They also

have certain credentials and an amount of experience within the field.
If we take the notion of office in this broad sense, not just as an
appointed position with a title, I think that we can say there are
offices within language practice and that they are predicated upon an
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expert knowledge and the quality of experience in the field.
I think that the same general analysis may be said of the Artworld.

The office holders of the Artworld are those who publicly pre-

sent and analyze works of art.

For the visual arts at this time, these

people are museum curators, art critics, gallery owners, art historians
and philosophers of art.

As with the other practices discussed above,

I think these offices are based on expertise and the quality of experience in the practice.
declare himself one.

For example, a museum curator does not just

He gains sanction and authority from the Art-

world in much the same way a judge gains sanction and authority from
the legal world.

He studies and obtains knowledge of the field, very

often receives accreditation at

~~e

formal completion of his studies,

works in a position of lesser responsibility for a time, and gradually,
through the work he has accomplished and the reputation he has achieved,
may be promoted to positions with greater responsibility.

The point is,

a member of the general public does not walk into a museum and appoint
himself curator or director of the museum.
pertise is needed for the position.
fices within the Artworld.

A great amount of ex-

The same holds true for other of-

What of the roles within the Artworld?

I

would suggest that the roles are occupied by museum goers, readers of
art history and criticism and those who in a general way are learning
about the visual arts.
congregation.

In many ways they are like the members of a

Members of a congregation meet periodically to partici-

pate in a specific public ritual but also spend time on their own pursuit of other rituals which are related to communal activity.
r~cw

They

enough theory about the practice to follow the precepts of the
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practice and to distinguish between their congregation and another one.
There also exists within the congregation those who are nominal members
and those who are sustaining members.

In other words, there is a great

variance in the amount of actual participation by members, yet all
members in some degree identify with the congregation.

I would sug-

gest the same holds true for members of the Artworld.

They are aware

of the primary convention and have at least some knowledge of the secondary conventions; in other words, they to some degree identify with
the Artworld and they are self-conscious about their participation in
the practice.

It should be noted that this is not a well-defined area.

There is not a register of members of the Artworld and there is not a
way of determining a basic level of Artworld literacy.

However, I

think that we can distinguish members from non-members by their recognition of the primary convention, at least some knowledge of secondary
conventions and the fact that they are self-conscious participants.
It should also be noted that people who fill staff positions within the
Artworld may be described as exactly that

they are part of the

mechanism which operates the Artworld and their actual membership is
contingent upon their own participation in the broad concept of the
Artworld, not within the confines of their specific jobs.
So far, I have not mentioned the position of the artist within
the Artworld.

Clearly, the contemporary artist perceives the position

of the artist as central to the Artworld, as essential.
creation of the work of art, there would be no Artworld.
of the artist is made to be displayed to the public.

Without the
The creation

If we were to

use a sports analogy, the position of the artist would be parallel to
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t.~e

playmaker.

Within law the "playmaker" would be the litigant who

has brought suite; within language, it would be the person who has
"coined" a new word -- for example, Baumgarten and "aesthetics" -- or
in some way caused a change in the language.

In these examples, the

common thread might be said to be the initiation of an action or the
creation of an object which is central to the practice.6 9

It is this

position that the artist possesses within the Artworld -- as initiator
of the move.

There are then three distinct areas of participation

within the Artworld: as an office holder, as a member, and as an initiator.

These three areas correspond to what I have called presenter,

audience and artist.

All of these positions are dependent upon rec-

ognition of the primary convention of the Artworld and delineated by
the degree of knowledge of the secondary conventions.
This brings us to what Rawls has called "the rights and duties,
powers and immunities" within the practice.

I think this general

notion of "moves" within the practice is what Dickie has called conferral of status as candidate for appreciation.

But while Dickie sees

this as a totally egalitarian process -- any member of the

~tworld

can

confer candidacy -- I think that conferral is a much more formal process and one that conforms to the idea of rights and duties of offices
and positions.

I believe the artwork is given status as a candidate

for appreciation by virtue of its public presentation as candidate.
It is given public presentation by the office holders in the Artworld.
The critic's office may be described by its responsibility to inform
and educate the members of the Artworld.

He also confers status on the

artwork by fulfilling the duties of his office, that is, by publishing
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his decisions about the artwork.

The curator also confers status by

placing an object within the museum.

The gallery owner does likewise.

The art historian or theoretician confers status by discussion of the
artwork in their publication.
In each of these cases, the office holder offers justification
as do office holders in language and law.

In the case of the critic,

justification is central to publication and is inherent to the office
of critic.

Justification can also be found in exhibit catalogues pub-

lished by museums, and occasionally by galleries.

Art historians and

theoreticians offer justification in the same way any scholar does,
through a logical presentation of
of these cases, is based upon

a~

~~e

material.

Justification, in all

understanding of the secondary con-

ventions and their application to the artworks in question.
The public aspect of the conferral of status is an important
part of the process.

As Rawls has noted, a person engaged in a prac-

tice must know what the rules demand of him and others.
they must be public.

In other words,

Through the office holders of the Artworld, the

conventions become public.

And through these office holders, conferral

of status also becomes a formal and public action.

Conferral of

status in Dickie's description is little more than a general nod in
the direction of an object.

He notes that the conferral is made on

behalf of the Artworld, yet gives no clue as to how one can act on
behalf of this institution without some sort of public announcement,
without some way to communicate this most important function of the
Artworld to its members.

If the Artworld is indeed an institution, the

public conferral of status seems to be a necessary element.
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But what of the artwork which has not yet met the public?

I

would suggest that a work of art has already been given the status of
candidate by the artist.

The act of conferring status for the artist

exists in the act of creation by the artist.

The artist's finished

product may fail his vision, but if he did not believe in his vision,
then he would also negate the intention of creation.

The fact that the

artist calls himself artist and not some other title like plumber or
welder points to his belief that he is creating the autonomous work
of art.

I think that we can say the artist confers status in a private

manner, and that the presentation of the work to the Artworld is the
reaffirmation of the conferral process.

Thus, candidacy is conferred

by public means by the office holders of the Artworld and by initially
private

mea~s

by the artist.

The other members of the Artworld, the

viewers, do no confer status for or on behalf of the Artworld.

They

may indeed make personal judgments which are valid for them on a personal level.

But to insist that they can confer status, randomly and·

on their own accord, is tantamount to suggesting that any member of the
worlds of language, law or ritual could likewise exercise such authority.

Thus we could have any English speaker declaring, on behalf of

all English speakers, that "good" will subsequently mean "bad," or a
motorist, acting on behalf of all
speed limit is now 90 m.p.h.

u.

S. motorists, declaring that the

The result in both cases would be chaos

-- and a negation of the institutional nature of the practices involved.
I have argued thus far that the Artworld is a much more formal
institution than Dickie has described.

To my mind, the keystone of
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this more formal institution is the autonomous work of art.

As we

have seen in the previous chapters, as the art product became the art
object, its autonomy became more pronounced and the conventions surrounding it became increasingly more descriptive of its autonomy.

The

initiation of aesthetic theory underlined the autonomy of the artwork,
a work which was created to be viewed and appreciated.

Our conception

of art assumes the primary convention and functions within the secondary conventions.

It is a phenomena which had its birth in the Renais-

sance and matured primarily in Western society, although its influence
has been felt worldwide by this time.

What of the "creative urge" we

believe to be inherent in all of mankind?

I would agree that it ex-

ists, from the caves of Altamira and Lascaux to Amish quilt makers.
But I think our recognition of the whole range of these works stems
from the Artworld which I have described.

We in fact appreciate

these objects because they have been called to our attention within
the context of the Artworld.

The concept which has united such dis-

parate objects is the museum context.

To a great extent, our percep-

tion of the work of art has been formed by the museum context and by
the attending secondary conventions.

The subordination of the original

utilitarian or ritualistic context to the museum context has made
these works become autonomous works of art.

Otherwise such works may

have remained fragments of foreign cultures, interesting but not part
of the whole range of artworks to which they now belong.

The thread

which binds all of these artworks together is not a concept

li~e

"beauty" or "expressiveness" -- it is the autonomy of the work of art.
~he

concept of an autonomous work of art belongs exclusively to the
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which I have described.
In some ways, the Artworld thus described may appear very narrow or restrictive.

What about the natural creativity of children?

the "Sunday painter"?

Of the illustrator or the graphic designer?

Of
I

do not think there is a simple answer to these questions but that the
understanding of each case will help explicate the boundaries of the
Artworld.
The idea of children as creative visually is a fairly recent
development and one that coincides with the idea of universal education.

It \1ould seem that as leisure time became available to an in-

creasingly large number of children, it was thought that drawing might
be a valuable tool for the child and was often taught as part of the
manual arts.

The idea of a small child, crayon in hand, expressing

his creativity probably has its roots in the progressive movement of
education in this century.

This attitude toward childhood creativity

has been fostered by the teaching of art education in elementary and
secondary schools.

This is not to say that children are not creative,

but rather that it is a recent phenomena and one that is sponsored,
however indirectly, by the Artworld.

The distinction between child

artists and artists is not only one of age and maturity, but of pro-fessional standing.

The artist thinks of himself as a professional.

This distinction also holds true for the Sunday painter.

He will not

describe himself as painter or artist but rather as one who paints as
a leisure activity.

He considers himself to have an amateur standing,

and often has had little formal or "professional" training.

I think

both the child and the amateur painter belong to the Artworld, but
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would tend to be classified as members rather than artists because
they have amateur status.

Children's art may be exhibited and ap-

preciated, but the expectations of the viewers are not the same as
when viewing an artist's exhibit.

The work is rarely reviewed, and

when publisbed normally serves some other context.

While the Sunday

painter may exhibit, it is often in non-juried shows and again the
viewer's expectations are different.

The object of painting for the

Sunday painter may also be a mixture of creating the autonomous work
of art and entertainment.

The same may be said of the child's art.

This brings us to the illustrator, graphic designer and a group
of other persons whose work closely parallels that done in the Artworld.

I would suggest that these persons and their work do not pro-

perly belong in the Artworld, although it is possible that they and
their work may be brought into the Artworld.

This import would be ac-

complished by the office holders of the Artworld.

I think that there

are other "worlds" in which these people function and that the primary convention of each of these is quite different from that of the
Artworld.

For example, I think that we may define an area called the

commercial world which would include a very wide variety of people who
are involved in print and electronic media and product design.

The

primary convention of the commercial world may be stated as the creation and promotion of commercial goods.

The primary convention is

not the creation and viewing of the autonomous artwork.
worlds share some of the
handling of

~~e

seconda~z

plastic elements.

However, both

conventions, particularly the
The end product of both worlds also

can resemble one another to a great extent.

Thus the work of an il-
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lustrator may closely resemble the work of an artist and may be imported to the Artworld where its previous context, that of illustration, is replaced by the museum context and where it becomes an autonomous artwork.

The

sa~e

is true of the work of a graphic designer,

product designer, commercial filmmaker, etc.

It should also be noted

that the commercial world often consciously uses visual characteristics
of particular movements of the Artworld.

An

example of this would be

be recent Chanel No. 5 television commercials which rely on the use of
images related to Surrealism.

In the same way, the Pop movement was

based to a great extent upon methods, materials and images used in the
commercial world.

I think that while these two worlds exist indepen-

dently, they may at times intersect as illustrated

i~

the following

manner:

However, it should be noted that the intersection occurs on the level
of secondary conventions, not the primary convention.
I think there are also two other worlds which sometimes intersect the Artworld, namely those of entertainment and documentation.
Each is primarily concerned with what the names indicate, i.e., entertainment and documentation.

With entertainment, the end product

is less important than the process; with
of the end product is most important.

doc~~entation,

the veracity

A detailed description of these

worlds and their intersection with the Artworld will be given in the
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next chapter using photography as an example.

But, at this point, I

think it should be noted that these worlds exist, that at times they
may intersect the Artworld, but that the primary convention of each
world remains constant while the area of intersection is the secondary
conventions.

A disregard of the primary conventions, or a confusion of

them, may obscure the perimeters of the Artworld.

However, I think

that these intersection points may provide much more interesting test
cases than those posed totally from within the Artworld -- precisely
because they are external to the practice.

Duchamp's Fountain is an

example of a challenge made totally within the Artworld; the challenge
is based on conventions operant within the practice.

Examples within

film, photography, and video give examples of media that exist outside
the Artworld as well as within it, and possess objects which share
characteristics on the level of secondary conventions.
It should also be noted that the Artworld is indeed a restricted area.

Historically, it has been the preserve of an educated elite.

The evolution of a mass society has only served to underscore the perimeters of the Artworld as an area containing people educated to the
history and theories of the Fine Arts.

This is not said as a judgment

of the Artworld nor as a reference to the political aspects of the
Artworld.

There are indeed powerful cliques operating within the Art-

world, but the suggestion that the Artworld is an elitist pursuit is
not based on the manipulations of a few people.

It is based on the

knowledge required to participate in the Artworld and the historical
precedents described in the previous chapters.

The Fine Arts have

evolved as a practice separate from everyday concerns, as a practice
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revolving around the autonomous artwork.

In trying to present a

theory which is as open-ended as possible, Dickie has presented his
artworld also as open-ended and without definable boundaries.
proven to be the

CnL~

of the problem.

This has

I do not think that limiting the

perimeters of the Artworld necessarily close the theory.

It does not

destroy the flexibility of the theory -- or the Artworld -- nor does it
render them less open to change.

However, it does allow a better

analytic tool.
There are two areas where a more definitive idea of the Artworld
would have cleared up what I consider to be misconceptions on Dickie's
part.

The first is Dickie's notion that originality is an antecedent

requirement for painting, and perhaps for other media.

If this idea is

examined in the light of primary and secondary conventions, as defined
earlier, I think we can see that originality is not an antecedent requirement for painting or any other media.

Rather, it is a secondary

convention which has evolved as the Artworld became a more formal institution.

Evidently, Dickie's use of originality is used primarily to

oppose the idea of a forgery: it is not used in the sense of novelty.
I think this is basically a political and narrow sense of the word.
Those to whom

~~is

sense of originality would be most important are

public and private collectors.

It would be important to them not only

on aesthetic grounds, but on grounds of their financial investment and
prestige.

Ultimately, the sense of originality brings into question

the monetar] worth of the object and has little to do with its aesthetic appreciation.

Moreover, while

~his

idea is applied most often to

paintings of past masters, it has found a corresponding application in
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other media.

Both printmaking and photography have broadened the con-

cept by accepting signed and numbered editions of prints and authorized
prints by people other than the original artist.

For example, before

her death, Imogen Cunningham set up a foundation to print her negatives.
While these new prints, imprinted with the foundation's logo, do not
fetch the price of vintage
sidered "collectable."

Cunningh~~

prints, they are nevertheless con-

On the other hand, prints may be obtained from

the LibrarJ of Congress which are made from negatives by some of the
best known photographers of the 1930's and 1940's.

These are not con-

sidered collectable and have no value on the market.

Thus it would

seem that originality is derived not from an original negative but from
some sort of authorization process.

Also, the printing of Moonrise,

Hernandez, New Mexico by Ansel Adams seems to be proceeding ad infinitum.

In both cases, the older printmaking tradition of making a limit-

ed edition and then striking the plate seems to be undergoing a change
at the hands of art photographers.

I think this has enlarged the idea

of originality and points to the fact that originality, especially in
the narrow sense, is one of the secondary conventions.
The other misconception is Dickie's description of the derivative sense of the work of art.

I would suggest that the derivative

sense is rarely if ever used from non-artifact to artifact, but is
normally used from artifact to artifact.
enter the museum context.

It is this way that objects

They have characteristics which resemble

the paradigmatic work of art.

The recognition of these characteristics

enables the office holders to place the object in a museum -- or some
other institutional situation -- where the similarities between the
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artifact and its paradigm work becomes most notable.

They become most

notable under these circumstances because their utilitarian context
has been subordinated to their aesthetic appreciation.

The character-

istics which cause this comparison are located in the secondary conventions, most often in the handling of the plastic elements.

A good

example of the derivative sense of the work of art is one that has
been cited earlier-- the acceptance of new media (film, photography,
video) into the Artworld.

This is because each of these shared some

secondary conventions with media that were already accepted within the
Artworld.

To ascribe the derivative sense mainly to driftwood cases

and other flora and fauna is to mistake its importance in the Artworld.

It is the derivative sense which helps comparisons to be made

between objects not originally created as artworks and paradigmatic
artworks.

It might also be noted that once such an object has been

inducted into the Artworld, it becomes paradigmatic itself, thus extending the concept of work of art by allowing new comparisons to be
made.
I think that Dickie, while providing an important contribution
by his theory's institutional nature, has also made important mistakes
by not recognizing the formal structure of the Artworld.

The Artworld

is not an absolutely egalitarian practice nor can everj act of human
creativity be neatly covered by the institutional theory.

To do so

would negate the very institutional nature of the theory Dickie has
described.

Rather, I think the Artworld can be described as a formal

institution, as a social practice that is definable using Rawls' def~nition

of an institution.

The Artworld is peopled by-artists, pre-
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senters and audience, all of whom are governed by the conventions of
the Artworld.

Membership is limited to those who recognize the pri-

mary convention and who recognize the primary convention and who have
some knowledge of the secondary conventions.
muse~~

Office holders include

curators and directors, critics, art historians and philosophers

of art; these people obtain their offices through their degree of expertise and experience within the Artworld.

The conferral of status

is accomplished in a public sense by the office holders of the Artworld and in a private sense by the artist.

Any object may be in-

ducted into the Artworld through the process of conferral and once so
inducted assumes the museum context, that is, is appreciated primarily
as an autonomous work of art.

Whatever utilitarian context the item

may have had is subordinated to the museum context.

I have also sug-

gested that there are other areas -- the worlds of documentation,
commercialism and entertainment -- which sometimes overlap or intersect the Artworld and that

~~ese

points of intersection may provide

good examples of the delineation between art and non-art.

The next

chapter will explore photography as a case study of the Artworld,
one in which the conditions described above are fully operative and
discernible.
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CHAPTER VI

PHOTOGRAPHY: A CASE STUDY

Introduction

In the past chapters we have examined an institutional theory of
the Artworld.

We have explored the Artworld as an institution, that

is, a social practice and have noted membership, offices, and conventions within the practice.

The role of the conventions, both pri-

mary and secondary, are important factors -- as is the process of conferral of status.

In this chapter, I would like to use photography as

a case study of the Artworld.
within the

Art·~orld

Photography is a relatively new medium

and as such may provide an important view of the

evolutionary nature of the Artworld.

Also, photography has caused many

problems within the Artworld, problems which center upon the nature of
photography, its place among the Fine Arts, and the conventions which
govern photography.

It is the contention of this chapter that the

conventions which govern the Artworld do not always govern all photographic practice because photography does not function only within the
Artworld but also functions in other worlds that have little to do with
the Fine Arts.

In order to delineate the conventions which govern the

Artworld and the sum of photographic practice, we must examine those
areas in which photography functions, i.e., the worlds of entertainment, documentation, commercialism, and art.
I~
1 -~
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A Case Study

To examine the perimeters of photography as well as its induction into the Artworld, I would like to begin with the early decades
of photographic history.

Daguerre introduced his process in 1839, the

early portion of the Victorian age when Romantic painting was much in
vogue.

Daguerreotypes were one-of-a-kind photographs produced on a

silvered plate.

They rapidly became popular for portraits and scenic

views, partially because they were much less expensive than painted
portraits and landscapes and partially because they were so realistic.
By realistic, I am referring to the representational quality of the
photography.

The daguerreotype was capable of capturing even the

smallest detail in a scene; as the optics improved, so did the capability of reproduction of detail.

With Talbot's paper process in 1841 and

Archer's wet plate collodion process in 1851 new vistas became possible: multiple prints could be made from one negative, and two or
more negatives could be combined.

In addition, exposure times were

reduced somewhat so that portraits became easier to pose.
time, photography became identified with documentation.

During this
With photog-

raphy's ability to present a clear, sharp focus, it was thought that
the artist's intervention between reality and its portrayal was not
possible.

The camera was a machine and

~herefore

only portrayed what

was actually present; the reproduction was automatic.

The photographer

did not create the photograph; it was made.
However, after the first thirty years of photographic historJ
had passed, some photographers began to wonder if more could not be
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expected from their medium.

C. Jabez Hughes wrote an article en-

titled "On Art-Photography" in 1861.

In the article he argued for the

expansion of photographic horizons: "Hitherto photography has been
principally content with representing Truth.
enlarged?

Can its sphere not be

And may it not aspire to delineate Beauty, too?" 1

Photog-

raphers responded to this and, perhaps with the mechanical aspects of
photography prominently in their minds, turned not to the paradigms of
Realism but rather to the canons of the Romantic movement.

Allegorical

pieces such as Rejlander's TWo Ways of Life (figure 16) and Henry Peach
Robinson's Fading Away {figure 17) certainly did not fit into the image
photography had as documentation.

Julia Margaret Cameron also produced

a number of allegorical photographs which were influenced by the PreRaphaelites and G. F. Watts.

She produced a great number of portraits

which were quite different from the allegorical scenes.
quite different from the portraits of her contemporaries.

They were also
She used

very few props or scenery, used light in a much more dramatic way, and
introduced a softer, slightly out of focus image.

She stated her in-

tention with these portraits in the following way:
When I have had these men
endeavored to do its duty
greatness of the inner as
The photograph
thus taken
..,
prayer ...

before my camera, my whole soul had
toward them in recording faithfully the
well as the features of the outer man.
has been almost the embodiment of a

The interesting point here is Cameron's desire to photograph the greatness of the inner man, that is, something intangible, something not
readily documented.

Indeed, photography as documentation had nothing

to do with this kind of photography.

It was the beginning of a sepa-

rate kind of photography: art photography.

More and more, art pho-
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Figure 16: Detail, The TWo Ways of Life, 0. G. Rejlander, 1857.

Figure 17: Fading Away, H. P. Robinson, 1858.
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Figure 18: Thomas Carlyle, Julia Margaret
Cameron, 1867.
tography became thought of as a separate entity from the rest of
photographic practice.
led "pictorial" effects

It became associated with what carne to be caldramatic lighting conditions; a soft focus

normally achieved by the use of diffusion lenses; manipulation of the
print which might include retouching, drawing on the negative or combining several negatives; often the use of allegorical themes; and an
expressive quality that reflected the creativity of the photographer.
Art photography, largely through these kinds of manipulations, was
viewed as expressive, that is, dominated by the mechanical nature of
the camera but open to the creative processes of the artist.

By the
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turn of the century, although the use of allegorical themes had lessened considerably, the use of pictorial effects had become synonymous
with art photography.
In Cameron's day, some photographs might have been considered
"artistic" but photography was not considered one of the Fine Arts.
Attitudes began to change in the latter part of the nineteenth century,
but not without a vigorous campaign waged by both amateur and professional photographers.

In 1891, the Vienna Camera Club held a juried

salon and in 1893 the Linked Ring, a London society for pictorial photographers, presented their first salon.

Alfred Stieglitz led the

fight in this country mounting "An Exhibition of American Pictorial
Photography Arranged by the 'Photo-Secession'" at the National Art
Club in New York in 1902.

Stieglitz also was featured in

t~e

"Chicago

Photography Salon of 1900," one of the first museum shows of photography in the United States.

It became an accepted notion that the

hanging and viewing of photographs could be equated with the Fine Arts
salons.

But it was art photography that was hung and titled in such a

manner.

Because art photography resembled some painting, and because

it was hung in salon settings and titled, the shared secondary conventions of art photography and painting became apparent and comparisons were made between the two.
photography as a Fine Art was

~~e

One of the basic claims for pictorial
recognition of the separation be-

tween it and photography as documentation.

A well

~nown

critic of the

time, Charles H. Caffin, underlined this separation:
There are two distinct roads to photography -- the utilitarian and
the aesthetic; the goal of the one being a record of facts, and
the other an expression of beauty • . • Examples of utilitarian
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photographs are those of machinery, of building and engineering
works, of war-scenes and daily incidents used in illustrated
papers, of a large majority of the views taken by tourists, and
of the greater number of portraits • • • Lastly, there is the
photograph whose motive is purely aesthetic: to be beautiful.3
What Caffin has called "utilitarian" photography, I have called
documentary, using "documentary" in a broad sense.

These documentary

photographs imply a factuality, a fidelity to the reality of the moment and the situation.

Examples of using documentary in this broad

sense would include Roger Fenton' coverage of the Crimean War or
Matthew Brady's of the Civil War; Adam Clark Vroman and T. H. O'Sul!ivan's photographs of the American southwest; Charles

~4rville

Eugene Atget's shots of a changing Paris; and Eadweard

M~ybridges'

classic studies of motion.

and

Jacob A. Riis and Lewis Hines used photog-

raphy as a scathing indictment of poverty and slum conditions in the
United States.

Police had begun using photography to identify crimi-

nals, governments to authenticate the death of political insurgents.
Medicine and science also had begun using photography as a documentary
tool.

With further sophistication of printing processes, half-tone re-

productions of photographs were easily possible and news9apers and
journals used photography as an integral part of reportage.

So, we

might say that photography existed and functioned within two separate
and clearly defined worlds -- those of documentation and of the Fine
Arts.

The conventions of both were clearly understood by the public.

The primary convention for art photography would be that the audience
was aware of the distinct aesthetic aims of a particular photograph,
that is, the art photograph was created to be viewed as an autonomous
work of art.

Secondary conventions might be described as "pictorial"
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effects for art photography, i.e., the soft focus, the dramatic use of
light, manipulation of the print and an expressive quality.

Art pho-

tographs were usually found in a gallery or on the pages of an art
publication.

The primary convention of the documentary photograph was

the audience•s awareness of its utilitarian aims.

Secondary conventions

would include sharp focus, natural lighting and a factual reportage.
Documentary photographs were found in the pages of news publications
or in the files of various agencies.
However, this description leaves out Caffin's tourists.

In

1889, George Eastman introduced the Kodak #1 camera, a small hand-held
camera that used film and which freed the user from the development
and printing of his negatives.

It became a common companion on tours,

vacations and festive occasions.

While there is definitely a part of

the documentary process involved -- "we visited such and such a place"
or "this is Aunt Mary on her eighty-first birthday" -- there is another
element involved, that of entertainment.

It is entertaining to view

the snapshots and to show them to other people, and I think entertainment often exceeds documentation under these conditions.

For this

reason, I would suggest that the snapshot be placed in what might be
called the world of entertainment.

I think the conventions of the

snapshot were equally well understood as those of documentary and art
photography.

The primary convention was the understanding of the

audience that the aim of the snapshot was enjoyment of a pleasant
memor].

Secondary conventions might be stated as a complete disregard

of photographic conventions.

As long as there was an indication of an

image, the snapshot was retained in the family album.
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This leaves what Caffin has termed "the greater number of portraits."

In other words, the commercial photographer.

As Daguerre's

process became widespread, commercial photographers used the process
as itinerant photographers or in small storefront businesses.

As the

technology of photography improved, these commercial photographers
used new processes for their portraits -- the ambrotype, the carte-devista and tin-type, and finally the new film and bromide papers of the
1920's.

Joining the commercial portrait photographers was the com-

mercial product photographer, or advertising photographer.

Again, due

to half-tone printing, the advertiser no longer had to rely upon an
engraving of the product, they could use a photograph.

With the evo-

lution of the journal into magazines like Liberty, Fortune, Vogue and
Life, advertising became an increasingly integral part of the publish-

ing process.

Advertisers, in turn, relied more and more upon photog-

raphy to sell their products.

Products and fashion became viable sub-

jects for photographic enterprise.

What can we surmise about con-

ventions concerning commercial photography?

First, the primary con-

vention views the audience as understanding that the aim of commercial
photography is to please the client.
portrait is complimentary.

The product looks good, the

Again, the documentary somewhat exists in

the commercial world, but in a very limited position.

As photographic

processes improved, the ability to ":=etouch" a photograph also improved.

The sitter of a portrait increasingly expected to find lines

in the face softened, if not removed.

The client for a product like-

wise expected the product to look "better" than life.

SecondarJ con-

ventions tended to be more of the documentary variety, although mini-
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mal manipulation of the print was also expected.

Commercial photogra-

phy could be found where people paid to have the image made, as advertising in magazines or product catalogues or in family surroundings.
I think it would be safe to say at this point that four distinctive worlds existed where photography functioned: the Artworld, the
worlds of documentation, entertainment and commercialism.

Perhaps if

we examine an example of each, we can see this type of differentiation.
All four of the following examples show facets of motherhood.
Figure 19 was taken by Hines as documentation of slum conditions
in New York.

The photographer's interest is as much in the surround-

ings of the woman as in the woman herself or her relationships to the
children.

The activity of the people in the picture -- as perhaps con-

trasted with activities of wealthier families -- is also a focal point,
not necessarily as a family activity but as a documented activity, a
moment from life.
Figure 20 is entitled The Heritage of Motherhood and is by one
of the founding members of the Photo-Secession.

It is not just a por-

trait of a woman alone in a barren and forbidding landscape.
a statement about motherhood.

It is

One would expect to see children, a fam-

ily, instead of the rocky landscape and threatening skies, to see a
welcoming attitude in the arms of the woman rather than the hands
tightly knitted together.

One would have these expectations because

of the title and the title in this case acts as an index of meaning in
the same way as painting titles.

The interesting point with this

photograph is that we have no sense of the documentary, indeed, we
do not even know if this young woman is married or a mother.

There is
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Figure 19: Family Picking Nutmeats at Home, Lewis Hines, 1911.

Figure 20: The Heritage of Motherhood, Gertrude Kasebier, ca. 1905.
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Figure 21: Snapshot, anonymous photographer, n.d.

Figure 22: Studio portrait, Farley Studio, n.d.
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no sense of the immediate moment from life, and we expect no sense of
documentation.

This is also a good

ex~~ple

effects in its soft focus and use of light.

of the use of pictorial
It is quite different

from Hines' photograph, which is very flatly lit and uses a much
sharper focus.
Figure 21 is a snapshot where the mother's head has been accidently cropped from the picture by the photographer -- the mother is
standing behind the grandmother with grandson.
the same fate.

TWo other relatives met

While this is not a "slice-of-life" documentation, it

is obviously posed, it is documentation of people who were at a particular place at a particular time.

But the concern of the photogra-

pher was to record this scene for remembrance and the pleasure it envoked.
Figure 22 is essentially the same, only done in a much more
formal setting with the assurance that the family would obtain a good
likeness.

Retouching was normally not done at the time when this

photograph was taken.

However, the photograph was taken at a com-

mercial photographer's studio and the client's satisfaction was the
aim of the photograph.
These four distinct areas remained pretty much the same for a
number of years.

Perhaps the first indication of change can be seen

in the later work of Stieglitz and Paul Strand as they began to divorce themselves from the pictorialists.
challenge
1920's.

c~~e

But I think that the real

with activity in California photography in the late

Several photographers, among them, Edward Weston and Imogen

Cunningham, for the Group f/64, a group dedicated to "straight" pho-
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tography as an art form.

Straight photography proposed an abandonment

of pictorial effects in art photography in favor of the straight appreach, that is, the kind of unn1anipulated photography which had been
previously connected with docmnentary photography.

Paul Strand had

earlier verbalized the message of Group f/64:
Photography, which is the first and only important contribution
thus far, of science to the arts, finds its raison d'etre, like
all media in a complete uniqueness of means. This is an absolute
un~~alified objectivity.
Unlike the other arts which are really
anti-photographic, this objectivity is of the very essence of
photography, its contribution and at the same time its limitation • • . 4
Strand believed that the uniqueness of art photography lay in its ability to capture a much fuller spectrum of tonal values than possible
in other media, and to do this without manipulation or "tricks of the
process."

Straight photography was very different from pictorial pho-

tography.

First, the secondary conventions were changed dramatically.

No longer were soft focus, dramatic lighting and situations or expressive ends dependent upon content considered the secondary conventions of art photography.

Straight photography utilized other con-

ventions, what the photographers felt were more "photographic" conventions and those which had been associated with documentary photography.

Thus, these photographers used large format cameras and small

apertures to obtain great definition and a more extended tonal range.
Important secondary conventions of straight photography would include
an extended tonal range, that is, the most possible steps of grey from
black to white, and the portrayal of a sharp, finely focused object.
Another aspect of this kind of art photography was the objectivity of
the camera.

Documentary photography had long utilized this aspect by
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its ability to capture all the detail of a given situation in a complete manner.

However, it should be noted that the selection of the

situation had always rested in the photographer's hands.

In the case

of straight photographers, the objectivity of the camera. allowed the
photographer to turn his camera on any object, place or person that presented itself.

That object, place or person was portrayed with a

"realism" achieved only by the photographic process.

Weston photograph-

ed such items· as common fruit and vegetables, shells and rocks, parts
of the landscape and household objects.

While this contributed to the

democratization of content, the important aspect of straight photography
was the emphasis on an unmanipulated

prL~t

quality of an object was most important.

•
tic spoon, might be found interesting

in which the reflected light

Thus any object, even a plasnot as an object, but as a

photographic representation.
With the gradual acceptance of straight photography as art photography, several things happened.

First, what had been considered art

photography, that is, pictorial photography, was viewed as
ment whose time was over.

~~is

art move-

It was a style that became limited to a

past development in the particular medium of photography.
example of

~~

A parallel

kind of change in the Artworld would be the change in

the style of painting from Romantic to Realistic or from Impressionistic to Post-Impressionistic.

In the same way, straight photography

supplanted pictorial photography as the basic style of art photography.
Second, while the primary convention of art photography remained the
same, the secondary conventions changed dramatically.

We might think

of the introduction of Impressionism as a direct parallel example of
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such a dramatic shift in secondary conventions.

But I do not think

this is so: while some secondary conventions did change, they were still
conventions of the painterly Artworld.

The secondary conventions of

straight photography had been brought in from outside the Artworld,
from documentation, where they had a contextual meaning all their own.
As a result, the distinctions between documentary and art photography
disintegrated for the Artworld.

The documentary photographer became

indistinguishable from the art photographer because the secondary conventions had become indistinguishable -- and because the Artworld accepted the new conventions.

The "manifestos" of straight photography

were published in a number of catalogues and photography publications.
For many critics and curators, the early secondary conventions of art
photography became transformed and passed the barrier between art and
documentary photography.

No longer were the old conventions, those of

pictorial photography, the accepted conventions for art photography.
The change from pictorial conventions to straight conventions was precisely the shift which changed the way that people looked at photography.

In using the full capacity of the camera photographically and

objectively a new photographic credo was created.

Thus, in the minds

of many critics and curators there no longer existed two separate
kinds of photography -- only Photography.
A good example might be Eugene Atget, a photographer who documented Paris from 1898 until shortly before his death in 1927.

After

an unsuccessful career in the theatre and a short stint as a painting
student, Atget turned his attention to photography, becoming in essence the first freelance photographer.

He pinned a sign over his door
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saying "Documents for Artists" and proceeded to photograph Paris,
selling his prints to artists, for post cards, for books about Paris,
or to various collections of Paris museums.

Man Ray, an artist in-

volved in exploring the photographic medium was one of the first to
recognize Atget's work as more than "mere" documentation, but it was
Berenice Abbot who fought to bring Atget's work to public notice.

She

was not successful in his lifetime, but her continued efforts produced both shows and books of his work.

In 1968 the Museum of Modern

Art acquired the 1,300 negatives and several thousand prints which
Abbot had preserved.

Other museums, notable the photographic division

of the Victoria and Albert Museum in London, are now scrambling to
"re-collect" prints Atget sold around the turn of the century as documents of Parisian monuments.

Atget, originally viewed as just another

documentary photographer, was brought into the Artworld.

It is in-

teresting to note that some controversy has arisen recently when new
prints from Atget's negatives were produced.

John Szarkowski and

Maria Morris of MOMA have been working with the whole body of Atget's
work, not just the more "artistic" negatives embodied in Abbot's collection.

They have found what they feel is a new approach to the

large body of work.

They feel that they have found an artistic matura-

tion in Atget's work that reflects a shift of emphasis from documentation to artistry.

How much of this shift is Atget's and how much is

due to the changing conventions of photography, and therefore what
Szarkowski and Morris are looking for, is a moot point:if the conventions had not changed, any discussion of Atget's work as art would have
been impossible.
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Figure 23: Aerial view of mud flats, St. Brieuc, France, U.S. Air Force,
1944.

Figure 24: Artichoke, halved, Edward Weston, 1930.
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Another example which shows the change from documentary to art
photography is figure 23, which is an aerial shot of France taken during World War I I for reconnaissance purposes.

Beaumont Newhall, a

noted historian of photography, comments:
Most aerial photographs are dull enough records. But when the
ground possesses a rich pattern, we can often select from photographs taken purely for scientific purposes some which will appeal strongly to our esthetic imagination. Many of the aerial reconnaissance photographs are of intrinsic beauty. They were taken
by pilots high above enemy territory flying straight and level on
a predetermined course while three automatic cameras made exposures at intervals of a few seconds • . . Each single print •
is not an independent picture, but merely one unit of a series
from which interpreters could extract military information. The
pictorial quality which we see is a by-product • • • Scientific
photographs taken through the past hundred years are basically
similar; it is our acceptance of them as esthetic revelations
which is ~ew.s
In other words, because of the museum context and the similarity of
secondary conventions, we may now view the most mechanically produced
shots as art photography.
in a museum, we are

~o

When we view an aerial view of mud flats

longer viewing it as factual data but rather

as an abstract representation, a beautiful pattern.

We might even as-

sociate it with work like Weston's Artichoke, halved (see figure 24).
This is a good example of the derivative sense of the work of art:
when placed together in the same context, both the mud flats and
Weston's print share many of the secondary conventions.

The viewpoint

has changed and the viewer's expectations have changed because of the
muse~~

context.

Information is no longer the goal, aesthetic interest

is.
The logical conclusion of this attitude can be seen in the exhibit Evidence, shown throughout the country between 1977 and 1980.
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The show featured photography that had originally been produced as
documentation for police departments, product testing services and the
like.

The published account of the exhibit is as follows:
Surprise, which appears to be the common base of both creative behavior and our response to what is called comedy, is often resurrected out of the familiar by relating the familiar which we have
taken for granted to a~ unfamiliar context; it is this context,
the circumstantial, which so often blinds all but the "child" in
us each, which is sometimes the sole impulse that allows us to
see the evident: "the emperor is naked."6

Thus, the point of the show was to demonstrate the shift in context
from documentary to art using photography.

~ne

exhibit included such

pictures as one of a man with a bag over his head and a hand holding a
torch trying to burn

~~e

bag and one print which included several hos-

pital beds and medical implements in the middle of a field with several
people dressed as nurses sitting on a parkbench nearby.

Either of

these photographs, if viewed from the Artworld, had a definite surreal
quality to them.
surreal

Yet, the original context was the opposite of the

it was supposed to the reality of a testing situation.

Alan Artner, art critic for the Chicago Tribune, reviewed the exhibit
and commented:
. . • context is everything. It provides the vocabulary. In corporations and government agencies, the words are task-oriented.
One does not think of terms like "surreal," "poetic," or "abstract." But at a museum they naturally come to mind, laying a
conceptual base from which comparisons are made. 7
The concept of the museum context could not be better stated that this
brief comment by Artner.

Regardless of the original purpose, the new

context of the work shown in this show places it in the Artworld.

The

greater the resemblance of secondary conventions, the easier it becomes to induct the work into the Artworld using the derivative sense
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of the work of art.
But what of the other side of this process -- documentary photography?

Is all documentary photography necessarily art photography?

I believe the answer is "no."

Documentary photography has still main-

tained its primary convention, i.e., that it is to be used as a document.

Medical researchers may be impressed by the beauty of a bac-

teria magnified by a microscope, but the photography of that bacteria
is primarily intended to give researchers information.

The utilitarian

purpose of documentary photography remains its primart purpose.

I

would suggest that this is one of the cases where the worlds of documentation and art intersect.
areas that intersect.

Each remain a separate entity but have

The question arises at this point whether any

art photography could be used as documentation.
"yes."

I think the answer is

Julia Margaret cameron's portraits of Victorian English writers

and painters certainly function as

coc~~ents

of the age.

I have suggested that there are also worlds of entertainment and
commercial photography which exist separately from the world of art
photography.

I think that these worlds also have areas of intersection

with the Artworld.

In 1967 there was a group show at MOMA of work done

by Diane Arbus, Garry Winogrand and Lee Friedlander.

This is heralded

as the public birth of the "snapshot" school of art photography.

It

is difficult to describe this movement as anything but anti-photographic, especially when one considers that the secondary conventions sur-

rounding art photography at the time were those of straight photography.
The secondart conventions of this new kind of art photography, i.e., the
snapshot school, relate very closely to what I have described as the
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secondary conventions of entertainment photography -- anything is acceptable as long as there is some sort of image.

Winogrand's and

Friedlander's work was uncomposed, out of focus, grainy and accidental.
As with the previous succession of style, the new snapshot school borrowed many of the secondary conventions of a world external to the
Artworld without changing the primary convention of either.

Tourists

still take snapshots of the changing of the guard at Buckingham Castle
and families still take pictures of birthday parties, graduations or
weddings; art photographers still work to have their work hung in the
museum or shown at a gallery.

In this case too, the secondary con-

ventions of the previous style or movement in art photography were disregarded.

Another result of the change in secondary conventions is

that we find more snapshots from yesteryear being presented in the
museum.

Thus, I think that we can draw the same conclusions for art

photography and entertainment photography as we did for art photography
and documentary photography: the two worlds overlap but portions of
each remain separate entities.
However, it should be noted at this point that the entertainment
photographer is not automatically doing art photography.

The photog-

rapher who takes pictures of the backyard birthday party must be a member of the Artworld, be aware of the conventions of art photography and
then confer status of candidate for appreciation on his photographs to
have his work belong in the Artworld.

Unless these conditions are met,

or unless an office holder of the Artworld confers status upon the
work, the pictures remain in the world of entertainment.
The final world that I have described is the world of commer-
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cial photography.

The intersection between art and commercial photog-

raphy is perhaps the most subtle in some ways -- or perhaps a bit harder to describe because the secondary conventions are so close, and have
been so for a long time.

For example, a magazine ad for a bathtub may

utilize a photography that can only be described as surreal and looks
very much like something Jerry Ulesman might have made.

On the other

hand, the work of an avowed commercial photographer like Avedon may be
found hanging in the museum.
bo~~

Also, many photographers have worked in

areas; Weston and Edward Steichen are good examples of this.

How-

ever, I would maintain that while the two worlds overlap at places,
there are two distinct worlds with two distinct sets of primary conventions.

The attitude of many commercial photographers reflects this

kind of division: they often speak of doing "their own work" which
they view as art photography and quite different from the work they do
for clients.
And what of the critics and curators who evidently have been a
part of this evolution of art photography?

For the most part, they

seem to have ignored the way documentary, commercial and entertainment
photography have been inducted into the Artworld and therefore seem to
have a rather myopic view of photography.

An example of this is Susan

Sontag's On Photography, which is probably the most widely read volume
of criticism on photography.

Yet, it is based on the premise that

there is only one kind of photography, art photography, and that it is
embedded firmly in the Artworld.
On Photography is a collection of essays in which Sontag pur-

sues the various wisps of photographic reality -- as she perceives
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them -- through the history, development and aesthetic of the photographic image.

While there are major themes which recur in the es-

says, the essay form and Sontag's literary approach make it difficult
to neatly categorize these themes.

For our purposes, I

thir~

an ex-

amination of one of the themes, the relationship between art and photography, will suffice.
Sontag's basic attitude toward photography soon becomes apparent -- she believes it to be hazardous for the health of contemporary mankind, especially in xs passive effect on the participatory
nature of mankind.

To her, photography is what Marshall McLuhan would

call a "cool" medium, that is, one without passion or involvement.
She sees photography as the medium modernists have used to "cool" all
of the arts into a non-participatory 9tance.

For instance, she says:

Aesthetic distance seems built into the very experience of looking at photographs, if not right away then certainly with the passage of time. Time eventually positions most photographs, even
the most amateurish, at the level of art.8
In this case, Sontag is not using "aesthetic distance" in the usual
philosophic usage.

To her, "distance" means what aesthetic theory

would normally describe as "overdistancing," that is, a non-involvement
with the experience.

In this passage, she is referring to the ap-

pearance in the museum of what were originally documentary, commercial
and entertainment photographs.

She seems to indicate that the mere

passage of time has elevated these photographs to a place within the
museum.

She takes no note of what Newhall has described earlier, that

is, a new way of looking at these photographs on the part of museum
curators and members of the Artworld.

Furthermore, she extends this
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"aesthetic distance" or non-involvement on the part of the viewer to
photographs not only within the museum context but to all photographs,
whether they are in the family album or on the front page of the morning newspaper.

She attributes what I have described earlier as the

derivative sense of the work of art in a blanket fashion over all
photography, regardless of its context.

Thus, in a description of the

photograph of Che Guevara's dead body which was used by wire services
all over the world, she states:
[The photograph] not only summed up the bitter realities of contemporary Latin American history but had some inadvertent resemblance • • • to Mantegna's "The Dead Christ" and Rembrandt's
"The Anatomy Lesson of Professor Tulp." What is compelling about
the photograph partly derives from what it shares, as a composition, with these paintings. 9
She ascribes this built-in "aesthetic distance" to all photography.

To

Sontag, this distance also indicates a radical leveling of content in
photographs where a picture of a starving child is equal to that of a
garbage can.

She arrives at this conclusion because she feels photog-

raphy is practically lacking all style.

By "style," she means what I

have described as secondary conventions.

To Sontag, all that remains

in the phtcgraph is its content:
. . the formal qualities of style -- the central issue in painting -- are, at most, of secondary importance in photography,
while what a photograph is of is always of primary importance. 10
I think this sentence indicates Sontag's insistence upon art photography as the only kind of photography.

Her refusal to acknowledge any

secondary conventions of photography, regardless of what kind of photography is discussed indicates this narrow perspective.

As a result,

she defines the content of photography as the only convention worth
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discussing.

I can think of no other visual art media where the content

is the defining characteristic.

I think Sontag has set up an impossible

situation in making her judgments from the sole vantage point of the
Artworld, yet refusing to discuss the secondary conventions of photography and subordinating them to content.

She believes that photography

is the major tool of the modernist assault on the Artworld yet does not
concede that this entire matter is internal to the Artworld.

She states:

The museum's naturalization of photography as art is the conclusive
victory of the century-long campaign waged by modernist taste on
behalf of an open-ended definition of art, photography offering a
much more suitable terrain than painting for this effort. For the
line between amateur and professional, primitive and sophisticated
is not just harder to draw with photography than it is with painting -- it has little meaning.ll
She continues:
That all the different kinds of photography form one continuous and
interdependent tradition is the once startling, now obvious-seeming assumption which underlies contemporary photographic taste and
authorizes the indefinite expansion of that taste.l2
Thus, I think Sontag has made a basic error in insisting that there is
only one kind of photography, art photography, and in viewing photography from only one perspective, that of the Artworld.

This provincial-

ism provides a very narrow foundation for the rest of her observations
on photography.

Lotte Jacobi, a well respected eighty-five year old

photographer, shows more insight into the problems of photography when
she states:
Photography is like any of what you call arts. Not every painting
is meant as a piece of art. You paint houses, you paint signs,
you £~int God knows what. It's all painting --but it's not all
art.
A recent article by OWen Edwards, photographic critic, amplifies
Jacobi's statement and also comments on the way specific images from
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documentary photography are inducted into the Artworld, and thus to
art photography.

His article is a review of two exhibitions, one of

photographs of space exploration at Grey Gallery in New York and the
other of NASA photographs at George Eastman House in Rochester.

He

raises the question of whether indiscriminate machine-made photographs
taken without even circumstantially artistic intention can indeed be
viewed as works of art.

He states that machines, or systems of ma-

chines, necessarily involve the human creative spirit and act as
proxies for mankind.

As for artistic intention, he answers in this

way:

Not everything can be art, but much can, and nowhere are the
boundaries more all-embracing than in photography. Many of the
photographs now revered by museum curators were made with little
if any regard for art. Anthropology, advertising, propaganda,
paid portraiture, science, historical preservation, journalism
and o~~er non-artistic pursuits have made artists of Gardner,
Nadar, Atget, Beato, Bellocq, and many many others. Each age
redefines art for itsel£.14
What Ed·'flards has called ''redefining art" I have called the induction of
objects into the Artworld.

Unlike Sontag, this view recognizes an

Artworld, an institution which affects the context in which the object
is viewed.

The change in context changes the way an object is viewed,

substituting an aesthetic meaning for the previous utilitarian one.
This change in context must be a conscious one; one that is

~ased

on

the conventions of the Artworld and also on the recognition of the
utilitarian conventions within which the photograph was originally
taken.
In summarizing this chapter, I think that the most important
point is the existence of four areas in which photography functions,
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each with a different primary convention.

While the secondary con-

ventions of each may at times overlap, the primary conventions have
remained constant.

It is the constancy of the primary convention of

each and the flux of the secondary conventions which have caused confusion to photographers and members of the Artworld alike.

The con-

fusion has been prolonged because, unlike painting, there is no large
body of critical work which takes into consideration the differences
between these four worlds and the areas of their intersection.

Many

critics and curators, like Sontag, have simply assumed the Artworld as
the only context within which photography functions.

This assumption

does nothing to clarify photography's role within the Artwor1d, the
expanding perimeters of the Artworld, or the places where the Artworld
intersects other worlds.

Notes:

1 c. Jabez Hughes, "On Art-Photography," Photography Notes VI
(1861), quoted in The History of Photography, Beaumont Newhall (New
York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1964), p. 59.
2 Julia Hargaret Cameron, "Annals of My Glass House," in Julia
Margaret Cameron, ed. Helmut Gernsheim (New York: Aperture, Inc., 1975),
p. 182.
3

Charles H. Caffin, Photography As A Fine Art (Hastings-onHudson, New York: Morgan & Morgan, Inc., Publishers, 1971), pp. 9-10.
4 Paul Strand, quo~ed in Photography Rediscovered: American
Photographs, 1900-1930, ed. David Travis (New York: Whitney Museum of
American Art, 1979), p. 74
5

Beaumont Newhall, The History of Photography, pp. 167-173.

6

Robert F. Forth, "Afterword," Evidence, ed. Larry Sultan and
Mike Mandel (Santa Cruz, Califcrnia: Clatworthy Co1orvues, 1977), n.p.
7

Alan Artner, Chicago Tribune, November 18, 1979.

203
8

Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: A Delta Book, 1977),

p. 21.
9

Ibid.

1

pp. 106-07.

10

Ibid.

I

p. 93.

11

Ibid.

I

pp. 131-32.

12

Ibid.

I

p. 132.

13 Interview with Lotte Jacobi, photographer, Deering, New
Hampshire, December 2, 1980.
14

OWen Edwards, "New Things To Be Seen and New Ways To See Them,"
American Photographer, November 1981, p. 30.

•

CHAPTER VII

IMPLIC~TIONS

OF A THEORY OF THE ARTWORLD

Introduction

In this chapter I would like to examine the implications of the
institutional theory described in previous chapters for art education.
To do this, I would like to describe the position of art education within the

str~cture

of formal education and the problems that I see as

inherent in the system.

I would also like to suggest that an alterna-

tive to the traditional type of art education may exist.

However, due

to the large amount of material needed to discuss these ideas in detail, I will limit my comments to somewhat broad generalizations rather
than specifics of implementation or curriculum.

It should be noted that

I will use three distinct terms in talking about instruction in the
visual arts -- art education, aesthetic education and visual education.
While full definitions will be given later in the text, the general
use of

t~ese

terms is as follows.

I will use the first to describe the

general system of instruction in the arts as it now exists, the second
to describe instruction in the appreciation of the Fine Arts, and the
third to describe a broad type instruction which is not primarily based
in the Fine Arts.
Art Education
204
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The place of art education within the system of schooling in the
United States is on the periphery of educational practice.

This is due

in large part to the perception of the general populace that art education is inexorably tied to the Fine Arts {the Artworld) and that the
Artworld is removed from the practical endeavors of everyday life.

Ef-

forts to justify the inclusion of art education in a more central position have resulted in the corruption of the ties between art education and the Artworld.
Art education in the United States has had neither a long nor
broad history; it didn't make its appearance as part of the general curriculum until well into the twentieth century.

Before that time, the

general course of instruction in the arts ran the gamut from nonexistent to a tool for education in the trades to a way of obtaining cul-

•

tural refinement.

When included in the curriculum of schools before

the turn of the century, it most often featured drawing geometric figures or other representational forms as an aid to training the perceptual ability of students.

There was a close alliance between the

industrial or vocational arts and art education at this point.

A form

of art education also existed in "finishing" schools in the form of
needlepoint, china painting and genre drawing.

The purpose of this

kind of instruction was the additional Culture and refinement the arts
might give to young ladies.

In both of these cases, emphasis was

placed on copying simple objects from life or artworks already in existence.

The connection between these types of instruction and the

Artworld were tenuous at best.
In the 1920's and 1930's, art education separated from the in-
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dustrial arts and emerged as a study of its own.

This was due in

large part to the impetus of John Dewey and the Progressive movement.
Dewey was instrumental in promulgating the idea of creative expression
in the child to the school system in the United States.
aesthetic theory, articulated in Art As Experience, 1

Dewey's

argued that the

aesthetic was part of every experience and was not separate from everyday activity.

He placed emphasis on the "process" of art, both in the

original creation of the experience by the artist and in the recreation
of the experience by the viewer.

I think, to Dewey, art was expected

to be in the service of experience, an aid to growth in the individual.
The application of Dewey's theories to the classroom by art educators
-- not necessarily as Dewey would have wished -- resulted in various
approaches, from the "laissez-faire" where the child was free to experiment in any direction to "project-building" where art projects
were used to demonstrate facts from other disciplines.

In both of

these cases, aesthetic education as a formal study of the objects, history and theory of the Artworld was not thought to be needed.

In the

laissez-faire approach, aesthetic education was considered an inhibiting factor in that the child might be intimidated by viewing the
products of professional artists.

It was thought the child would

either discontinue his own efforts or suspend his spontaneity and
originality in an effort to copy.

In the case of the art project ap-

proach, the emphasis was placed on the accuracy of the project and not
on aesthetic qualities.

Thus, the production of soap carving of Corin-

thian column, models of medieval castles, or drawings of the first
Thanksgiving had little relation to the Artworld.
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Art education as it developed over the decades came to be understood as a vehicle for the creativity of the child and often took the
form of the two approaches described above.

The justification of an

arts curriculum was based on the idea of creativity as an inherent
human characteristic.

While the expression of this creativity is

normally thought to be the function of the Artworld, the emphasis of
most art education programs and art educators has been placed on a much
broader idea of creativity.

For example, Viktor Lowenfeld has noted a

distinction between art education and the Artworld:
Art education primarily deals with the effect which art processes
have on the individual, while the so-called fine arts are more
concerned with the resulting products. It is then quite logical
to say that art education is more interested in the effect of a
greater and more harmonious organization of the elements of art
on the individual and his development, while aesthetic growth in
the fine arts generally refers to the harmonious organization of
the elements of art themselves. 2
Lowenfeld goes on to argue that the creativity fostered by art education stands as one of the most valuable tools of a free society in
that creativity produces individuality and a broader base within the
individual for problem solving.

This kind of justification, allowing

for individual differences among theorists, is one of the most prevalent
among art educators.

At the heart of this attitude is the assumption

that the processes of the Artworld are valuable to the growth of the
child but the context in which these processes exist is extraneous.
Kenneth Lansing, a well known art educator, has noted this dichotomy:
If art educators justi=y their subject by stressing the value of
the art process, they must admit that one of their objectives is
the production of artists. After all, a person is not engaged in
an art process unless he produces art; and if he produces art, he
is an artist.
By the same token, art instructors cannot logically justify
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their subject simply by pointing to the value of the art product.
They must admit that they aim to develop connoisseurs. The
reason for this is that the full value of an art object cannot
be realized if people are incapable of making critical judgments
about form and content. 3
While Lansing's view is not universally held in the art education community, it does point to the problem.

In attempting to justify art

education programs within the schools, art educators have tried to find
a broadly based and practical argument for the continued existence of
these programs.

The "creativity factor" usually argued provides the

practicality and demoncratic framework needed for such justification
while an argument based on the training of artists and connoisseurs
seems to underline the elitist conception of the Artworld when placed
in the context of mass education.

I think that this has been the cen-

tral problem in art education and is somewhat of a "catch-22" situation.
Art education is certainly derived from the Artworld and is often perceived by a mass audience as part of an elitist pursuit, as something
within the schools that has little bearing on everyday life.

To

ar~~e

its ever]day applications, art educators have had to appeal to the Artworld to demonstrate the universality of the creative spirit in man,
yet could not use the Artworld as a central part of study because of
its elitist connotations.

In other words, art educators have had to

extract some of the processes of the Artworld and distill these practices to a common level of acceptability.
This means that many of the secondary conventions of the Artworld remain largely unknown to students in art education programs or,
in some cases, these conventions may be distorted to fit the dichotomy.
For example, creative genius or talent has been one of the major se-
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condary conventions of the Artworld since the

~~nnerist

period.

The

very idea of a "masterpiece" carries the connotation of a rare ability,
a rare talent.

The general procedure in the Artworld for the artist

of study, preparation, and gradual public recognition is also an indication of the important part talent plays in the Artworld.

Yet, art

education to a great extent ignores this aspect in favor of a more
democratic approach.

The approach of art education becomes "although

not everyone has talent, everyone can be creative."

I am not arguing

against this approach, but rather pointing to the kind of dichotomy
that exists within art education.
I think that other major conventions of the Artworld have been
ignored as well.

Too often, whether it be an analysis of the handling

of the plastic elements or art history or theoretical perspectives engendered by a movement, there is not adequate discussion to make these
conventions understood or related to what the student knows.

I would

suspect that a portion of this is due to the conception that the conventions are esoteric and have little to do with other subject areas
studied.

Another part is the lack of knowledge of these conventions by

teachers, especially on the elementary level.
This last point, the lack of

~nowledge

of the conventions on the

part of classroom teachers is significant because it points again to
the separation of the Artworld from everyday concerns.

This can be

seen in the training of student teachers in elementary education programs.

At most, these students are given six hours of art education

theory and methods in the course of their studies.

This is probably

equivalent to six hours of Greek in preparation to teaching Greek --
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precisely because both "art" and Greek are equally alien to the everyday experiences of most students who are preparing for teacher education.

There is no possibility to teach enough of the basics of either

art or Greek in six hours of academic experience on the college level
to prepare future teachers to teach either art or Greek.

The previous

statement presupposes minimal experience with art education -- and the
Artworld -- on the part of student teachers.

Statistics show that

about 10% of high school students nationwide enroll in an introductory
art class. 4

On the elementary level, few schools employ art teachers

and rely upon the classroom teacher for any instruction in the arts.
Basically, this means that college students who are preparing to be
elementary teachers may have had little previous experience with art
education and the quality of

tha~

training is open to question.

This

results in either a dual agenda in the art education classes where
secondary conventions as well as methods and materials are taught or
emphasis is placed on methods through project oriented presentations.
In either case, the result is a superficial exploration of the arts
especially for those who will be expected to teach art in their own
classrooms.

If this seems to be a circular situation, it is.

The

solution would seem to be more hours required for art education in
elementary teacher education programs; yet the fact is that few hours
can be added to programs which are already over-crowded to meet state
certification requirements.

This is especially true for a subject

area that is perceived as not central to the curriculum.
Another problem exists on the secondary level.
there are very few general survey courses of the arts.

In this case,
Instead, em-
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phasis is placed upon studio courses.

This means that training is

given which is appropriate to practitioners in the Artworld.

While the

handling of plastic elements is basic to these courses, the history and
theory of the Artworld may be given little attention.

In this sense,

the training can become a rather narrow study within one or two media
instead of an introduction to all of the conventions of the Artworld
as well as methods and materials used in the Artworld.

A parallel ex-

ample might be teaching the sonnet form without any reference to poets
who used it or the Magna Carta without any reference to conditions in
England in 1215.

The contextual settings in these examples which lead

to a greater understanding would be lacking.

In the same way, the

contextual setting of the Artworld may be found lacking in many secondary art education programs.
In both elementary and secondary levels of art education the
dichotomy between the exclusive aspects of the Artworld and the need
for a democratic art experience for children have tended to create a
highly distilled program.

The need to justify these programs on the

basis of their practicality has lead to a divorce of art education from
the rich texture of the conventions of the Artworld, thus widening the
gap between the Artworld and the general public.

A resolution of the

dichotomy between the Artworld and art education might be a systematic
instruction in all of the conventions of the Artworld at both elementary and secondary levels.

This instruction might also be designed to

educate students as members cf the Artworld rather than practitioners.
This is not to say that studio experience would be absent

~rom

such a

program, but rather that it would not be predominate in programs as it
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is presently.
Visual Education

Another approach to the dichotomy between art education and the
Artworld might be to remove the Artworld as the sole basis of art education.

Reference has been made in recent years to the "mass arts,"

that is, popular forms of entertainment or those of a commercial nature.
These include movies, commercial television, print media in the form
of magazines, and some mass produced products.

What differentiates

these "arts" from the artworks of the Artworld is their primarily utilitarian context rather than aesthetic context.

In other words,

their primary conventions are different than that of the Artworld.
However, as we have seen, these worlds share some secondary conventions
with the Artworld and at times intersect the Artworld.

In this way,

a particular medium like film can function both in the Artworld and in
the worlds of entertainment, commercialism, and documentation.
fiL~s

Those

which function in the Artworld are classified as art films and

are described by an hauteur theory.
sent the art film.

Films like Persona or

8~

repre-

On the other hand, the large percentage of com-

mercial releases represent both the commercial and entertainment worlds.
Films like Raiders of the Lost Ark, Halloween, and The French Lieutenant's Woman represent the commercial film.

These films have a body of

criticism which reflects some of the secondary conventions of the art
film, for example, the handling of the visual elements, the actors'
performance, and the director's ability to form a unified product.
there is an additional element, that of the utilitarian context.

But
In
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this way, the reviews of a movie like Raiders of the Lost Ark include
the entertainment value of the film.

This is not to say that com-

mercial films cannot be appreciated on an aesthetic level; they can,
but aesthetic appreciation is only one facet of appreciation and not
the primary one.
It should be noted that the classificatory sense of a work of
art, which Dickie has described and which is operant in the Artworld,
is not operant in the worlds of entertainment, commercialism or docuThere is an immediate evaluative sense to these products

mentation.

which is based on their utilitarian context.

In no sense does the

question of a product being a product arise.

A movie is a movie, a

television program is a television program, an advertisement is an advertisement, a spoon is a spoon.

But the evaluation of the product as

good or bad does come into question.

This type of evaluation is based

to a great extent upon the utilitarian context of the product.

In

this way, the entertainment value of Raiders of the Lost Ark becomes
an. integral part of its evaluation.

In the same way, the entertain-

ment value of a television series becomes an important part of its
evaluation because commercial television is thought to be an entertainment medium.

An advertisement is evaluated not only on its visual

imagery but on its ability to sell the product.

The kind of evaluation

usually involved in these products may be described as a combination
of aesthetic and utilitarian factors, using "aesthetic" to describe the
way in which the visual elements of a product are used.

For example,

a spoon may be examined in the light of its aesthetic and utilitarian
factors.

It should be aesthetically pleasing, that is, be visually
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well designed; at the same time, it should be functional, that is,
easy to use, easy to handle, and able to contain a liquid.

Both the

spoon's form and function are equally important factors and both weigh
equally in the spoon's evaluation.
In some cases, the balance between form and function are not
maintained and the utilitarian context becomes the only criteria for
judging the value of a product.

For example, the function of a tele-

vision commercial is to sell the product.

Functional requirements

like the length of commercial time, the necessity of seeing the product,
and the need for viewer identification are all important factors which
contribute to the commercial.

However, some advertisers have sub-

ordinated the form of the commercial to the functional requirements.
The result is the type of commercial which is remembered for its poor
form, that is, a strident or negative presentation which is not pleasing.

The justification for commercials of this type is based on the

flli,ctional factor -- product recognition and retention.

The same may

be said of print advertisements, commercial television programming,
movies, or mass produced products.

The balance between the form and

function has been disrupted.
It would seem that a course of study based on an analysis of both
form and function in the media described above and in mass produced objects would provide a basis for visual literacy.

By visual literacy

I mean a learned response to the visual elements which surround us
daily.

An

evaluation of these media and products would be appropriate

L, light of their nature and because
clude such evaluation.

~,

analytical approach must in-

It should be noted that this type of study

215

would have to be systematic, to begin at the elementary level and to
continue through the secondary grades.

It should also be noted that

the mere addition of video, filmmaking, advertising, graphic and product design to an art curriculum would fulfill the conditions I have in
mind.

Rather, my suggestion would be that these studies would be ap-

proached from the context of the worlds of entertainment, commercialism
and documentation.

One major benefit of such a program may be found in

its relationship to everyday life.

The Artworld may be viewed as re-

mote and inaccessible to many students.

However, the products of

these other worlds surround these students and are present in their
everyday life.

Moreover, a study of this type might conceivably lead

back into the Artworld because the conventions of these worlds and the
Artworld are shared in some ways.

The student would have a foundation

upon which to explore the Artworld, not as an alien territory but one
that has characteristics in common with everyday life.
With either art education or visual education programs, the
major problem remains: the lack of qualified and knowledgeable teachers,
particularly on the elementary level.

For a visual education program,

a familiarity with the worlds of commercialism and entertainment do
not guarantee good instruction.

The teacher must be aware of the con-

ventions that are operant, and must be able to explain them.

The train-

ing of teachers who are capable of this kind of teaching is not easy.
Increased requirement for certification, or for in-service training,
must be based on what is perceived as practical grounds.

A visual ed-

ucation program might be justified on the basis that it could create
educated consumers, but I am not sure that this would be considered a
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totally practical justification.
In the final analysis, as long as the Artworld remains separate
from everyday life, art education will face a basic dichotomy in its
approach and function.

On the other hand, a visual education

progr~~

would be based upon the quotidian aspects of the student's life.
Either approach that I have suggested -- a reorganized art education
program with greater stress on all of the secondary conventions or a
visual education program -- would be difficult to implement.

The

justification of either program ultimately rests on the importance of
understanding of the visual elements which man creates.
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